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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, it is widely believed that those accused
of capital crimes1 benefit from extensive procedural and substan-
1. Because the vast majority of those charged with and convicted of capital crimes are
male, this Article uses the masculine pronoun to refer to death row inmates and defendants
in capital cases. As of April 20, 1994, 2,804 of the 2,848 inmates on America's death rows
(98.45%) were male. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FuND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 1
[Vol. 43
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tive protections, a sort of "super due process" through which every
precaution is taken to assure that the death penalty is adminis-
tered fairly and reliably. Many feel that those protections are, if
anything, too extensive, and that the criminal justice system errs
on the side of mercy for murderers, frustrating the public will by
unduly delaying executions.2 This popular perception is fueled by
the media attention given to aberrational cases, such as those in-
volving O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers, where the de-
fendants have ample personal resources to finance an aggressive
defense.3 Moreover, this perception is endorsed by the rhetoric of
the system itself-especially in the Supreme Court's numerous
capital punishment opinions issued in the last two decades.4
(Spring 1994) [hereinafter DEATH Row USA].
2. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (stating that time-consuming habeas review of death cases makes
"a mockery of our criminal justice system"); see also American Bar Ass'n Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Ira P. Robbins, rep.), Toward a More Just and Effective
System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 159 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Task Force] (quoting Idaho Supreme Court Justice Robert Huntley as saying that
"the single greatest problem the American system of justice faces with the public is the
unseemly and unexplained amount of time it takes to process a capital punishment case");
Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Har-
ris Case, 40 UCLA L. Rv. 295 (1992) (discussing growing concern that capital cases are
litigated for too many years); Linda Greenhouse, Justice Powell Assails Delays in Carrying
Out Executions, N.Y. TiaEs, May 10, 1983, at A16 (In speech, Justice Powell criticized
delays in processing death cases, stating that "[t]he primary fault lies with our permissive
system, that both Congress and the courts tolerate."); Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Urges
Curb on Appeals of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1990, at Al (Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, in urging greater legislative limitations on federal habeas corpus review of capital
cases, stated that "a lag of seven to eight years between sentence and execution in the aver-
age death penalty case represented a 'serious malfunction in our legal system.' ").
The popular belief that it takes too long to carry out death sentences has motivated
several recent legislative proposals intended to streamline the processing of capital punish-
ment cases so that the time that elapses between the conviction of murderers and their
execution is significantly reduced. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, What Ever Happened to
Habeas Reform?, LEGAL TmES, May 16, 1994, at 1; An Attack on the Bill of Rights, SACRA-
Nrro BEE, November 7, 1993, at F3.
3. See, e.g., Barbara Babcock, Equal Justice-And a Defendant With the Money to
Exercise Every Right, L.A. Tnias, July 10, 1994, at A26 (contrasting defense of O.J. Simp-
son murder case with more typical cases); Alan Abrahamson, Simpson Legal Fees Could
Run Into Millions, L.A. TimES, July 9, 1994, at A10; Alan Abrahamson, To Retry, or Not to
Retry, Is the Question, L.A. TMs, January 27, 1994, at B1 (reporting that cost of first trial
of Erik and Lyle Menendez, which ended in hung jury, exhausted Menendez estate valued
at $14 million).
4. See Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposi-
tion of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 798 (1986)
[hereinafter Tabak, Death of Fairness]. Tabak, who has represented several death row in-
mates in post-conviction proceedings, notes that the widely-held belief that the American
legal system "guarantees the fair imposition of the death penalty" is "[a] popular miscon-
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Among those who have witnessed the day-to-day operation of
the death penalty system, however, a different perspective predom-
inates. The process of selecting those offenders who will be put to
death by the states5 has been described by one prosecutor as "ran-
dom, chance, [a] throw of dice;" other observers refer to the sys-
tem as "a sham,"' 7 "scandalous," "shameful," and "deplorable.",,
While elaborate procedures and rules- peculiar to capital punish-
ment have been developed to ensure that only those defendants
"most deserving of death" are singled out for execution,9 in prac-
tice those who have been sentenced to death, as a class, are largely
indistinguishable from convicted murderers who have been spared
the ultimate punishment. 10 As applied, these procedures have done
too little to remove the influence of prejudice and caprice in the
life and death decisions made by prosecutors, judges, and juries in
capital cases.""
Many attribute this failure to the pervasive influence of ra-
cism. Numerous empirical studies have linked sentencing patterns
in death penalty cases with the racial characteristics of the defend-
ant and the victim.' 2 Others point to the distorting effects of polit-
ception," and places much of the blame for this misconception on the United States Su-
preme Court. Id.
5. So far, the death penalty has been almost exclusively a punishment sought by state
officials in state court. As of April 20, 1994, only 13 of the 2,848 inmates awaiting execution
in the United States were charged and convicted in the United States military courts or
federal courts. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 1, 42. It remains to be seen whether this
changes in light of recent legislative proposals that would dramatically expand the number
of federal crimes punishable by death. See, e.g., Carolyn Skorneck, House Votes Death Pen-
alty for 70 Crimes, LEGAL INTELIGENCER, April 15, 1994, at 1. See also 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)
(1994).
6. See Jason DeParle, Special Report: A Matter of Life or Death, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, 2, 6 (1985).
7. See Esther F. Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The Last Best Hope: Representing
Death Row Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 213, 213 (1989).
8. ABA Task Force, supra note 2, at 69.
9. Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Un-
guided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1176 (1991).
10. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EmpIcAL ANALYSIS 3 (1990) ("The problem is that a very large proportion of each
year's death sentences are imposed against defendants whose cases are not among the most
aggravated and therefore the most blameworthy cases."); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE
L.J. 1835, 1840 (1994) [hereinafter Bright, Counsel for the Poor].
11. Numerous studies have demonstrated that an unacceptable degree of arbitrariness
continues to infect results obtained in capital cases. See infra notes 64, 395, and 396.
12. See infra notes 24 and 64 and accompanying text. These studies show that the
killer of a white person is far more likely to receive a death sentence than the killer of an
African-American. Between 1976 and April 20, 1994, 232 persons have been executed by the
states. Of those, 80 were black defendants who murdered white victims, while one was a
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ics on a death penalty system that is administered at the local level
by popularly-elected prosecutors and judges.13 The fear of voter
backlash from an electorate that overwhelmingly supports the
death penalty colors the way in which discretion is exercised by
the central decision-makers in the capital punishment system.1
Still others, such as former Justice Harry Blackmun, have con-
cluded that the problem is more fundamental: efforts to accommo-
date basic constitutional values such as consistency, reliability, and
fairness in the context of capital punishment have spawned consti-
tutional rules that cannot be reconciled with one another and can-
not achieve their intended ends. This view maintains that even if
the lingering influences of racism and politics could be wrenched
from the system tomorrow, the system would still yield unaccept-
ably arbitrary results. 6
Although I share Justice Blackmun's doubts about the death
penalty, this Article assumes that the procedural and substantive
protections that have been erected by the Supreme Court in an
effort to minimize arbitrariness in capital sentencing, if fully im-
plemented, could yield rational, consistent and fair sentences in
capital cases. The problem is that these procedures and rules are
rarely implemented. Without discounting in any way the deleteri-
ous effects of racism and the politicization of capital punishment,
this Article contends that the primary obstacle to the full imple-
mentation of these rules is the chronic and severe underfunding of
indigent defense services by state and local governments through-
out the United States.
white defendant who murdered a black victim (the only white person executed for the mur-
der of an African-American in this country since 1932, when such records were first kept,
through April 20, 1994). DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 5; Jack Greenberg, Death Row,
U.S.A., N.Y. TImms, June 2, 1993, at A19. In addition, 33 of the 37 defendants who have
been charged with capital crimes by the federal government between 1990 and June 1994
were either African-American or Mexican-American. See Harvey Berkman, No Racial Bias
Found in Federal Death Suits, NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1994, at A12.
13. See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
14. See generally David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics: Explaining Payne v.
Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAvis L. RE v. 157 (1992) [hereinafter Dow, When Law Bows to Politics];
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in
American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711 (1990-91); Paul Reidinger, The
Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J., April 1987, at 52.
15. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129-34 (1994) (Blacknun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
16. See id.
17. Of course, racism, the politicization of the death penalty, and the refusal of the
states to provide adequate resources for the defense of capital defendants are closely related
phenomena. Resource deprivation is one consequence of the overwhelming popular demand
for the execution of murderers in the United States and the political powerlessness of capi-
tal defendants; it is also one of the reasons that defense counsel in individual cases fail to
1995]
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The vast majority of those who are tried for capital offenses
are too poor to, pay for their own defense. According to some esti-
mates, approximately ninety percent of those charged with capital
murder are indigent when arrested,"" and virtually all are indigent
by the time their cases reach the appellate courts.1 These defend-
ants are entirely dependent on others for the resources necessary
to develop and present a defense at trial and to pursue an appeal.
While the ultimate constitutional responsibility for providing indi-
gent defense services in capital cases rests with the state,20 state
governments have rarely regarded this constitutional responsibility
as one that carries with it significant financial obligations. Most
states have shifted the economic cost of defending the poor in
criminal cases to individual lawyers asked to represent criminal de-
fendants for woefully inadequate compensation or to severely un-
derfunded public defender offices.2" This policy has had a disas-
trous impact on the quality of defense services provided in capital
cases.
22
To appreciate the magnitude of the financial burden the states
detect and minimize the influence of racial attitudes on sentencing decisions. On the other
hand, latent racial prejudices may underlie at least some of the political support for the
death penalty and the reluctance to provide those representing indigent defendants with the
resources necessary to provide a meaningful defense.
18. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 249 (1991) [hereinafter Berger, The
Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon]; see also Jack Greenberg & Jack Himmelstein, Varieties of
Attack on the Death Penalty, 15 CRmM & DELINQ. 112, 114 (1969) (noting that nearly 100%
of those executed from 1930 until 1967 were indigent); Michael G. Millman, Financing the
Right to Counsel in Capital Cases, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 383, 384 (1985) (reporting that in
California less than 2% of death row inmates were represented by retained counsel); Wil-
1am P. Redick, The Crisis in Representation of Tennessee Capital Cases, TENN. B.J.,
March/April 1993, at 22, 23 (estimating that more than 75% of all capital defendants in
Tennessee are indigent at the trial stage); Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution
of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 59, 70 (1989) (reporting that approximately 90% of those on death row in 1985 had
appointed counsel when convicted) (citing John Conyers, Jr., The Death Penalty Lottery,
N.Y. Times, July 1, 1985, at A15).
19. See Redick, supra note 18, at 23.
20. Over sixty years ago, in the infamous "Scottsboro boys" case, the United States
Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant charged with a capital offense was entitled
to the assistance of court-appointed counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
The Powell Court found the right to counsel in death cases to be a right guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at
71. In the last three decades, however, starting with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), the Court has looked to the Sixth Amendment as the source of that right. The Sixth
Amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. V1.
21. See infra part II.
22. See infra part IH.
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have imposed on the criminal defense bar, the revolution in capital
punishment jurisprudence that began in the 1960s must be taken
into account. In that decade, the Supreme Court was confronted
repeatedly with compelling evidence that death sentences were
meted out capriciously2 s and that the death penalty was adminis-
tered in a racially discriminatory manner.24 The legal assault on
capital punishment culminated in 1972 with Furman v. Georgia,2 5
where the Supreme Court found that all existing death penalty
statutes in the United States violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.26 In the after-
math of the Furman decision, thirty-five states enacted new capi-
tal punishment statutes.2 Four years after Furman, in Gregg v.
Georgia28 and four companion cases,2 9 the Supreme Court passed
on the constitutionality of five of these statutory schemes, uphold-
ing three and invalidating two.30 In doing so, the Court embarked
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICmE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864-1982 205-17 (1984) (reviewing empirical studies pre-dating Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972)); see also BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 80-139 (summarizing results of
both pre-Furman and post-Furman studies).
24. For summaries and analyses of empirical studies conducted before Furman showing
that arbitrariness in the application of the death penalty was largely attributable to racism,
see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 140-97; BOWERS, supra note 23, at 67-102, 205-17;
SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITms IN CAPI-
TAL SENTENCING 17-20 (1989); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 73-77 (1973); Marvin Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Race, Judi-
cial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 119, 126-33
(1973). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citing studies and reports suggesting the discriminatory application of the death penalty);
id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Id. at 417 (Burger, J., dissenting). The Eighth Amendment provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIH.
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). With the recent adoption of the death penalty in New York, thirty-eight
states now have capital punishment statutes on the books. N.Y. S.B. 2850, 218th Legislature
(1995); DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 1. The United States Government and the United
States Military also provide for the death penalty. Id. For a discussion of the feverish legis-
lative response to the Furman decision, see Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 13-19 (1980); Rupert V. Barry, Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legisla-
tive History, 22 How. L.J. 53, 84-95 (1979); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of
the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974).
28. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
29. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
30. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-207 (upholding Georgia's "guided discretion" scheme which
placed ultimate sentencing authority with jury); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-60 (upholding Flor-
ida's "guided discretion" scheme which placed ultimate sentencing authority with trial
judge); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-76 (upholding Texas's "structured discretion" statute, which
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on a course intended to rationalize the application of the death
penalty in the United States through the development of an intri-
cate and unique set of substantive and procedural rules, derived
primarily through its interpretation of the requirements of the
Eighth Amendment.3 1
These rules, designed to ensure proportionality, consistency,
and fairness in the administration of the death penalty, 2 have
transformed capital cases into the most conceptually complex and
emotionally demanding litigation in the United States. 3 Defending
a capital case in the post-Furman era requires mastery of a pleth-
ora of legal, criminological, medical, and psychological concepts; a
commitment of investigative resources that is unprecedented in
the annals of criminal defense work; and a level of expert assis-
tance that is largely unknown in non-capital criminal cases.34 This
required the death sentence for defendants convicted of capital murder if the jury answered
each of three questions posed during penalty phase affirmatively); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
285-305 (invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute); Roberts, 428 U.S.
at 331-36 (invalidating Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute).
31. See infra part I.A.
32. See infra part I.A.
33. See Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 505 (S.C. 1992) (stating that "capital trials
today, as never before, present a myriad of complexities heretofore unknown"). As a recent
report from the American Bar Association noted:
[D]eath penalty cases have become so specialized that defense counsel has duties
and functions definably different from those of counsel in ordinary criminal cases
.... At every stage of a capital case, counsel must be aware of specialized and
frequently changing legal principles and rules, and be able to develop strategies
applying them in the pressure-filled environment of high-stakes, complex
litigation.
AmEiucAN BAR Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES Commentary to Guideline 1.1, at 31 (1989) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE-
LINES]. See Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-
Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 281, 292-
300 (1991) (contrasting demands of capital and non-capital cases); Albert L. Vreeland, II,
Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 626, 645-50 (1991) (reviewing the
requirements of an effective capital defense); see also Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death
Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REv. 695, 696 (1991) (asserting
that "the trial for life" is "the most emotionally and intellectually difficult trial there is").
The Supreme Court's modem capital punishment jurisprudence has been described by the
justices themselves as "exceedingly complex," Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 27 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), even "byzantine." Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2130 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring). One attorney with extensive experience in protracted and complex
civil litigation expressed a common view when he said that "there is nothing more difficult,
more time consuming, more expensive, and more emotionally exhausting than handling a
death penalty case after conviction." THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, TIME AND EXPENSE ANALYSIS
IN POST-CONVICTION DEATH PENALTY CASES 22 (1987) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG, TIME AND
EXPENSE ANALYSIS].
34. See infra part I.B.
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Article reviews data that has been collected in time and expense
studies of capital defense services and posits that in a typical
death penalty case, a defense attorney who takes the procedural
steps and pursues the defenses contemplated by the Court's mod-
ern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can expect to expend at
least 1900 attorney hours to defend his or her client's case through
direct appeal (a process that takes about two years). In addition to
this time commitment, which is conservatively valued at $190,000,
the cost of investigators, experts, and other support needed to
properly defend a death case would likely exceed $40,000.35
Most states that vigorously enforce the death penalty have
done little to help defray this cost. Many jurisdictions provide in-
digent capital defendants with court-appointed attorneys who are
compensated at rates that are well below prevailing market rates
and are frequently insufficient to cover the attorney's overhead
costs for the time spent working on the case-meaning that the
attorney is losing money for each hour devoted to the case.8 6 In
other jurisdictions, the burdens of capital defense are foisted upon
underfunded public defender offices. Public defenders often are re-
quired to represent over twenty capital murder defendants at one
time or handle a felony caseload of several hundred while defend-
ing a capital case. Moreover, public defenders are so poorly paid in
most jurisdictions that defender offices cannot retain experienced
death penalty lawyers.3 7
State expenditures on defense experts in capital cases are piti-
fully inadequate. Authorizations for funds to pay expert fees usu-
ally do not exceed $1000 per case. 8 For a defendant charged with a
capital crime to receive the level of expert assistance required, ei-
ther the cost of that assistance must be paid by the defense attor-
ney, or the defendant must go without. Almost always, he goes
without.
The failure of the states to provide adequate resources for
capital defense has predictable consequences. Although capital
cases are among the most complex known in the law, poorly
funded indigent defense systems as a rule do not attract the best
criminal lawyers. The attorneys defending death penalty cases, as
a class, are less experienced and far more likely to be disciplined
for unprofessional conduct than the bar as a whole.3" More funda-
mentally, even the experienced and competent defense lawyers as-
35. For the calculation and bases for these figures, see infra part I.C.
36. See infra part H.A-B.
37. See infra part H.C.
38. See infra part H.D.
39. See infra notes 328-36 and accompanying text.
1995]
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signed to capital cases lack the resources to subsidize the cost of
defending a poor person facing the death penalty. In litigation that
requires proficiency in many areas of study, capital defendants are
typically represented by lawyers who simply cannot afford to ac-
quire that base of knowledge. In a sentencing process structured
such that it is imperative that the defense be assisted by mental
health experts, the vast majority of capital defendants do not re-
ceive such assistance.40 Trials that should last a month or more are
completed in three or four days.41 Sentencing proceedings that
should be the primary focus of the defense are completed in a mat-
ter of hours, with the defense offering virtually no evidence miti-
gating against the imposition of the death penalty.42
Resource deprivation at the level described in this Article is
nothing less than a state-created systemic defect tainting most
death sentences rendered in the United States. It virtually guaran-
tees that most indigent defendants facing the death penalty will
receive severely substandard representation, regardless of the abili-
ties or shortcomings of individual defense lawyers. Moreover, it in-
jects an extralegal factor-the defendant's poverty-into the
death-sentencing process. The evidence reviewed in this Article
shows that the determination of whether someone is executed in
this country depends as much or more on this extralegal factor
than on any factor relevant to the nature of the defendant's crime
or the defendant's culpability.43 Any system for selecting offenders
to die for their crimes that is so strongly influenced by a legally
irrelevant consideration such as the offender's poverty is operating
arbitrarily.
The thesis of this Article is that the failure of the states to
provide the resources necessary to give effect to the abstract values
of fairness and reliability in individual capital cases offends the
Eighth Amendment. At the core of the Supreme Court's modern
capital punishment jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment is
a constitutional demand for procedural fairness.44 The death pen-
40. See infra part II.D.
41. See infra notes 187-88, 355-56 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 359-85 and accompanying text.
43. See infra part I.B.
44. See infra part I.A. See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (While
"there can be 'no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority
should be used to impose death,'" the Constitution is satisfied "when 'the mode [for deter-
mining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as
possible.' ") (citations omitted); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]e have consistently required that
capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural
fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding.").
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alty has survived as a constitutionally legitimate punishment in
this country because of the substantive and procedural safeguards
intended to assure that it is imposed fairly and accurately. But no
matter how carefully we construct these procedures, they are
worthless unless they are put to use . "A fair procedure translates
'its fairness to the outcome only when it is actually carried out."'45
The actors given primary responsibility for making sure that those
procedures are carried out in individual cases-the defense attor-
neys-are repeatedly denied the resources necessary to translate
theoretical protections into meaningful limitations on the arbitrary
application of the death penalty. As applied in individual cases,
the rules designed to assure procedural fairness are more often
than not merely empty words. The arbitrariness that was found
constitutionally offensive in Furman has persisted, because most
states have been unwilling to pay for the implementation of the
Supreme Court's post-Furman, reforms.
Part I of this Article reviews the specialized rules of modern
capital punishment jurisprudence and the Eighth Amendment val-
ues that underpin those rules. It discusses the centrality of the de-
fense attorney's role in assuring that the death penalty is adminis-
tered in a way that comports with these Eighth Amendment values
and the burden this role entails, and it estimates the cost of devel-
oping and presenting a defense adequate to assure that the capital
defendant's rights under the Eighth Amendment are observed.
Part II examines how most states have failed to provide the re-
sources necessary for meaningful capital defense. It specifically ad-
dresses deficiencies in public defense funding in nineteen states
which have carried out eighty-nine percent of the nation's post-
Furman executions and house sixty-nine percent of the inmates
currently awaiting execution in the United States.46
Part III discusses the consequences of resource deprivation in
capital cases. This section relates empirical and anecdotal evidence
of the chronically deficient defense services provided to poor per-
sons facing the death penalty in the United States. Part IV of the
Article rebuts the common misperception that existing avenues for
the review of death sentences are sufficient to remedy gross injus-
tices produced by our system of capital punishment and refutes
45. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86 (1971).
46. Those states, which are discussed in greater or lesser detail in this Article, are Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia. For data regarding the number of executions that have been carried out in
those states as of April 20, 1994, see DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 10. For data regard-
ing the death row populations of those states as of that date, see id. at 11-41.
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those judges and commentators who contend that it is appropriate
for states to impose the burdens of defending those accused of cap-
ital crimes on the criminal defense bar. Part V reviews the litiga-
tion strategies that have been used recently in efforts to ameliorate
the injustices of resource deprivation and the meager results these
strategies have yielded. Finally, Part VI argues that the focus of
existing litigation strategies has been misplaced and that the
Eighth Amendment's bar of cruel and unusual punishments should
be the foundation for a systemic attack on the arbitrariness and
inequities caused by the states' failure to provide indigent defend-
ants the resources necessary to develop meaningful defenses in
death penalty cases.
I. THE COMPLEXITIES AND COSTS OF MODERN DEATH PENALTY
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Emergence of the Eighth Amendment as the Primary
Source of Rights for Those Accused of Capital Crimes
The ramifications of the failure to allocate resources to the de-
fense of those accused of capital crimes cannot be fully appreciated
without understanding the peculiarities of death penalty litigation.
While the Supreme Court has never found the death penalty to be
unconstitutional per se,47 it has long recognized fundamental dis-
tinctions between capital cases and other criminal cases.48 These
47. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-79 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958) (indicating, in
dicta, that the death penalty did not violate Eighth Amendment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (carrying out execution after first attempt failed not
found to be cruel and unusual punishment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (holding
that electrocution as means of execution not cruel and unusual); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 134-35 (1879) (holding that firing squad as method of execution not cruel and unusual).
Capital punishment was not considered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the
Eighth Amendment and has long been seen as an accepted punishment in the United
States. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-77; In re Kemnler, 136 U.S. at 446-47. While the
effect of the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was to invalidate all
then-existing death penalty statutes, id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting), a majority of the
justices refused to foreclose the possibility that state legislatures could enact capital punish-
ment schemes that did not violate the Constitution. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring); id. at 375 (Burger,
C.J., joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
48. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that capi-
tal cases "stand on quite a different footing than other offenses," requiring that "the law
[be] especially sensitive to demands for ... procedural fairness" when death penalty might
be meted out); see also Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) ("The difference be-
tween capital and non-capital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways
in which the distinction becomes relevant."); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752
(1948) ("In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of
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distinctions stem naturally and inevitably from the oft-repeated
truism that "death is different. ' 49 Doctrinally, this concept sub-
sumes within it at least two distinct concerns. First, because death
is final and irrevocable, one wrongfully punished cannot thereafter
be recompensed by society."' Second, the deliberate act of the state
in taking the life of one of its citizens is of such enormity, and the
punishment is of such severity, that a death sentence must "be,
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emo-
the accused."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932) (distinguishing capital from
non-capital cases in determining that defendants' due process rights were infringed when
they were denied assistance of counsel in preparing defense).
49. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
("[D]eath is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of
criminal justice.").
From the point of view of the defendant, [the death penalty] is different in both
its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any
other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, Stewart, and
Powell, JJ.) (citations omitted); see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)
("The Court ... has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other pun-
ishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing de-
termination."); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983) ("[B]ecause there is a qualita-
tive difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, 'there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.' ") (citation omitted); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 637 (1980) ("[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)
("[Tihe penalty of death is qualitatively different from any other sentence."); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.) ("[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than
degree."); Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (Capital punishment "is unique
in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a
basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all
that is embodied in our concept of humanity.").
While the distinctions between capital and non-capital punishments traditionally have
been invoked to justify greater procedural and substantive protections for capital defend-
ants, several commentators have recently questioned the Court's continued faithfulness to
the "death is different" doctrine, some even finding that the Court has used the distinctions
between the death penalty and other punishments as justification for harsher rules in death
cases than exist for non-capital cases. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Born-Again Death, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1987) [hereinafter Berger, Born-Again Death]; Deborah W.
Denno, "Death is Different" and Other Twists of Fate, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437
(1992); William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent
Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985); Daniel R.
Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat From the "Death is
Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1389 (1991).
50. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brenan, J., concurring).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion."51 Because the death penalty is a punishment qualitatively
different from any other in the American criminal justice system,
"the procedures that surround it, as well as the normative and le-
gal discourse used to analyze it, must be sui generis. ' '52
While the uniqueness of the death penalty has long been rec-
ognized, most of the substantive and procedural restrictions
unique to capital punishment cases have emerged only within the
last twenty years.5 3 Before Furman v. Georgia, the courts directly
or indirectly recognized differences in the rights of criminal de-
fendants based on whether they faced the death penalty, but these
were primarily differences in degree, not kind.5 4 With Furman, the
Court embarked on a course that would see fundamental structural
and substantive changes in the administration of capital punish-
ment in the United States.
This revolution was accomplished in large part through the
Supreme Court's reappraisal of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.5 5 Before Furman,
Eighth Amendment challenges to death sentences were sporadic
and unsuccessful, and the Court interpreted the cruel and unusual
clause narrowly." After Furman and Gregg, however, the Eighth
51. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-58 (plurality opinion of Stevens, Stewart, and Powell, JJ.).
52. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics, supra note 14, at 166.
53. Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the
Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1221, 1225-45 (1985).
54. In his concurrence in Furman, Justice Brennan summarized how lawmakers, courts,
and juries have treated capital cases differently from non-capital cases, arguing that these
differences are rooted in the unusual severity, enormity, and finality of a state execution.
408 U.S. at 285-91. Nonetheless, for the most part, the pre-Furman doctrinal distinctions
between capital and non-capital cases were subtle. For example, the Court on occasion
seemed to give closer scrutiny to legal challenges in death cases than in cases where the
punishment was not irreversible. See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948)
(resolving in defendant's favor doubts arising because of ambiguous jury instruction). In one
area, however, a distinction of great import was drawn between death cases and other crimi-
nal cases. For three decades, an indigent defendant facing a capital charge under state law
was entitled to the assistance of an attorney at no cost, while this right was not extended to
non-capital prosecutions under state law. Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932) (holding that indigent charged with rape and facing death penalty entitled to assis-
tance of counsel in preparation and presentation of defense) with Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 674-75 (1948) (holding that conviction of unrepresented indigent of non-capital offense
did not violate due process clause) and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (same).
55. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 27, at 10-12.
56. See cases cited supra note 47. The pre-Furman history of the Eighth Amendment
in the context of capital punishment is reviewed in Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dersho-
witz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1970). In the
non-capital context, the Court has continued to interpret the prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishments restrictively when asked to limit the power of the state to punish crimes,
showing great deference to legislative determinations of the appropriateness of a particular
punishment. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that mandatory
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Amendment became the primary focus of the courts in death cases,
and it has been the most significant source of procedural and sub-
stantive rights for those charged with capital crimes.5
Several overlapping principles drive the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence. The Eighth Amendment requires an acceptable de-
gree of proportionality, forbidding the death penalty if it is cate-
gorically disproportionate to the harm caused by the defendant's
crime. 8 Thus, the Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
foreclose death as a punishment for certain offenses, 9 but to per-
mit death as a punishment for aggravated murder.6 0
In addition, the Eighth Amendment requires that the proce-
dures established by the states for selecting those offenders who
are to be put to death operate in a rational and non-arbitrary man-
ner.6 1 In accordance with this principle, the death penalty can be
imposed only through a procedure that guides the discretion of the
sentencer, so that death sentences are not handed out "wantonly"
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of
cocaine not violative of Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per
curiam) (upholding 40-year prison sentence and $20,000 fine for possession and distribution
of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that
mandatory life sentence imposed on three-time felon who was convicted of obtaining $80
worth of merchandise through fraudulent use of credit card, passed a forged check for
$28.36, and obtained $120.75 by false pretenses did not violate Eighth Amendment).
57. See Gillers, supra note 27, at 10-12; Garey, supra note 53, at 1230.
58. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987) ("[A] societal consensus that
the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from imposing
the death penlty for that offense."). The Supreme Court has refused to extend this princi-
ple to require proportionality review by appellate courts in individual cases that fall within
the categories of offenses that can be punished by death. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37
(1984).
59. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that death sentence of
accomplice to robbery during which a murder was committed is unconstitutional if accom-
plice did not kill, intend to kill, or intend that lethal force be used during robbery);
Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (holding that death sentence for kidnapping vio-
lates Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(holding that death penalty for crime of rape "grossly disproportionate and excessive" and
thus violative of Eighth Amendment). The Court has also found that the Eighth Amend-
ment categorically prohibits the execution of certain classes of defendants. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (prohibiting execution of defendant for offense committed
while defendant was less than 16 years of age); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
(holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of prisoner who is insane).
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.).
61. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 206 (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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or "freakishly. ' 6 2 Prior to Furman, judges and juries were given
largely unfettered discretion in deciding whether a defendant
would be executed for committing a capital crime, 63 resulting in
extreme arbitrariness in the application of the death penalty, due
in large part to racism.6 4 The common strand unifying the other-
62. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. Texas, 113
S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1993).
63. Most of the pre-Furman capital punishment laws in force in the various states
shared certain basic characteristics. First, a very large number of defendants were techni-
cally eligible for the death penalty ("death eligible"), with most capital punishment jurisdic-
tions making everyone who committed murder, regardless of gradation, death eligible, and
many jurisdictions included non-homicide felonies in their death penalty statutes. See
BALDUs ET AL.., supra note 10, at 7. At different points in time, a prosecutor, a judge, or the
jury could remove a defendant from the pool of death-eligible defendants. Id. at 7-8. The
ultimate sentencing determination was made by a jury-in contrast to the usual practice in
non-capital cases, where jury sentencing is rare. See Gillers, supra note 27, at 15-19. Juries
were given broad discretion in choosing whether to sentence a defendant to death, without
"any sort of authoritative guidelines or standards to regulate their decisions." BALDUS ET
AL., supra note 10, at 8-9. Mandatory death sentences were uncommon; there was a steady
historical trend disfavoring anything that would interfere with the jury's discretion. HUGO
A. BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHENT 166 (1987); see infra note 71. In all but a few states, there was a single ("uni-
tary") trial of all issues relating to guilt and sentence, and the jury decided the defendant's
guilt and sentencing simultaneously. See infra note 88. Appellate review of sentences
handed out in criminal cases, including capital cases, was very limited; appellate courts gen-
erally restricted their inquiry to assuring compliance with statutory limits, without consider-
ing the propriety or reasonableness of the sentence rendered in any particular case. See, e.g.,
Charles B. Burr, II, Appellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing Dis-
cretion-A Workable Alternative?, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1971); Criminal Proce-
dure-Scope of Appellate Review of Sentences in Capital Cases, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 434
(1960).
64. While an exceptionally small number of defendants eligible for the death penalty
actually received death sentences in the pre-Furman era-about 100 per year in the 1960s,
down from a high of 300-400 in 1935-a high proportion of death-eligible non-whites were
sentenced to death. See BALDUS Er AL., supra note 10, at 9; see also sources cited supra note
24. Empirical studies of the operation of capital punishment in this country after Furman
and Gregg reveal that the arbitrariness detected in earlier studies has not been remedied.
See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 80-139; BOWERS, supra note 23, at 217-69, 337-48
(arguing that arbitrariness is linked with operation of discretion, including prosecutorial dis-
cretion, within capital punishment system). Modern studies continue to detect race-linked
arbitrariness. There has been a particularly strong statistical relationship between sentenc-
ing patterns in death cases and the racial identity of the victim of the crime. See, e.g.,
BALDus ET AL., supra note 10, at 140-97 (reporting data collected in Georgia); id. at 254-67
(reviewing studies conducted in other states); BOWERS, supra note 23, at 217-69 (reporting
sentencing patterns in Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas); GROSS & MAURO, supra note 24,
at 35-105 (examining sentencing patterns in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia); John F. Karns & Lee S. Weinberg, Thi Death
Sentence in Pennsylvania-1978-1990: A Preliminary Analysis of the Effects of Statutory
and Nonstatutory Factors, 95 DICK. L. REv. 691, 734 (1991) ("In virtually all situations
except killing by torture, non-whites who kill whites have the highest probability of being
sentenced to death [in Pennsylvania], while whites who kill nonwhites have the lowest.");
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wise divergent views expressed in the five separate concurring
opinions constituting the majority in Furman was a condemnation
of capital punishment schemes that gave judges and juries standar-
dless discretion in sentencing.6 5 Furman's core holding was that
the Eighth Amendment demands an acceptable measure of consis-
tency in sentencing decisions.6 A death penalty statute must
"channel" the discretion of the sentencing authority and provide
meaningful guidance that minimizes arbitrariness in the selection
of those defendants who will be executed. 7
But the Court has also recognized that "a consistency pro-
duced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency."68
The Eighth Amendment requires that states allow "the sentencer
sufficient discretion to take account of the 'character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense' to assure that 'death is the appropriate punishment in a spe-
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1991) (reviewing death sentencing in Florida);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide
Cases, 19 LAw & Soc. Rlv. 587 (1985) (reporting that blacks accused of killing whites most
likely to be "upgraded" (increasing likelihood of ultimate death sentence) and least likely to
be "downgraded" by Florida prosecutors); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimination in
Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRrM. JUST. 279 (1987)
(studying sentencing in Louisiana).
65. Scholars have noted that support for a wide range of conflicting positions can be
found in Furman's five concurring and four dissenting opinions, which together span 231
pages in the United States Reports: "A certain amount of ambiguity is a feature of many
legal opinions, but this is something different, a case that is not so much a precedent as a
Rorschach test." GROSS & MAURo, supra note 24, at 7 (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding
the cacophony of views expressed in Furman, each Justice that made up the plurality cited
arbitrariness as a constitutional defect of then-existing death penalty statutes. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who would have found capital punishment per se unconstitutional,
both cited arbitrariness in sentencing as one of the bases for their conclusion. Furman, 408
U.S. at 294-95, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas focused on the race- and class-based discrimination that was associated with the
standardless discretion exercised by sentencing juries. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stewart thought existing schemes to be arbitrary because decisions to impose
the death penalty seemed random. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White's
opinion focused primarily on the death penalty's lack of utility given its infrequent use, but
he also decried that "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313.
66. This has been repeatedly identified as the unifying principle running through
Furman's concurring opinions. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1993); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 774 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
68. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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cific case.' "69 The rationale underlying this individualization re-
quirement is that any sentencing scheme which fails to strive for
fairness and reliability will yield arbitrary results, and fundamen-
tal fairness and reliability cannot be attained in the death penalty
69. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1993) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); see also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting that
sentencing decision must "focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the
defendant"). At various times, the justices have noted that there is some tension between
the consistency and individualization principles drawn from the Eighth Amendment. See,
e.g., Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129, 1132-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 904-15 (Thomas, J., concurring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
656-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.); California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has concluded
that the individualization requirement cannot be reconciled with Furman and has rejected
the idea that the states must permit the sentencer to consider all relevant evidence offered
by the defendant in mitigation of a death sentence. Walton, 497 U.S. at 656-73 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1127-28 (Scalia, J., concurring); Johnson, 113
S. Ct. at 2672 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas has urged the Court to reconsider its
ban on mandatory sentencing, arguing that individualized sentencing yields racially discrim-
inatory results. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 912 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, on
the other hand, has cited the futility of the Court's efforts to harmonize the consistency and
individualization requirements as one basis for his conclusion that the death penalty cannot
be administered constitutionally. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1137 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
Others, however, have suggested that the consistency and individualization require-
ments can be reconciled. Justice Stevens observed that "[a]lthough these principles-one
narrowing the relevant class, the other broadening the scope of considered evi-
dence-seemingly point in opposite directions, in fact both serve the same end: ensuring
that a capital sentence is the product of individualized and reasoned moral decisionmak-
ing." Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2534 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Professor
Sundby argues that both requirements reduce the number of defendants actually sentenced
to death, and both "work[] towards the same end of identifying the group of defendants
most deserving of death . . - ." Sundby, supra note 9, at 1176. Professor Bilionis argues
that while it is "cruel" to impose the death penalty without a "reliabl[e] determin[ation]
that death is indeed the morally appropriate penalty," Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropri-
ateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRmIINOLoaY 283,
288 (1991), the same degree of reliability need not accompany a jury's decision to show
mercy: "The principle advanced by Furman and its progeny requires that the potential for
arbitrary or capricious results in capital sentencing must be minimized-but not at the ex-
pense of the discretion necessary to ensure a morally appropriate sentence." Id. at 327. Ron-
ald J. Mann, on the other hand, questions whether Furman really requires "consistency" at
all. He suggests that the Court's modem death penalty jurisprudence is driven by an "indi-
vidualized-consideration principle"; the death penalty is a "cruel" punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment if the defendant is not afforded "a realistic opportunity
for individualized consideration," Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Prin-
ciple and the Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493, 498-
99 (1992), and individualized consideration is impossible if the sentencer is given too little
guidance (Furman), or if the sentencer is precluded from considering all relevant factors
mitigating against a death sentence (Lochett). Id. at 499.
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context without individualized sentencing.70 Thus, mandatory
death sentences for the commission of specified crimes without re-
gard to the personal characteristics and history of the accused or
the particular circumstances surrounding the crime are
unconstitutional. 71
Finally, the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital punish-
ment scheme serve the penological objectives of retribution, deter-
rence, or both.7 2 The evidence of the death penalty's deterrent ef-
70. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-12; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Only capital defendants have a constitutional right
to individualized sentencing. The Court has refused to find this requirement in the prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments in non-capital cases. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart
When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 85, 119 & n.141 (1993) (listing cases in
which federal circuit courts have rejected individualized sentencing challenges to Federal
Sentencing Guidelines). The Court has observed that individualized sentencing reflects "en-
lightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative" in non-capital cases, but it is a
"constitutionally indispensable part" of capital sentencing. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plu-
rality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
71. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
accord Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Stevens, JJ.); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273-74 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stew-
art, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 n.38 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658,
2665 (1993). In the century before the Furman decision, mandatory death sentences had
fallen out of favor in the United States. Tennessee was the first state to reject mandatory
death sentencing, in 1838; by 1900, the federal government and 22 states had abandoned
mandatory sentencing; and by the mid-twentieth century, every jurisdiction with the death
penalty had given the sentencer discretion-albeit uncontrolled discretion-to impose a
death sentence or spare the defendant. Bilionis, supra note 69, at 289 & n.15. In the imme-
diate aftermath of Furman, at least sixteen states enacted legislation providing mandatory
death sentences for specified crimes such as contract murder, murder of a police officer,
murder while serving a life sentence, and felony murder. Note, Discretion and the Constitu-
tionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1710-12 (1974).
Mandatory schemes, however, risk the execution of defendants who were incapable of being
deterred from committing their crimes and who were not "sufficiently culpable" under the
Court's model of retributive justice. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78. See also F.
Patrick Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A
Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 1113, 1116 (1985). In
invalidating such schemes, the Court refused to accept "[u]niformity of result [that] was
achieved by ignoring the particular circumstances of the crime, as well as the individual
humanity of those who stood to be condemned." Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and
the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALB. L. REV. 225, 229 (1992).
72. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) ("There must be a valid penologi-
cal reason for choosing from the many criminal defendants the few who are sentenced to
death."). A death sentence which does not serve a legitimate penological purpose would be
deemed unnecessarily severe--"cruel"-and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment. See,
e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring);
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fect is at best inconclusive, 3 however, and retribution has emerged
as the primary justification of capital punishment in the modern
era. 4 The model of retributive justice 5 that has been articulated
id. at 331-32, 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Generally, criminal punishments serve one of four penological goals: deterrence, retribu-
tion, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMI-
NAL LAW 23-27 (2d ed. 1986). In concluding that the death penalty was not per se unconsti-
tutional, the Supreme Court was willing to "assume," that even in the absence of supporting
empirical evidence, the death penalty was a "significant deterrent" for certain categories of
homicide such as murders for hire and murders committed while serving a life sentence.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Moreover,
the Court found that society's interest in retribution-expressing "society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct"-was sufficient in itself to justify capital punishment, Id. at
183; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). The other common peno-
logical purposes are not sufficiently furthered to justify capital punishment in the face of an
Eighth Amendment challenge. Rehabilitation of the prisoner, obviously, is not served by
killing him, see Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 478 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), and although the goal of incapacitating the prisoner from committing other crimes is
accomplished by executing him, the Court has found that because this goal is adequately
served by a sentence of life imprisonment, incapacitation alone cannot justify the death
penalty. Id. at 461-62. Although rehabilitation and incapacitation do not justify capital pun-
ishment as an alternative to other punishments, they may be relevant to capital sentencing
decisions. Capital defendants frequently offer evidence of their rehabilitative potential in
mitigation of their sentence. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
Court has held that juries may legitimately consider a defendant's "future dangerousness"
in the capital sentencing process, see Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73, 276 (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), and that the sentencer must consider evidence that the
defendant does not pose a danger if incarcerated instead of executed. See, e.g., Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986).
73. The weight of the extensive body of empirical evidence simply does not support
claims that capital punishment deters capital crimes more effectively than life imprison-
ment, and some studies even show a slight "brutalization" effect, resulting in an increase in
homicides by one or two murders per execution. See, e.g., BOWERS, supra note 23, at 23-24,
103-29, 271-335, 381-83; ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT (1953); THORSTEIN
SELLIN, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(1959); David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of Thorstein Sellin and Isaac
Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); James
Alan Fox & Michael L. Radelet, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Studies of the Deterrent
Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 29 (1989); Richard Lempert, The Effect of
Executions on Homicides: A New Look in an Old Light, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 88 (1983);
Hans Zeizel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts and Faiths, 1976 Sup. CT.
REv. 317; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring). Contra WALTER
BERNs, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 83-152
(1991); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975); Stephen Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reex-
amination of the United States Times-Series Evidence, 52 S. ECON. J. 68 (1985).
74. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461. See also BEDAU, supra note 63, at 172 (characterizing the
plurality's reliance on deterrence in Gregg "somewhat half-hearted" and based on specula-
tion rather than fact); Dubber, supra note 70, at 132 ("Over the course of capital jurispru-
dence since Furman, the Court has settled on a generally retributive approach to capital
sentencing."). The primacy of the retribution rationale is reflected in the aggravating and
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in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, moreover, re-
quires individualized sentencing, since the core of the Court's re-
tributive rationale "is that a [death] sentence must be directly re-
lated to the personal culpability of the criminal offender, '7' and
may not exceed "the degree of punishment and suffering that is
appropriate for or proportionate to the moral culpability of the of-
fender and his offense. 17 Individualized sentencing, in the Court's
mitigating factors expressly identified in all current capital punishment statutes. Those fac-
tors tend to focus on the moral culpability of the offender. See Robert Alan Kelly, Applica-
bility of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical and
Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 U. Mo.-K.C. L.
REv. 411, 446 (1992). Nonetheless, the deterrence rationale clearly underlies the states' deci-
sion to make certain crimes death-eligible and the legislative determination that certain
circumstances aggravate a death-eligible crime. See id. at 448. See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6(3)(a) (1962) (murder committed by prison inmate is aggravating circumstance); id.
§ 210.6(3)(e) (commission of murder for purpose of avoiding arrest or effecting escape is
aggravating circumstance).
75. "Retribution" is a term used to describe several different theories of punishment.
Jordan M. Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death
Penalty, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1131, 1144 (1993); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 305, 390. Some advocate "categorical" (or "pure") moral retribution.
"[R]ooted in religious belief or moral instinct," this theory of retribution holds "that certain
crimes by their very nature merit death," regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
crime or the perpetrator. Id. at 390. This theory would justify mandatory death sentences
for the commission of specifically defined offenses. Others, however, noting the emphasis
retributivist theory places on the moral choices of the offender, see, e.g., EDMUND L.
PINCoFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 8 (1966), maintain that retribution theory
"place[s] limits on punishment by insisting that punishment fairly reflect the moral culpa-
bility of the individual offender as well as the extent of the harm caused by the offense."
Steiker, supra, at 1144; see also PETER Burr, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 51-52
(1963) (asserting that implied limit of retribution is that punishment can be no greater than
defendant deserves). A just retributive judgment "must be scaled to the degree of societal
condemnation, which in turn depends on the moral turpitude of the defendant." James S.
Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate":
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 811 n.240 (1978). Under this
approach, "adjusting the degree of punishment to the extent of culpability of the individual,
the criminal justice system succeeds in giving the offender his 'just deserts'" while at the
same time "provid[ing] sufficient 'justice' to satisfy the public's need for vengeance .... "
Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio
and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 317, 369 n.239 (1981); see also Bilionis, supra note 69, at 286 (arguing that execution
"is legitimate only when it can be said with confidence that it is not only a permissible legal
response but also the morally appropriate response to the particular crime and the particu-
lar offender" (emphasis in original)). This latter approach to retribution, which is consistent
with the long-standing American tradition of discretionary sentencing in capital cases, see
supra notes 63 & 71, has been followed by the majority of the Supreme Court. See infra text
accompanying notes 83-87.
76. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
77. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 75, at 369. See also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,492-
93 (1990) (stating that capital sentencing scheme must allow sentencer to express its "rea-
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view, assures that any decision to put an offender to death is a
"reasoned moral response" 8 to the offender and his crime.
These principles are at the center of the modern movement
toward constitutionalizing the basic structure of death penalty tri-
als. Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to insist on
any particular combination of procedural safeguards, all capital
punishment schemes currently operating in the United States
share basic features that respond to the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. 9 For example, the states are required to "nar-
row the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty"80 and
channel the discretion of the sentencing authority.81 This can be
accomplished in two ways, both of which are employed in varying
degrees in states with capital punishment. First, states limit the
pool of defendants eligible for the death penalty to those who com-
mit certain defined types of homicide; and second, states require
the sentencer to find that aggravating circumstances exist before
sentencing a defendant to die. 2
soned moral response" to defendant and crime); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)
(same); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that statute that prevented a "reasoned moral response" by cutting off sentencer's ability to
give effect to relevant mitigating evidence violated Eighth Amendment); Tison, 481 U.S. at
149 (concluding that death sentence must correlate with "personal culpability" of defend-
ant); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
"proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness").
78. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
79. Many of these features were first proposed by an advisory committee of the Ameri-
can Law Institute in 1959 in the course of drafting the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
80. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1993); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 774 (1990); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Zant, 462 U.S. at 879; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428;
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Furman, 408
U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
82. BEDAU, supra note 63, at 177. See also Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 916 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Lowenflield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988); WELSH S.
WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NiNsIES 74 (1991) [hereinafter WHITE, NINETIES] ("Re-
quiring the sentencer to make its death penalty determination on the basis of a weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances was designed to reduce the pool of those eligi-
ble for the death sentence and to inject a greater degree of rationality into the sentencing
process."). The Court has explained that "there is a required threshold below which the
death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria
that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular
defendant's case meet the threshold." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987). It is
not enough that a statutory definition of capital murder or a statutory aggravating circum-
stance "enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from
those who do not;" the narrowing device "must provide a principled basis" for making this
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In addition, the Eighth Amendment requires that the sen-
tencer give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by the
defendant before rendering a final sentence,8 3 even if that evidence
is not "relate[d] specifically to [the accused's] culpability for the
crime he committed. '84 Under the Eighth Amendment, a legiti-
mate retributive judgment must take into account, among other
things, evidence that tends to emphasize the defendant's redeem-
ing traits, explain (if not excuse) the defendant's acts, or show how
circumstances partly or wholly beyond the defendant's control
caused his life or personality to deteriorate to the point where he
could commit a heinous crime.85 In accordance with what has come
to be known as the Lockett doctrine,88 a defendant cannot be pre-
cluded from offering, and the sentencing authority cannot refuse to
consider, "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence of less than death.
'87
distinction. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542 (1993). For example, "[i]f the sentencer
fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible
for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm." Id. at 1542 (emphasis in
original).
83. See, e.g., Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2665-66; Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 900; McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1990); Penry, 492 U.S. at 319-28; Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988); Hitchcock v. Duggar, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987); McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 304-06; Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1978) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.); see also Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2675-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Gra-
ham, 113 S. Ct. at 916-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4; see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304 ("In contrast to the
carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death
sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to con-
sider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence." (em-
phasis in original)).
85. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 189 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that evidence of defendant's "redeeming features" may reveal "virtues that can
fairly be balanced against society's interest in killing [the defendant] in retribution for his
violent crime"); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304 ("Any exclusion of the 'compassionate or miti-
gating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind' that are relevant to the
sentencer's decision would fail to treat all persons as 'uniquely individual human beings."'
(citation omitted)).
86. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
87. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). The Lockett plurality explained
that:
[any death penalty system that] prevents the sentencer [from considering] aspects
of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense prof-
fered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite
of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life
and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Individualized sentencing requires the sentencing authority to
consider certain evidence which, while irrelevant and probably
prejudicial to a determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence,
is highly probative of the moral culpability of the offender. In or-
der to assure that juries are able to consider this evidence without
prejudicing their determination of whether the defendant has com-
mitted a crime making him eligible for the death penalty, all states
which currently have capital punishment statutes provide a bifur-
cated trial procedure.3 8 In the first stage, commonly called the
Id. at 605; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.); accord Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2665-66; Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 899-900; Penry,
492 U.S. at 319-28; Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304-06; Skipper,
476 U.S. at 4-5; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-36
(1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
270-74 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 250-53 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Gregg, 428
U.S. 196-97 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
The doctrine not only requires that defendants be free to introduce mitigating evidence,
a capital punishment scheme, to be found constitutional, must provide a method through
which the consideration of such evidence "affect[s] the sentencing decision." Lockett, 438
U.S. at 608. Moreover, a sentencer may not "refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any
relevant mitigating evidence." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14. Until recently, it was widely
believed that there were virtually no limitations on the consideration of mitigation evidence
by juries. See, e.g., McCleshey, 481 U.S. at 306 ("States cannot limit the sentencer's consid-
eration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the [death]
penalty. In this respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow
it to consider any relevant information offered by the defendant."). The Court has back-
tracked from that position, finding that while the states cannot "plac[e] relevant mitigating
evidence 'beyond the effective reach of the sentencer,'" the states are free to "guid[e] the
sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence." Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2666. For detailed
discussions of the Lockett doctrine, see Bilionis, supra note 69, at 309-12; Hertz & Weis-
berg, supra note 75; Lyon, supra note 33; Mann, supra note 69; Sundby, supra note 9.
88. Gillers, supra note 27, at 102-19. Prior to Furman, a judge or jury decided whether
the death penalty was appropriate based solely on the evidence presented during the trial of
the defendant's guilt or innocence (a "unitary" trial procedure) and decided guilt and sen-
tencing simultaneously. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 10-11; MELTSNER, supra note
24, at 68. In some states, evidentiary rules limited the defendant to introducing evidence
relevant only to guilt. Id. Even if the defendant was allowed to introduce evidence regarding
his character, background, and mental health, he did so at risk of having the determination
of guilt influenced by considerations unconnected with the state's evidence concerning the
crime with which he was charged. Moreover, the unitary trial procedure forced defendants
to either waive their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination or to surrender their
opportunity to testify about mitigating circumstances. BALDUS FT AL., supra note 10, at 8.
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly required bifurcated proceedings in the
aftermath of the jurisprudential revolution that began with Furman, the states have inter-
preted the Court's remarks condoning bifurcation as "virtually requiring it." Weisberg,
supra note 75, at 309. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) ("As a general proposition [the] concerns [expressed in Furman regarding
the arbitrary and capricious administration of capital punishment] are best met by a system
that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of
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"guilt phase," the issues of guilt, innocence, and the traditional de-
fenses to criminal responsibility are tried. It is during this phase
that the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed an
offense, clearly defined by statute, that is potentially punishable by
death (a "capital offense" that makes the defendant "death-
eligible").89
If this burden is met, the court must conduct a separate sen-
tencing hearing-commonly called the "penalty phase." 90 During
the penalty phase, the sentencing authority (typically the same
jury that has found the defendant guilty of the underlying capital
offense)9 1 is presented additional evidence of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances relevant to the crime and the accused.92 In
order to obtain a death sentence, the prosecution must establish
that at least one of a list of statutorily-defined aggravating circum-
stances is present.93 The defendant is given an opportunity to pre-
the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide
its use of the information."); see also Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland:
Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1544,
1547 (1983) ("A separate sentencing hearing-in effect, a 'trial' on the issue of punishment
held after determination of guilt-provides the primary means by which the requisite con-
sistency and reliability are to be achieved.").
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40, 13A-5-43 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West
1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1992); OHo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.022, 2929.03 (Anderson
1993).
90. Wm=, NiNETIEs, supra note 82, at 73 (stating that penalty phase is "most visible
by-product" of modern death penalty); Weisberg, supra note 75, at 306 (describing the pen-
alty trial as a "curious new legal form").
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1990); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.022, 2929.03 (Anderson 1993);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994). In almost all of the death
penalty states, a sentencing hearing is conducted before a jury. The exceptions are Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, in which the presiding trial judge has exclusive sentencing
authority. See ARiz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(a)
(1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989). In most of
the remaining capital punishment states, the jury makes the binding decision of whether the
defendant will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The exceptions are Alabama,
Florida, and Indiana, where the jury makes a non-binding recommendation after the sen-
tencing hearing, and the trial judge makes the final sentencing decision, and Nevada, where
a three-judge panel makes the sentencing determination if the jury cannot unanimously
agree on the sentence to be imposed. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1994); NEv. Rav. STAT.
§ 175.556 (1987). See generally Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The
Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to a Jury Trial, 65 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 1 (1989).
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45, 13A-5-49 through 52 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03
(Anderson 1993); TEx. CODE CraM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1995).
93. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(f) (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 190.3 (West
1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1990); OHIO RaV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04(A)
(Anderson 1993).
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sent evidence that mitigates against a sentence of death and in
favor of a lesser sentence 9 4 usually life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole. The typical capital punishment statute permits
the imposition of the death penalty if the sentencing authority
concludes that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors
supports a decision to put the defendant to death.,
Finally, the Supreme Court has indicated that an automatic
appeal of all death sentences is an "important additional safeguard
against arbitrariness and caprice."9 " While it is unclear whether
94. Mitigating evidence is evidence bearing on any facet of the defendant's character,
record, background, or crime that might serve "as a basis for a sentence less than death."
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986); Bi-
lionis, supra note 69, at 302 ("Any evidence about the offender or the offense that might
support a conceivable moral argument against the death sentence in a particular case is
protected under Lockett's definition.").
95. "Guided discretion" statutes, where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
taken into consideration in the sentencing process, have been used in all states in the mod-
em era except Texas and Oregon, which have "structured discretion" statutes. With regard
to guided discretion statutes, the Supreme Court has distinguished between "weighing" and
"nonweighing" sentencing schemes. In a "weighing" state, after the jury has found the de-
fendant guilty of capital murder at the guilt phase and finds the existence of one or more
statutorily-defined aggravating factors at the penalty phase, the jury must "weigh" the ag-
gravating factors found against the mitigating factors found. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1136 (1992). Examples of "weighing" states are Mississippi, see id., and Florida, see
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 318 (1991). In a "nonweighing" state, the jury is required to
find the existence of at least one aggravating factor; after that, the jury makes its sentencing
determination by "tak[ing] into consideration all circumstances before it from both the
guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial." Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136 (quoting
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983)). Thus, in nonweighing states, the statutory defi-
nitions of aggravating factors are relevant only to the determination that the defendant is
eligible for the death penalty, but do not have a specific function with regard to the ulti-
mate sentencing determination. Juries are permitted to consider nonstatutory aggravating
factors in determining the defendant's sentence, so long as they are not "constitutionally
impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." Zant, 462 U.S. at 885. There
are about fifteen states which expressly permit the sentencer to consider nonstatutory ag-
gravators. Gillers, supra note 27, at 101-19 (app.). The distinction between weighing and
nonweighing states is particularly significant with regard to the procedures that must be
followed by appellate courts in reviewing cases in which the sentencer finds an invalid statu-
tory aggravator. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2119 (1992); Stringer, 112
S. Ct. at 1136-39; Parker, 498 U.S. at 318. Oregon and Texas have "structured discretion"
statutes, which require the jury to answer a series of questions upon the completion of the
penalty phase of the defendant's trial, and the defendant's sentence is based on the jury's
responses to the questions posed. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1993); TEX. CODE CRI5.
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1995). Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances is to be considered in answering the questions posed. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(1)(c)(A) (1993); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1995).
96. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
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automatic appellate review is required by Furman,9 7 all states pro-
vide judicial review of a death sentence at some level."e Most states
provide an automatic appeal to the highest appellate court in the
state; a few states also provide an appeal as of right to an interme-
diate appellate court.99
Other special rules, developed in recognition of the need for
greater reliability in capital cases than in non-capital cases, have
added to the burdens of capital litigation. For example, there are
rules governing the voir dire of jury venirepersons in capital cases
that are largely unknown in non-capital criminal trials.100 In death
cases, the Court has exhibited greater willingness to scrutinize the
adequacy and clarity of statutory aggravating factors 01 and jury
instrutions.10 2
As a consequence of the Court's efforts to rationalize the ap-
plication of the death penalty, attorneys who represent capital de-
fendants must master rules and procedures peculiar to death cases,
97. See BEDAU, supra note 63, at 181.
98. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984); see also BEDAU, supra note 63, at 181.
99. Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 14 HUM. RTS. 14, 16 (1987).
100. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229-30 (1992) (holding that defend-
ant has due process right to adequate voir dire of venirepersons to identify and disqualify
jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty if defendant was found guilty of
capital crime); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968) (holding that inquiry into
venirepersons' view on death penalty permitted); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36
(1986) (plurality opinion) (allowing inquiry into racial attitudes of venirepersons in capital
cases).
101. For example, the Court has invalidated the use of vaguely defined aggravating fac-
tors as violative of the Eighth Amendment. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
(invalidating "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (invalidating "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man" aggravating circumstance). The Court has reasoned that a constitutionally-acceptable
sentencing statute must "suitably direct[] and limit[]" the discretion of the sentencing au-
thority in order to minimize the chances of arbitrary or capricious decisions, and that this
can only be accomplished through" 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and
detailed guidance' [for the sentencer], and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death.'" Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990).
102. See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (condemning use of reasonable
doubt instruction in death case that suggested higher degree of doubt was required for ac-
quittal than is permissible under Fourteenth Amendment); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (holding that jury instruction requiring that jury unanimously find
existence of mitigating circumstance before it can be considered in sentencing determination
impermissible); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (invalidating jury instruction
that required jury to unanimously agree on mitigating factors); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 315-18 (1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that jury instruction cannot place burden of
proving element of intent on defendant); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-48 (1980)
(holding that, in death case, if evidence supports lesser included offense, jury must be in-
structed on it).
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develop unique trial strategies resulting from these peculiarities,
and expend a vastly greater amount of resources in extensive pre-
trial investigation and preparation than is required in other crimi-
nal cases. The constitutional responsibilities of defense lawyers
have multiplied with each refinement of the capital punishment
process of the past twenty years.
B. The Constitutional Responsibilities of Attorneys
Representing Defendants Accused of Capital Crimes
The interrelated substantive and procedural rules that have
been erected to assure the constitutionality of the death penalty
are not self-executing. Our legal system places primary responsibil-
ity for the proper operation of this system on the attorneys who
represent defendants accused of capital crimes.103 It is through the
zealous advocacy of the defendant's legal representative that all
other rights of the accused are preserved.104
Long before the Supreme Court recognized that poor persons
accused of crimes had a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance
of state-provided counsel,105 the Court acknowledged the centrality
103. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("As a general matter, it is
through counsel that all other rights of the accused are protected: 'Of all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for
it affects his ability to assert any other right he may have."' (citation omitted)); Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) ("Unless a defendant charged with a serious offense has
counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our sys-
tem of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself."). For a discussion of the
demands of representation in capital cases, see MILLARD FARriER & JAMES KINARD, TRIAL OF
THE PENALTY PHASE (1981); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986)
[hereinafter Goodpaster, Adversary System]; Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983) [hereinafter
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life]; Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323 [hereinafter White, Effec-
tive Assistance]; Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentenc-
ing, 39 STAN. L. REv. 461 (1987).
104. Cf. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
60, 65-66 (1964) (arguing that the Court's determination that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired states to provide attorneys free of charge to indigents facing felony charges was "the
watershed decision in the evolution of the criminal process" because it provided mechanism
for achieving all other rights guaranteed to accused).
105. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court recognized that
indigents were entitled to the assistance of state-supplied counsel to defend felony charges
at the trial level. Id. at 344-45. An indigent's right to appointed counsel was extended to
other stages of proceedings and other types of proceedings in a series of cases in the decade
following Gideon. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963) (right to ap-
pointed counsel for first appeal of conviction); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)
(right to appointed counsel during in-custody interrogations); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-38
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of defense counsel to the institutional legitimacy of capital punish-
ment. In Powell v. Alabama,106 thirty years before Gideon, the
Court recognized that meaningful assistance of counsel in capital
cases was indispensable to the procedural fairness of a capital
trial.107 The Court, relying on the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, found that the states were obligated to pro-
vide counsel to an indigent charged with an offense punishable by
death:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law ....
Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him.108
Every task ordinarily performed in the representation of a
criminal defendant is more difficult and time-consuming when the
defendant is facing execution. The responsibilities thrust upon de-
fense counsel in a capital case carry with them psychological and
emotional pressures unknown elsewhere in the law. 09 In addition,
defending a capital case is an intellectually rigorous enterprise, re-
(1967) (right to assigned counsel in juvenile proceedings that could result in incarceration);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1967) (right to appointed counsel at combined proba-
tion revocation and sentencing hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)
(right to counsel during post-indictment line-ups); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1970) (right to counsel in preliminary hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (right to appointed counsel extended to misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment
might be imposed); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (limited right to as-
signed counsel during probation and parole revocation hearings).
106. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
107. Id. at 68-69.
108. Id.
109. Attorneys representing defendants accused of capital crimes, of course, have al-
ways been confronted by these pressures. The attorney must pursue the case knowing that
"[e]very motion has an impact on whether the client lives or dies," Lyon, supra note 33, at
697, and that any tactical decision that goes awry could land his client on death row. The
psychological pressure inherent in capital litigation is often intensified by community out-
rage against the attorney's client that often is redirected toward the defense attorney. In
addition, "[t]here is always a political component to a death penalty case, even if it is no
more than the prosecutor's wish to appear tough on crime." Id. at 696 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Capital cases are often tried in an atmosphere that makes miscarriages of justice more
likely because the heinousness of the crime creates "more political and emotional pressure
to find a defendant." Denno, supra note 49, at 451 (citing WELsH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE Nmxmrnss 45 (1991)).
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quiring command of the rules unique to capital litigation and con-
stant vigilance in keeping abreast of new developments in a vola-
tile and highly nuanced area of the law. 110
The burdens of pre-trial motion practice are greater in death
cases than other criminal cases."" To properly defend a capital
case, defense counsel might be required to make or oppose up to
fifty pre-trial motions, a level of activity unknown in non-capital
felony cases. 112 Motions routinely made in non-capital cases often
are more burdensome in death cases, both because the outcomes of
those motions have greater ramifications, and because capital mur-
der statutes tend to be more complex and give rise to more eviden-
tiary issues than other criminal statutes.1 ' In addition, death pen-
alty attorneys are required to bring motions unique to capital
litigation and to engage in more intensive pre-trial discovery than
is typical in non-capital cases. 1
110. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 33, Commentary to Guideline 8.1, at 73. The defense
attorney must master a body of post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence notable for its
sudden shifts in both fundamental assumptions and minor premises. See generally James R.
Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evidence, and Capi-
tal Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 65 (1993).
111. See PHILLip J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER
CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 16-17, 28-30 (1993); NEW YORK STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, CAPITAL
LOSSES: THE PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 12-15 (1982) [hereinafter
CAPITAL LOSSES]; SOUTHERN PoVERTY LAW CENTER, MOTIONS FOR CAPITAL CASES (1981);
Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense Problems:
It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1992); Garey, supra note 53, at 1247-
51; Lyon, supra note 33, at 696-701; Vreeland, supra note 33, at 646-47.
112. See, e.g., Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 297. Pre-trial motions "create a
record and set a course of strategy upon which the entire litigation effort in a capital case is
patterned." CAPrrAL LoSSES, supra note 111, at 12. In most death penalty jurisdictions, a
defendant cannot raise issues on appeal that were not raised, usually through motions,
before trial or at trial. Particularly in light of the seriousness of capital cases and the insta-
bility of the current capital punishment jurisprudence, there are pressures on counsel to
raise through motion practice all potential issues, even those not currently supported by
existing precedent, or else risk waiving those issues on direct appeal and later during state
and federal post-conviction proceedings. See infra notes 413-15 and accompanying text.
113. Garey, supra note 53, at 1248; see also CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 111, at 12-13;
Vreeland, supra note 33, at 647. The motions routinely made in ordinary criminal
cases-motions to suppress physical evidence, challenge witness identification procedures,
and the like---"are longer, more complicated and more heavily litigated in death cases."
CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 111, at 13. Moreover, the notoriety of most capital cases require
defense attorneys to carefully prepare and support motions for a change of venue, individual
voir dire, and sequestration of jurors during voir dire and trial-motions that are not unique
to capital litigation, but are rarely important in non-capital cases. See CAPITAL LOSSES,
supra note 111, at 131; NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES
§§ 3.01, 3.06 (2d ed. 1989); Garey, supra note 53, at 1249; Vreeland, supra note 33, at 647.
114. For example, attorneys in capital cases must challenge aspects of the indictment
that make the alleged offense a capital one, qualifying the defendant for the death penalty.
Garey, supra note 53, at 1249. Defense counsel are required to make and support motions
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Similarly, jury voir dire is lengthier and more difficult process
in capital cases.115 The scope of voir dire is broader,"6 reflecting
greater concern about possible sources of juror bias, such as pre-
trial publicity or racial prejudice."'1 Most importantly, the Su-
preme Court has allowed inquiry into the attitudes of venireper-
sons regarding the death penalty, permitting the prosecution to
disqualify individuals opposed to capital punishment. 18 An im-
pressive body of social science research has shown that "death-
qualified" juries are considerably more likely to return guilty ver-
dicts, to convict on more serious charges, and to be less receptive
to diminished capacity defenses than non-death-qualified juries."19
for funds for investigators and experts, many of whom are only necessary in capital cases.
Id. at 1249-50; see also Vreeland, supra note 33, at 647. Attorneys must make a host of
pretrial motions arising out of the body of Eighth Amendment law relevant only to capital
cases. Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 134.
115. The complexities of jury selection in capital cases are discussed in Marshall Dayan
et al., Searching for an Impartial Sentencer Through Jury Selection in Capital Trials, 23
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 151 (1989). See also ABA GummEs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.7.2 and
commentary; COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 111, at 17-18; Friedman & Stevenson, supra note
111, at 10; Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 297.
116. Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 297; Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 134.
There is a greater chance that voir dire will be conducted individually in a capital case,
either as a result of statute or judicial discretion. See, e.g., TsX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
35.17(2) (West Supp. 1994) (upon request, capital defendant entitled to individual voir
dire); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. R. CRIM. P. 1106(e) (1989 & Supp. 1994) (right to individual
voir dire, unless waived); Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d. 1301, 1354 (Cal. 1980) (estab-
lishing waivable right to individual voir dire); Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (S.C.
1992) (holding that in a capital case "each juror, individually, must be interrogated by the
attorney who, prior to trial, has searchingly researched and probed the background of every
prospective juror").
117. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[b]ecause of the range of discretion en-
trusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected." Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986)
(opinion of White, J.).
118. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968).
119. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Em-
pirical studies showing that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict and less recep-
tive to defense arguments than non-death-qualified juries. See, e.g., WHITE, NINmNs, supra
note 82, at 186-218; Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representative-
ness of the Death Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1970); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death-Qualification on Jurors'
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 53
(1984); Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity,
8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge
to Death-Qualified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21 (1986); Robert
Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and
Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAVIOR 31 (1984); Stephen Gillers, Proving the Prejudice
of Death-Qualified Juries After Adams v. Texas, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 219 (1985); Faye
Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psy-
chological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970);
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A highly specialized procedure has evolved in connection with the
selection of "death-qualified" juries,120 and it is incumbent upon
defense lawyers to minimize the harmful consequences of death-
qualification by identifying potential jurors who favor the death
penalty but might refrain from imposing it on the defendant, and
to rehabilitate venirepersons who initially profess opposition to
capital punishment.121 To accomplish this, defense lawyers need to
master sophisticated jury selection techniques, and they require
the aid of social scientists and jury selection specialists who can
assist in developing voir dire examinations and profiles of prospec-
tive jurors. 22
Moreover, the guilt phase of a capital case alone, if properly
defended, will last longer on average than the entirety of non-capi-
tal murder trials. Murder cases tend to be more difficult and time-
consuming than other felony cases; the guilt phase of a capital
murder trial is further complicated by the need to prove or dis-
prove that the defendant's actions fall within the legal definition of
capital murder. Further, capital cases commonly involve mental
capacity defenses that add to the defense attorney's task. In addi-
tion to greater trial time, the defense of capital cases at the guilt
phase often requires greater assistance from investigators and ex-
perts in pathology, psychiatry, ballistics and other forensic
specialties.
It is the labor that must be expended by attorneys, investiga-
tors and experts to prepare and present evidence at the penalty
phase of a capital trial, however, that makes the cost of capital
defense exponentially greater than the cost of any other criminal
proceeding tried in the state courts. At the penalty phase of a capi-
tal trial, the sentencing authority, usually a jury, is asked to make
"a highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the
punishment that a particular person deserves. ' 123 During the guilt
and penalty phases, the prosecution presents a narrative consisting
Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualifi-
cation Process, 8 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 121 (1984); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect
of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567
(1971); William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness:
The Translation of Attitudes Into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 95 (1984).
120. ABA GUiDELiNEs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.7.2 commentary at 117 (footnotes
omitted).
121. ABA GUmELI ES, supra note 33, Guideline 1.1 commentary at 31.
122. ABA GumEFnqEs, supra note 33, Guideline 8.1 commentary at 74; see also id.,
Guideline 11.7.2 commentary at 117 ("Determining what invisible but lethal currents of
prejudice may exist in the jury pool and how to avoid letting the client be trapped therein
may require sociological data, psychological expertise, skillful questioning and intuition.").
123. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33-44 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
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of violent acts committed by the defendant, focused primarily if
not exclusively on the circumstances surrounding the murder of
the victim. During the penalty phase, the defense attorney must
counter the prosecution's chronicle of often depraved or inhuman
acts with a narrative that humanizes the perpetrator of those
acts.124 This typically is an account of physical or psychological vi-
olence and deprivation suffered by the defendant over a lifetime.12 5
Defense counsel must come forth with evidence that "helps the
jury understand the sources and origins of the lawless violence per-
petrated by [the defendant] without suggesting that [the jurors]
should forgive that violence or recant their judgment [of guilt]. '128
For attorneys accustomed to a predominantly defensive role in
which they respond to evidence presented by the prosecution, con-
ducting a defense at the penalty phase is "an alien, unlawyerly
task."'21 7 Because the defense must not only blunt the impact of
evidence of aggravating circumstances but also come forward to es-
tablish affirmatively the existence of mitigating factors, "the whole
124. See, e.g., WHITE, NuImms, supra note 82, at 76 (asserting that defense counsel
must show during the penalty phase that the crime alone does not represent the defendant);
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 321 (arguing that "to ensure a meaning-
ful penalty hearing in capital cases, it is essential that the client be presented to the sen-
tencer as a human being"); id. at 335 (observing that defense counsel must counter prosecu-
tion's effort to portray defendant "as evil and inhuman, perhaps monstrous"); Weisberg,
supra note 75, at 361 ("The overall goal of the defense is to present a human narrative, an
explanation of the defendant's apparently malignant violence as in some way rooted in un-
derstandable aspects of the human condition, so the jury will be less inclined to cast him out
of the human circle."). Professor Robin West observes that it is
not just that criminal defendants have a right to a jury that has heard their life
story, we need to hear the life story. We need to understand what happened and
why. We need to hear about the event that caused the arrest, about the life cir-
cumstances that caused and arguably mitigates the criminality of the event, and
the social realities that engendered, facilitated, or permitted the life circum-
stances. We need to learn once again to recognize these people as human, as "like
us." We need that gap of emphatic understanding closed. We need to be given a
stake in their lives, and in the communities from which they come. We need to be
made responsible.
Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility, and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty
Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 175-76 (1990).
125. See generally Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital
Trials, 27 LAw & Soc'y Rv. 19 (i993). Sarat notes that "[iln constructing a narrative of
violence and pain [in telling the story of the victim's death], prosecutors ... construct a
sociologically simple world of good and evil and a morally clear world of responsibility and
desert." Id. at 51. The defense must counter this with a more complex narrative; "the vio-
lence that was part of the defendant's life story was more diffuse, spread out over a longer
period of time, and more systemic. In contrast to the violence that took [the victim's] life,
the violence that [the defendant] had endured made his life what it is." Id. at 39.
126. Id. at 41.
127. Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 250.
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theory of proceeding" at the penalty trial "stands outside normal
criminal trial practice" for most defense lawyers.128 Moreover, the
evidence that should be presented at the penalty trial is exactly
the sort that defense attorneys ordinarily endeavor to keep away
from the jury; facts about the life and character of the defendant
that probably has little or no direct connection to the crime with
which he is charged. 129
The potential scope of mitigation evidence is quite broad and
continually expanding.1 3 0 In making a reasoned retributive judg-
ment, "there are no absolute criteria for gauging the degree of cul-
pability or moral iniquity of an individual criminal offender.""",
Furthermore, as knowledge of the mysteries of severely aberrant
conduct increases, so does recognition of the possible causes of that
conduct."3 2 At the penalty phase, the defendant's "whole career
and soul" are subject to inquiry,133 and the defendant's opportu-
nity to present mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant or his
crime is virtually unlimited. 4
128. ABA GUIDELINEs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.8.6 commentary at 134. See also
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 337 (observing that "[m]ost defense ad-
vocates are accustomed to a purely defensive role, to responding, to attempting to defeat the
prosecution's affirmative case").
129. See ABA GUEDELINEs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.8.6 commentary at 134 ("Attor-
neys skilled in narrowing the focus of trial to exclude irrelevant references to the life and
character of a client may find themselves unprepared for the sentencing phase of a capital
case where the life and character of the client may have to be revealed in detail."); see also
Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 250 (arguing that
"[c]onstructing ... a 'dramatic psychohistory' of the client and presenting it at the penalty
phase smacks more of social work than of law" (footnote omitted)); Goodpaster, The Trial
for Life, supra note 103, at 321 (asserting that the investigation of defendant's life history
"is a very different inquiry from an investigation of facts relating to an offense"); Paduano
& Smith, supra note 33, at 298 (noting that defense attorney in a capital case cannot limit
investigation to witnesses with knowledge of the events surrounding the defendant's offense,
as is typical in non-capital cases).
130. The state cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence in such
a way as to "create[] the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion). Lockett defines mitigating evidence to include all facts relevant to the defend-
ant's character, record, background, and offense that militate against imposing the death
penalty, id. at 604, a definition which "does not exclude very much." Weisberg, supra note
75, at 324.
131. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 75, at 369-70.
132. Cf. Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ark. 1991) ("New scientific develop-
ments and an increased awareness in areas of social consciousness have served to drastically
raise the complexity of criminal litigation.").
133. Weisberg, supra note 75, at 335.
134. WHITE, NINsmEs, supra note 82, at 73; see also Goodpaster, The Trial for Life,
supra note 103, at 315 ("As a matter of law and practice, the opportunity to present almost
any arguably mitigating evidence crucially distinguishes death penalty trials from all other
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In developing a case of mitigation, a defense lawyer must look
beyond the rather narrow terms of the death penalty statutes
themselves 135 and conduct an investigation that "[11iterally. . . be-
gins with the onset of the client's life: prenatal care and birth."13 6
Experts have identified several broad categories of evidence that
might be put forward by the defendant at the penalty phase:1 7 (1)
evidence that portrays the positive qualities the defendant pos-
sesses; 38 (2) evidence that makes the defendant's violent acts "hu-
manly understandable in light of his past history and the unique
circumstances affecting his formative development"; 3 (3) evidence
that tends to show that the defendant's life in prison will likely be
productive, or at least unthreatening to others; 4 ' (4) evidence that
criminal trials.").
135. There are two broad categories of mitigation: statutory mitigating factors and non-
statutory mitigating factors. Typical statutory mitigating factors include the defendant's
youth; lack of significant prior criminal activity; impaired capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct; and lesser role in the criminal activity that resulted in the death of
another. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (1962). For the most part, statutory
mitigators tend to be narrowly defined and generally "barren of helpful guidelines" for de-
veloping mitigating evidence. William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty
Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 284 (1991). They usually do little more than
mimic the mitigating circumstances listed in the statutory schemes found constitutional by
the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); they "do not ... represent a considered legisla-
tive policy judgment about what makes an offender comparatively less culpable." Geimer,
supra, at 284. A well-prepared penalty trial will frequently focus on mitigating factors that
are not specifically identified in statutes but which under the Lockett doctrine cannot be
unduly restricted by the states. See supra notes 68-70, 83-87 and accompanying text. To
identify these factors, the defense attorney must closely study the caselaw and the writings
of death penalty experts.
136. Lyon, supra note 33, at 703.
137. The categories set forth here have been culled from'Goodpaster, The Trial for
Life, supra note 103, at 335-37; Lyon, supra note 33, at 703; and Geimer, supra note 135, at
286. Most mitigating factors are "comprised of circumstances that would be considered miti-
gating only in a retributive manner." Kelly, supra note 74, at 446.
138. Falling within this category would be evidence of general good character, military
service, service to the community, or a minor or non-existent prior criminal record. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub
nom.; Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); ABA GUmELmES,
supra note 33, Guideline 11.8.6(B)(3) & (6). Also relevant would be evidence of the defend-
ant's employment history and hardworking nature, see id., Guideline 11.8.6(B)(4); Arm-
strong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987), perseverance in overcoming hard-
ships, see Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1483-84 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
872 (1986), or remorse for his crime, see Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 889 (11th Cir.
1987).
139. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 335.
140. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987) (stating that a history of non-
violent behavior while incarcerated might be relevant to sentencing decision); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (holding that evidence of past peaceful behavior in
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rebuts the prosecutor's evidence of aggravating circumstances;
141
and (5) evidence of extenuating circumstances surrounding the
capital crime itself.14
2
Of these categories, the second is usually the most significant.
A jury might be persuaded that a death sentence is unjust because
of the defendant's youth,143 impaired mental capacity,144 or stunted
intellectual or emotional development. 14 Evidence of the defend-
prison is relevant mitigation evidence); Miller v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 426, 430-31 (11th Cir.
1986) (holding that testimony concerning defendant's rehabilitative capacity is relevant mit-
igation); see also ABA GUDELINES, supra note 33, Guideline 11.8.6(B)(5)-(7).
141. Especially burdensome is the need to investigate and possibly rebut the prosecu-
tion's evidence of victim impact. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
142. This category would include evidence leaving a lingering doubt about the defend-
ant's guilt of capital murder in the jurors' minds, a lesser role played by the defendant in a
crime committed by several persons, or any confession made by the defendant. Geimer,
supra note 135, at 286; see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979) (involving evi-
dence that defendant was not triggerman); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1352-55 (10th
Cir.) (involving shared or limited participation in crime), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984);
Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983) (involving cooperation with au-
thorities), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984). Evidence that the defendant was provoked or
acted under duress or coercion, see, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987), or was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time he committed his crime, see, e.g., Sumner
v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per
curiam), has also been deemed mitigating.
143. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
116 (1982); see also Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 n.* (1993) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (noting that thirty of the thirty-six states with death penalty statutes either iden-
tify age as a statutory mitigating factor, or prohibit the execution of those who were under
age 18 at the time of the commission of the crime). Youth is viewed as a factor that reduces
a defendant's moral culpability for the offense because the "emotional and cognitive imma-
turity and inexperience with life render him less responsible," and because youthfulness "is
transitory, indicating that the defendant is less likely to be dangerous in the future." Gra-
ham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 924 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). At least twenty-five states
specifically identify impaired mental capacity as a statutory mitigating circumstance. See
Bilionis, supra note 69, at 303 n.62 (listing statutory provisions). Those who are mentally
retarded or impaired are largely immune from the deterrent effect of punishment. Liebman
& Shepard, supra note 75, at 827-28. Moreover, the mental capacity of the defendant is
relevant to a retributive judgment about the defendant and his crime, because the criminal
conduct of mental retardates often "stem from an impulsive reaction against the painful
awareness, hammered home by frustration, failure, and humiliation, of the cruel trick that
biology has played on him," id. at 825 (internal quotation omitted), and because the cogni-
tion and volition level of the mentally impaired are low, cutting against any sense that the
defendant is fully responsible for his actions. Id. at 825-26. Thus, evidence of a capital de-
fendant's mental capacity might persuade a jury to render "a sentence of less than death"
because the defendant's personal responsibility for the offense is diminished by his inability
"to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his conduct." Penry, 492 U.S. at
322.
145. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 787 n.7 (1987); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116.
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ant's insanity, mental illness, or medically-diagnosed personality
disorder is relevant to the jury's determination of the defendant's
moral responsibility for his offense.14 Evidence of a difficult child-
hood; domestic turbulence; physical, mental or sexual abuse; neg-
lect; poverty; or other tragic formative influences might mitigate
against the imposition of a death sentence. 147 Such evidence might
help explain the defendant's distorted personality, warped devel-
opm.ent, and abhorrent acts. It might arouse compassion or mercy,
or undermine the uncomplicated picture of good and evil that the
146. For a general discussion of the mitigating effect of evidence of mental illness or
diagnosed personality disorders, see Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of
Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sen-
tencing, 41 HASTNGS L.J. 409 (1990). Evidence of mental illness "has the potential to totally
change the evidentiary picture by altering the causal relationship that can exist between
mental illness and homicidal behavior." Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir.
1988). The Model Penal Code lists "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" and "mental
disease or defect" as mitigating circumstances, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b) & (g)
(1980), and at least 22 states expressly identify some sort of mental illness as a statutory
mitigator. Bilionis, supra note 69, at 303 n.63; see also ABA GuEDELINEs, supra note 33,
Guideline 11.8.6(B)(1). Personality disorders, such as the psychopathic condition called
"anti-social personality," have been linked to "identifiable childhood characteristics and bi-
ological abnormalities," Liebman & Shepard, supra note 75, at 831, and evidence of such
disorders mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty on those afflicted with them.
See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107, 115; Clisby v. State, 456 So. 2d 99, 102 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). Even evidence of sociopathy-a lack of conscience
or super ego-can mitigate against execution. Sociopaths typically are unable to conform to
the rules of society or experience guilt. Liebman & Shepard, supra note 75, at 830. They
cannot be deterred from committing crimes, because they are unable "either to suppress
immediate gratification in favor of longterm needs or to conform to the basic moral codes of
the society"; their conduct is unaltered by the threat of punishment. Id. at 833. The soci-
opath's impaired ability to conform his actions to the rules of society diminish the volitional
character of his conduct, mitigating against a retributive judgment requiring a sentence of
death. Id. at 832.
147. See, e.g., Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 926 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that evidence
of defendant's unhappy upbringing, repeated custodial changes, and mother's mental illness
and repeated hospitalization is mitigating); Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (stating that "defendants
who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background ... may be
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse"); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16
(holding that evidence of defendant's "difficult family history and of emotional disturbance"
is mitigating); Middleton, 849 F.2d at 495 (holding that evidence of "a childhood of brutal
treatment and neglect" and sexual abuse is mitigating); Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430,
1433 (11th Cir. 1987) (involving evidence of childhood poverty and poor living conditions,
inadequate adult supervision, and irregular school attendance); Porter v. Wainwright, 805
F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving mitigation evidence including testimony describing
mental and physical abuse inflicted by stepfather during defendant's childhood and physi-
cal, emotional, and sexual abuse defendant suffered at juvenile detention centers), cert. de-
nied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1466 (8th Cir. 1983) (involv-
ing turbulent family background, physical abuse by father, and repeated attempts to run
away from home). See also ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 33, Guideline 11.4.1(D)(2) & (3),
11.8.6(B)(5).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
prosecution would like the jury to accept in rendering a
sentence.48
Amassing mitigation evidence149 is an intimidating and time-
consuming task. 150 An attorney or investigator must interview all
"witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history,"'' in-
cluding relatives, childhood friends, neighbors, teachers, ministers,
and social workers. 52 This is an enormous undertaking often com-
plicated by the difficulty in locating such witnesses, many of whom
may have not been in the defendant's life for years.5 " The defense
attorney likely will be required to meet with the defendant and
members of his family several times in an effort to gain their trust
148. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 335-36; see also WHITE, NINE-
TIS, supra note 82, at 76 ("Defense counsel must gather together a massive amount of
material pertaining to the defendant and present it to the jury in a way that will explain
where the defendant has come from and why he has become the man he is now."); Weisberg,
supra note 75, at 381 ("The artful defense lawyer describes a narrative chain from a child-
hood of abuse, neglect and family turmoil, to a youth in social or penal institutions and an
introduction to brutality and crime, up to the present murder.").
149. For a discussion of the vital importance of extensive investigation of mitigation,
see sources cited supra note 103. See also Geimer, supra note 135, at 290-91.
150. Preparation for the penalty phase of the defendant's trial must begin at the outset
of the attorney's representation of the defendant. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 33,
Guideline 11.4.1(A), 11.8.3(A), commentary to Guideline 1.1 at 32. At trial, counsel will be
required to integrate a theory of the case at the guilt phase with a theory of mitigation at
the penalty phase. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 33, Guideline 1.1 commentary at 32; Good-
paster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 329; Lyon, supra note 33, at 708-11. Capital
punishment experts stress that:
[c]ounsel's obligation to discover and appropriately present all potentially benefi-
cial mitigating evidence at the penalty phase should influence everything the at-
torney does before and during trial: it should shape the relationship with the cli-
ent, prosecutor, court personnel, and jurors; it should determine how voir dire
proceeds, how potential jurors are questioned, which potential jurors are chal-
lenged for cause and which peremptorily; and it should directly affect the nature
of the defense presented during the guilt trial and the affirmative mitigating case
put on at the penalty trial.
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 320 (citing Denis N. Balske, New Strate-
gies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV. 331, 353-59 (1979)).
151. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 33, Guideline 11.4.1(D)(3)(B) at 95; see also Lyon,
supra note 33, at 704-05.
152. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 321. See also WHITE, NINETIES,
supra note 82, at 79 ("Someone will need to talk to the people who knew the defendant
during the various stages of his life-family members, friends, teachers, psychiatrists-and
who can trace the path of his life for the jury."); Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 133("[T]he defense should develop evidence ... concerning the defendant's entire back-
ground-including childhood, mental and psychological conditions, family relations, em-
ployment history, prior arrests and convictions, medical history, and much more.").
153. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at 321 ("Counsel will have to
uncover witnesses from a possibly distant past, not only relatives, but childhood friends,
teachers, ministers, neighbors, all of whom may be scattered like a diaspora of leaves along
the tracks of defendant's travels.").
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and develop an effective relationship with them.1" The attorney
may be met with resistance to the investigation of mitigating evi-
dence;155 this resistance must either be overcome or ignored, for
without conducting a complete investigation, the attorney cannot
properly advise the defendant at trial.1 56 The attorney must assem-
ble the documentary record of the defendant's life, collecting
school, work, and prison records which might provide clues to the
causes of the deterioration of the defendant's personality. 157 The
attorney must also perform the wrenching task of interviewing
members of the victim's family to determine whether any of them
would be willing to testify in opposition of the defendant's execu-
tion.158 In states in which "victim impact" evidence is deemed ad-
missible, defense attorneys are required to investigate the victim's
background in much the same way that they must examine the
defendant's past, so that they can anticipate and, if possible, di-
minish the impact of such evidence.1 59
The preparation and presentation of mitigation evidence re-
quires substantial expert assistance.160 In addition to trained inves-
tigators competent to locate and interview witnesses and assemble
demonstrative evidence,161 an attorney will need the aid of persons
154. Id. at 321-23; Lyon, supra note 33, at 703-04. In interviewing the defendant, as
well as his family and friends, the attorney may require time to overcome racial, cultural, or
socioeconomic barriers, or may be required to overcome problems of communication when
the defendant is emotionally disturbed or mentally impaired. Berger, The Chiropractor as
Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 250-51; Tabak, Death of Fairness, supra note 4, at 804.
155. The defendant or his family may distrust the attorney or may not want private
facts they view as shameful or embarrassing aired publicly in a crowded courtroom. The
defendant and his family may lack awareness that certain facts about the defendant's up-
bringing might be considered mitigating, making the attorney's investigation more difficult.
156. See ABA GUmELINEs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.4.1(C) and commentary at 93-
96. Absent investigation of all potential mitigating evidence, "counsel's evaluation and ad-
vice amount to little more than a guess." Id. at 96. See also id. Guideline 1.1 commentary at
32 ("Substantial pretrial investigation is a necessary base for intelligent assessment of possi-
bly conflicting options as to the defense.").
157. See Lyon, supra note 33, at 705-06.
158. ABA GUDELI-Es, supra note 33, Guideline 11.4.1(D)(3)(C) at 95.
159. States may allow the sentencer to consider evidence of the victim's "uniqueness as
an individual human being," Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991), and the impact
of the defendant's crimes on the victim's survivors. Id. at 827. In permitting consideration of
such evidence, the Supreme Court reasoned that "victim impact" evidence was relevant to
"the specific harm caused by the crime in question," which in turn is germane to "the de-
fendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness." Id. at 824. The Payne decision has been
extensively criticized. See, e.g., Dow, When Law Bows to Politics, supra note 14; Dubber,
supra note 70, at 133-45.
160. The presentation of expert testimony in death cases is discussed generally in
Geimer, supra note 135, at 291-92. See also ABA GUMELINES, supra note 33, Guidelines
11.4.1(D)(7), 11.8.6(B)(1)-(8) at 94-95, 133.
161. ABA GumELNEs, supra note 33, Guideline 8.1 commentary at 73-74; see also id.
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skilled in social work and related disciplines to assist and possibly
testify during the penalty phase."6 2 Perhaps most importantly,
counsel needs mental health experts to help develop mitigation
theories, to prepare defense counsel to cross-examine experts testi-
fying for the prosecution, and to testify of behalf of the
defendant.6 3
If a client is sentenced to death, the responsibilities of counsel
during the appellate process can be nearly as daunting as those
during the trial stage. When a client faces death, the attorney can-
not make the sort of cost-benefit choices that might be made in
non-capital cases. The gravity of the punishment should overcome
any hesitancy to raise an issue that, in the attorney's view, is un-
likely to prove successful on appeal."" Cases are legion of defend-
ants who have been executed after their counsel failed to raise
"marginal" claims that proved successful when raised by other
capital defendants.165 Given the seriousness of death cases and the
instability of capital punishment jurisprudence, there are pressures
on counsel to raise all available "law reform" issues calling for a
change in existing precedent, even under circumstances where such
issues might not be pursued if the client was not facing death."66
Further, since the federal courts have been constricting the availa-
bility of habeas corpus review of claims not raised before state
Guideline 11.4.1(D)(7) at 95-96.
162. Id. Guideline 8.1 commentary at 73-74.
163. Id. Guideline 8.1 commentary at 74. See also id. Guideline 11.4.1(D)(7) at 95.
164. This principle must also inform the defense attorney's conduct during the pre-trial
and trial stages. Most states adhere to strict procedural default rules, even in capital cases,
and issues not adequately presented at the trial stage will not be considered on appeal.
Thus, in deciding whether to pursue some legal strategy through a motion brought before or
during trial, "trial counsel's perception that the effort needed to bring the motion probably
outweighs the chances of the motion being granted should not alone preclude filing of the
motion." Id. Guideline 11.5.1 commentary at 103.
165. There are numerous examples of different sentences meted out to similarly-situ-
ated defendants solely because one attorney decided to raise a legal issue at trial or on
appeal that was not raised by another attorney. See, e.g., Bright, Counsel for the Poor,
supra note 10, at 1839-40 (noting that John Eldon Smith was executed by the State of
Georgia after attorney failed to challenge jury composition, while co-defendant's death sen-
tence was reversed because jury composition issue properly preserved); Friedman & Steven-
son, supra note 111, at 20 n.103 (noting that the Alabama Supreme Court granted Paul
Edward Murry relief from a death sentence because his attorney preserved an objection to
the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that it could not convict someone of the capital
offense of killing an on-duty law enforcement officer unless the defendant knew the victim
was a police officer, but refused relief to Ed Harrell, whose attorney did not preserve an
identical objection). See also Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of
Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty,
57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 885 (1992) [hereinafter Bright, In Defense of Life].
166. ABA GumaLlNs, supra note 33, Guideline 11.5.1 commentary at 103.
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courts, 67 counsel must take pains to raise all possible federal con-
stitutional issues at every opportunity, or risk falling into the "pro-
cedural 'black hole'" created by increasingly unforgiving proce-
dural default rules. "8
It is obvious, then, that an attorney representing a capital de-
fendant must expend an extraordinary amount of time and re-
sources in investigating, preparing, and presenting a defense that
gives meaning to the safeguards erected by the Supreme Court
against the arbitrary, irrational, or unfair application of the death
penalty. One commentator characterized the required expenditures
as "astronomical."' 69 A more precise estimate of the required costs
of capital litigation for the defense is elusive; the next section sum-
marizes the efforts that have been made to quantify those costs.
C. Estimating the Cost of Death Penalty Litigation During the
Primary Trial and Direct Appeal
Few studies have attempted to measure directly the expendi-
tures necessary to properly defend a capital defendant during the
initial trial-the "main event"170 of capital litigation-or during
the direct appeal.11 The few studies that exist are informative, but
167. See infra notes 413-15. Once a death row inmate has exhausted his direct appeals
in state court, he may seek review of his conviction and sentence by the United States Su-
preme Court, usually by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. Amsterdam, supra note 99, at
16. If that petition is denied, the inmate must exhaust any collateral post-conviction reme-
dies available to him under state law. Most states provide some procedure for raising post-
conviction challenges to a conviction and sentence. Id. at 17. In those states, the inmate files
a petition in the same court where he was originally convicted and sentenced, and the in-
mate can appeal the denial of a post-conviction petition through the state appellate courts.
Id. Typically, the grounds for relief in state post-conviction are very limited, and petitions
are rarely granted. See infra note 401 and accompanying text. After state court appeals are
exhausted, and perhaps after another certiorari petition is filed with and denied by the
United States Supreme Court, the death row inmate can file a petition for habeas corpus
relief with the United States District Court for the district in which the inmate was con-
victed and sentenced. Substantively, federal habeas relief is available to an inmate who can
show that his conviction or sentence was obtained in violation of the United States Consti-
tution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In recent years, however, formidable procedural barri-
ers have radically restricted the availability of habeas relief even to those inmates whose
convictions and sentences were obtained in gross violation of the Constitution. See infra
part IV.A.1.
168. Lyon, supra note 33, at 698.
169. Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 299.
170. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); see also Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 744 (1991).
171. See UNITED STATEs GEN. AccT. OFFICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE
ON CosTs OF DEATH SErENCES 1-2 (1989) (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives). Widely
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tend to understate defense costs." Most capital defendants are in-
digent and represented by appointed counsel or public defenders,
and the resources provided for indigent defense services can be an
artificial constraint on both the expenditures that are actually
made on behalf of those indigent defendants17 and on subjective
perceptions of the level of funding required for capital defense.174
As will be seen, most attorneys asked to defend those accused of
capital crimes cannot or will not compensate for the shortfalls in
state funding through the use of their own private resources. The
result is that much of the research, investigation, and expert work
required for the preparation of a meaningful defense in a capital
ranging estimates of the cost of the death penalty have been offered in the reports of these
studies. See, e.g, CoITmE TO STUDY THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND, FINAL REPORT:
THE COST AND HOURS ASSOCIATED WITH PROCESSING A SAMPLE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER
CASES FOR WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY WAS SOUGHT IN MARYLAND BETWEEN JULY 1979 AND
MARCH 1984 (1985); COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 111; Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth
R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment?: Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 45, 47-58 (1989).
172. Two reports are based on a study of expenditures of time and money made in
actual cases. See CooK & SLAWSON, supra note 111 (studying North Carolina cases con-
ducted in early 1990s); ComrsrrpE TO STUDY THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND, supra note
171 (studying Maryland cases in early 1980s). Others are based, at least in part, on re-
sponses to questionnaires directed at prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. See, e.g.,
CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 111; Garey, supra note 53; Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note
171.
173. Accord Vreeland, supra note 33, at 649 n.187 ("Since most appointed counsel and
public defenders operate under severe financial constraints, the time they would invest in
effective representation of capital defendants could be discerned only if those constraints
were lifted."). In most states, the financial constraints are less oppressive for defense attor-
neys who were retained, rather than appointed, to represent capital defendants, and some-
what better estimates of the work required to defend a capital case might be obtained from
retained counsel A cautionary note, however, was sounded by William P. Redick, Jr., the
Director of the Capital Case Resource Center of Tennessee, who has been involved in capital
litigation since 1978:
I have never seen retained counsel in a capital case, rare as those instances are, in
which the attorney quoted an adequate fee or was paid an adequate fee. In almost
every instance, the defendant or his family has retained an attorney who does not
appreciate the amount of work that the case would require and consequently
quotes a fee that the defendant/family are willing to pay.
Letter from William P. Redick, Jr., to Douglas W. Vick 2 (March 2, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Redick Letter].
174. The studies have sought estimates from defense attorneys, prosecutors, or judges
regarding the level of funding that would be adequate to assure that the indigent receive an
adequate defense in capital cases. These estimates will be colored by the modest expecta-
tions that become engrained in attorneys accustomed to the realities of day-to-day practice
within jurisdictions suffering severe funding shortages. Cf. Redick Letter, supra note 173, at
1 (writing that funds provided for experts and investigators in Tennessee are artificially low
in part "because the expectations of both the bench and bar concerning what the cases
require are very low").
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case goes undone.175
There have been a comparatively greater number of studies
concerning the costs of capital punishment litigation during collat-
eral post-conviction proceedings conducted after completion of the
direct appeal."7 ' This data can be helpful in estimating the costs
associated with the defendant's primary trial and direct appeal,
but they must be viewed critically. Typically, the primary (and
often only) issue in post-conviction proceedings is whether the cap-
ital defendant received effective assistance of counsel during his
primary trial and direct appeal.177 In preparing an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim in a death case, post-conviction counsel
must perform most of the tasks that should have been performed
by the inmate's original trial attorney.1 78 Accordingly, cost esti-
mates for pre-trial preparation of post-conviction cases provide
some basis for approximating the cost of preparing for a capital
defendant's initial trial. In some ways, however, data concerning
the cost of post-conviction representation will understate defense
costs at the initial trial, because post-conviction attorneys will al-
ready have the benefit of the knowledge gained and wrong turns
taken by the defendant's original counsel. "9 In other ways, this
data will overstate the costs of adequate representation during the
defendant's initial trial, since a large number of the attorneys who
have represented death row inmates in post-conviction proceedings
lack experience in criminal matters at the outset of their represen-
tation,8 0 and the difficult procedural nuances of post-conviction
175. See generally infra part M.A.
176. See, e.g., Tan SPANGENBERG GRoup, A CASELOADIWORKLOAD FORMULA FOR FLOR-
MA'S OFFICE OF THE CAPrTAL COLLATERAL REPRESENTATIVE (1987); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
A REPORT ON POSTCONVICTION CAPITAL REPRESENTATION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (Draft
Report) (Feb. 1990); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL
CASES IN TExAS (1993) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY]; SPANGENBERG, TIME AND
EXPENSE ANALYSIS, supra note 33; see also ABA Task Force, supra note 2; Alice McGill,
Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in
Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990). See also supra note 167
(describing post-conviction proceedings).
177. See infra part IV.A.2.
178. See, e.g., WHITE, NIn~ms, supra note 82, at 14 (explaining that preparations for
federal habeas corpus challenges to death sentences "involve a tedious and prolonged search
for critical mitigating or exculpatory evidence that was either not available or was not found
at the time of the defendant's trial").
179. In addition, since post-conviction cases are almost always taken on a pro bono
basis, the same economic constraints" distorting the data gathered from the attorneys origi-
nally assigned to capital cases could affect estimates of the cost of the post-conviction repre-
sentation of death row inmates. On the other hand, a greater percentage of the post-convic-
tion cases that have been studied involved the work of attorneys with large law firms with
greater resources to dedicate to the representation of indigents on America's death rows.
180. On the other hand, indigent defendants facing the death penalty are frequently
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proceedings can add to the legal research costs of post-conviction
representation.
The results of the studies that have attempted a cost analysis
of the representation of defendants in capital cases must be scruti-
nized with these limitations in mind. Nonetheless, no matter how
skeptically existing data is viewed, it incontrovertibly establishes
that the costs of representing defendants charged with capital
crimes are far greater than the resources provided for the represen-
tation of the poor in most states with the death penalty."'
A starting point for the evaluation of the costs of capital rep-
resentation is data collected in studies conducted in the mid- and
late-1980s, primarily in California.182 Questionnaires completed by
prosecutors and defense attorneys who had worked on capital cases
indicated that defense attorneys file from two to six times as many
pretrial motions in capital cases as they do in non-capital cases,
and prosecutors file twice as many motions.183 Because of their rel-
ative complexity, pre-trial motions in California death penalty
cases consume an average of twelve days of court time, as opposed
to the one day expended in non-capital murder cases.184
represented by attorneys at their initial trial who have had little or no more criminal law
experience than those who have taken on post-conviction death penalty appeals. These trial
attorneys would face the same learning curve confronted by many post-conviction attorneys.
181. The estimate of the resources necessary to defend a capital case developed here
assumes that most death penalty states will follow past practice and rely primarily on non-
specialists to perform capital defense work at the initial stages rather than establish an
office staffed by attorneys who work exclusively on death penalty cases. Currently, most
attorneys who defend death cases are private attorneys with small practices, often sole prac-
tices, with no particular expertise in capital litigation at the outset of their representation. If
death cases were handled solely by a cadre of trained specialists, certain costs (such as legal
research) would be spread over a number of cases, and thus the cost of providing meaningful
representation in death cases would probably decrease. A 1990 survey of capital trial lawyers
in six Southern states-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas-found "near unanimity" supporting the use of specially trained lawyers to handle
death penalty trials. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's
Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 44.
182. For a discussion of the costs of capital representation in California, see generally
Stephen Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, SACHA-
mENTo BEE, March 28, 1988, at Al; see also Garey, supra note 53, at 1245-70; Spangenberg
& Walsh, supra note 171. California dedicates far more resources to capital defense than
other death penalty states. It is therefore alarming that the director of the California Appel-
late Project has observed that even in that state, the quality of the defense provided at the
trial level is "substandard" in 15-20% of that state's death penalty cases. Millman, supra
note 18, at 385.
183. Garey, supra note 53, at 1248; see also CAPITAL LosSES, supra note 111, at 12 (esti-
mating that attorneys filed between ten and twenty-five motions in capital cases, as con-
trasted to five to seven in non-capital cases); Vreeland, supra note 33, at 646-47 (same).
184. Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al (citing a 1985 U.C. Davis Law Review study, a
1986-87 study by California's Administrative Office of the Courts, and interviews with pros-
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One study indicates that jury selection in capital cases takes
on average 5.3 times longer to complete than it does in non-death
cases;185 another indicates that jury voir dire in capital cases lasts
from two days to two months longer in death cases than in non-
death cases.186 Data from the mid-1980s reveal that the capital
trial itself lasts on average three to four times longer than non-
capital murder trials,87 with the average capital trial requiring
thirty to forty days of court time."8 '
The resources required to try a capital case pale in comparison
to the resources required to prepare for one. Death penalty experts
have observed that defense lawyers must invest several hundred
hours into research and investigation to properly prepare for a cap-
ital trial.189 A national survey of lawyers representing death row
inmates in post-conviction proceedings indicated that attorneys ex-
pended an average of 582 attorney hours when the case was at the
trial court level in state post-conviction, and support staff ex-
ecutors and defense lawyers).
185. Garey, supra note 53, at 1257 (citing L. Saunders et al., An Empirical Study At-
tempting to Compare the Trial Costs of Capital Cases with the Trial Costs of Noncapital
Cases (Spring 1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review)).
186. Id., at 1257 n.173; see also 1 CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS FOR CRIM. JUST. & CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASS'N, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MIANUAL at E-7 (1986); Span-
genberg & Walsh, supra note 171, at 51-52; Vreeland, supra note 33, at 647-48. In Califor-
nia, jury selection in a capital case takes on average 25 days, while jury selection in the
typical non-capital murder trial lasts three days. Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al.
187. Garey, supra note 53, at 1258 (citing study of twenty California cases involving
first degree murder convictions (ten capital and ten non-capital) in which capital trials aver-
aged 42 days and non-capital trials averaged 12 days); Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al
(reporting that guilt and penalty phases of average capital case in California lasts 42 days,
while non-capital murder trials last an average of 11 days); accord Spangenberg & Walsh,
supra note 171, at 53 (citing KANSAS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP'T, COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING
THE DEATH PENALTY, HOUSE BLL 2062 at 3 (1987)).
188. Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al (noting that average death penalty case in Cali-
fornia requires 30 days of trial testimony at guilt phase, and an additional 12 days for the
penalty phase); see also Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 171, at 53 (average capital trial
lasts 30 days); accord Garey, supra note 53, at 1258 & n.176.
189. See Vreeland, supra note 33, at 649. Professor Welsh White, quoting a psycholo-
gist who had worked on several death penalty cases, wrote:
[U]nless someone is able to spend hundreds of hours interviewing witnesses and
going through documents, "the defense can do little more than scratch the sur-
face." That is why you see penalty trials in which the defense presents no mitigat-
ing evidence or in which only the defendant's mother is called to testify.
WHrrE, NINETIEs, supra note 82, at 86-87. To be cost-effective, much of this work should be
conducted by non-attorneys. Currently, the average fee charged by criminal investigators is
$40 per hour. NATIONAL FORENSIC CENTER, THE GUIDE TO EXPERTS' FEES 1992-1993 39
(1992). However, the hourly rates for experienced investigators in some jurisdictions can
range between $75 and $200. CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 111, at 13. In the early 1980s, the
National College for Criminal Defense estimated that the minimum investigation cost for
just the guilt phase of a capital trial was $10,000. Id.
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pended on average 257 hours.190 A survey from the mid-1980s
showed that the staff attorneys in the Death Penalty Unit of Ma-
ryland's Public Defender's Office worked an average of 535 hours
per case at the trial level. 191 A recent study showed that defense
attorneys in North Carolina spend an average of 613 hours on a
capital case at the trial level.1 9 2 In New Jersey, staff attorneys with
the State Public Defender Office spent between 630 and 1166
hours in out-of-court time preparing for each capital case handled
by that office.193
The preparation and presentation of an adequate defense in a
death penalty case requires substantial assistance from experts. No
case of mitigation can be properly prepared without consulting
mental health experts. Currently, psychiatrists charge an average
of $250 per hour for trial preparation work and $300 per hour for
court testimony;19 4 psychologists charge an average of $100 per
hour for trial preparation and $150 per hour for trial testimony.1°
Other experts are similarly expensive: physicians cost an average of
$250 an hour before trial and $275 per hour at trial;196 pathologists
charge an average of $185 per hour for trial preparation and $275
per hour for trial testimony;197 substance abuse experts charge an
190. SPANGENBERG, TIE AND EXPENSE ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 9, 17, 20. The me-
dian number of hours reported by the sample of attorneys was 400 hours. Id. at 9. The
results of this survey are conservative, since the data included cases that were still pending
at various stages of post-conviction (and thus all time expended on all cases was not re-
ported) and because many of the attorneys responding to questionnaires were not compen-
sated and thus did not keep records of all time and costs expended on their cases. Id. at 6-7,
19. Among attorneys who did maintain contemporaneous time records, the median number
of attorney hours expended at the trial level in state post-conviction was 494 (average 887).
Id. at 14. Data regarding support staff time was generally undocumented, and estimates
were, again, conservative. Id. at 16.
191. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN Vi-
GINIA: FINAL REPORT 23 (1988) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA STUDY].
192. COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 111, at 61-63.
193. SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA STUDY, supra note 191, at 23.
194. NATIONAL FORENSIC CENTER, supra note 189, at 50. Hourly fees for trial prepara-
tion range from a low of $125 to a high of $350; hourly rates for trial testimony range from
$125 to $500. Id. Psychiatrists who bill for trial testimony on a daily basis charge from
$1000 to $4000 per day, with an average of $2500 per day. Id. The average charge for the
preparation of a report by a psychiatrist is $235 per hour. Id.
195. Id. at 51. The hourly rates charged by psychologists for pre-trial work range from a
low of $50 to a high of $125; hourly rates for trial testimony range from $100 to $200. Id.
The average daily rate for trial testimony is $1200 per day; daily rates range from $800 to
$3000. Id. The average charge for the preparation of a report is $70 per hour. Id.
196. Id. at 48. Hourly fees for trial preparation range from a low of $100 to a high of
$400; hourly rates for trial testimony range from $65 to $500 and daily rates range from
$500 to $5000. Id. The average charge for the preparation of a report is $250 per hour. Id.
197. Id. at 47. Hourly fees for trial preparation range from a low of $100 to a high of
$250; hourly rates for trial testimony range from $100 to $1000 and daily rates range from
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average of $200 per hour before trial and $275 per hour for trial
testimony."1 8 In the mid-1980s, specialists on eyewitness identifica-
tion cost approximately $500 per day for courtroom testimony and
$100 per hour for consultation; jury selection experts cost $500 per
day; crime scene reconstructionists and blood stain analysts cost
$700 to $1000 per day. ee In one year in the 1980s, New Jersey
spent $6.9 million providing expert witnesses for the defense in
death penalty cases, an average of $42,000 per trial.2 00 In Califor-
nia, $15,000 is spent on psychiatrists and other expert witnesses in
the typical capital case, with an additional $25,000-$50,000 spent
on investigation costs.
20 1
A direct appeal of a death sentence can be nearly as time-con-
suming as preparing and presenting a defense at trial. A number of
estimates have placed the average attorney hours required to prop-
erly pursue such an appeal at around 700-1000.202 In California,
lawyers were paid an average $110,000 for appellate work at the
state level in death cases, at an .hourly rate ($75) that was not ade-
quate to attract enough attorneys to represent all defendants ap-
pealing their death sentences. e3
In sum, the defense of a capital case is a costly proposition. In
$375 to $8000, with an average rate being $2100 per day. Id. The average charge for the
preparation of a report is $180 per hour. Id.
198. Id. at 8. The hourly rates charged by such experts for pre-trial work range from a
low of $100 to a high of $250; hourly rates for trial testimony range from $150 to $375. Id.
199. CAPrrAL LOSSES, supra note 111, at 15; see also Garey, supra note 53, at 1253-54.
200. Compare Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 137-38 (citing Presentation of Dale
Jones, New Jersey Office of the Public Advocate (Jan. 19, 1989)) and SPANGENBERG, TIME
AND EXPENSE ANALYsis, supra note 33, at 18-20 (concluding from data compiled from a sur-
vey of a sample of over 100 attorneys representing death row inmates during post-conviction
proceedings that expenditures on expert witnesses and other necessary litigation costs
ranged from $100 to $96,667 with an average of $4000).
201. Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al.
202. Millman, supra note 18, at 384; see also CAPrrAL LOSSES, supra note 111, at 20
(estimating that, based on standards developed by the Appellate Section of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, one appeal requires 800-900 attorney hours); Garey,
supra note 53, at 1263 ("A typical capital appeal takes approximately 800-1000 attorney
hours."); Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 171, at 52 ("On average, capital appeals take
500-1000 hours of defense attorney time."); see generally COMMIrrEE TO STUDY THE DEATH
PENALTY IN MARYLAND, supra note 171; KANsAS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP'T, COSTS OF IM-
PLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY, HousE BILL 2062 at 4 (1987). One study indicated that in
addition to the cost of direct appeals through the state court system, in cases in which a writ
of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court is sought and granted, the attorney can
expect to expend approximately 46% of one work year on Supreme Court proceedings alone.
CAPrrAL LossEs, supra note 111, at 21-22. The study's estimate is based on time expended
on research, preparing the certiorari petition, preparing briefs, and preparing for oral argu-
ment. Id.
203. Phillip Carrizosa, Fixed Fees for Capital Appeals are Approved, S. F. DAmY J.,
Dec. 16, 1993, at 3.
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a system serious about minimizing the arbitrary or unfair applica-
tion of the death penalty, attorneys representing the accused in an
unexceptional death case would need to expend over 600 hours in
pre-trial preparation, 600 hours in court time, and 700 hours dur-
ing the direct appeal in state court, and these estimates are con-
servative. Under the terms of the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Amend-
ments Act of 1988,204 an attorney representing an indigent
defendant facing the death penalty for a federal offense currently
is paid around $100 per hour for both out-of-court and in-court
work.20 5 At this rate, the cost for attorney time alone in a typical
capital case would be around $190,000.201 On top of this figure, the
204. 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). With this act, Congress greatly expanded the number of
federal crimes punishable by death. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1988). At the same time, Con-
gress gave indigents a statutory right to appointed counsel both in federal capital cases and
in federal habeas proceedings in which death sentences received under state law were being
challenged. See id. § 848(q)(4)(A)&(B). In addition to establishing minimum experience re-
quirements for counsel appointed in death cases, see id. § 848(q)(5)-(7), the act provided
that defense counsel would be compensated at the hourly rate set by the court and provided
funds for "investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services" approved by the
court. See id. § 848(q)(10).
205. Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10), compensation rates are left to the discretion of the
district court, but the statute clearly calls for a departure from the "bargain-basement
rates" and fee caps provided by the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d), which gov-
erns compensation rates for attorneys appointed in non-capital cases. United States v.
Cooper, 746 F. Supp. 1352, 1352 (N.D. IlM. 1990). The United States Judicial Conference has
recommended that fees under § 848(q)(10) be set between $75 per hour and $125 per hour.
VII GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES 11 6.02(B) (1993). In the relatively few reported cases applying the statute, the com-
pensation rates set for defense attorneys have usually exceeded $100 per hour. See, e.g., Hill
v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to disturb hourly rate of $85 set by
Arkansas district court for work at habeas corpus stage); Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d
1226, 1231 (8th Cir. 1991) (deeming reasonable $115 per hour for attorney time and $40 per
hour for law clerks and paralegals in Arkansas habeas case); United States v. Cheely, 790
F. Supp. 901, 909 (D. Alaska 1992) (setting attorney compensation at $125 per hour for out-
of-court and in-court time in federal death penalty case); Cooper, 746 F. Supp. at 1354
(same). The $100 hourly rate appears to be close to the minimum necessary to attract com-
petent counsel to do capital defense work. For example, a survey asked attorneys in Texas
who had in the past represented defendants charged with capital crimes what minimum
hourly rate would be necessary to persuade them to take another capital case, the median
response was $100. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 53.
206. Over a decade ago, it was estimated that if New York reinstated the death penalty,
defense costs for the guilt and penalty phases of a capital defendant's trial would average
$352,700, and a direct appeal within the state court system would cost another $80,000 for
the defense. CAPrrAL LossEs, supra note 111, at 18, 21. A Maryland law firm which repre-
sented a capital defendant on a pro bono basis in the early 1980s reported that it expended
1,817 attorney hours on the case, valued at $156,462. Garey, supra note 53, at 1261 (citing
Amicus Curiae Brief of Boston Bar Association at 68 n.21; Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz,
470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984)). An attorney in Oregon was less conservative, estimating that
it would cost approximately $700,000 to defend a death penalty case in that state. Id. at
1261-62.
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cost of investigators, experts, and support staff needed to prepare
an adequate defense in a typical capital case would likely exceed
$40,000..While these figures may seem high to prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys who are used to working in systems that provide
much less for indigent defense, it bears reminding that these
amounts are far below the legal costs associated with the litigation
of a moderately complex commercial case.
Since the vast majority of capital defendants in the United
States are indigent,207 a state that actively enforced its death pen-
alty laws but at the same time provided adequate funding for indi-
gent defense would face a major budgetary problem.208 Most death
penalty states have had a simple response to this cost problem:
they have ignored it. Refusing to adequately fund defense services,
they have chosen instead to pass the costs of capital defense to the
lawyers appointed to represent the poor, who have been unable or
unwilling to bear them.
II. THE RESOURCES PROVIDED FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDIGENTS
FACING THE DEATH PENALTY
The vast majority of the indigent defense systems in place in
the United States have had a short life, with most coming into ex-
istence little more than twenty years ago.209 Modern systems for
delivering defense services to the poor arose in the wake of Gideon
v. Wainwright2 ° and its progeny, which required the states to pro-
vide attorneys to indigents charged with various crimes.211 Indigent
defense systems developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
there was a de facto national moratorium on executions, and were
not designed to meet the peculiar demands of the modern death
penalty.21 2 From the moment of their creation, these systems have
been constrained by severe underfunding,215 and to this day there
207. See supra note 18.
208. For example, the death penalty costs state and local governments in California
approximately $90 million a year. Magagnini, supra note 182, at Al.
209. Jonathan E. Gradess, The Road From Scottsboro, 2 CriaM. JUST., Summer 1987, at
2, 4. Gradess notes that "[f]rom a historical perspective, public defense systems are very
young... [and i]n a real sense, they are experimental models." Id.
210. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
211. See cases cited supra note 105.
212. See Gradess, supra note 209, at 4 ("[M]ost public defense systems were not cre-
ated with capital punishment in mind . . . [and] assigned counsel and defender systems
came into existence at the tail end of America's national commitment to the poor.").
213. Numerous studies have documented the adverse effects of inadequate funding of
indigent defense services in non-capital cases. See, e.g., AmERIcAN BAR ASs'N & NATIONAL
LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING
(1982); NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PRO-
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have been only sporadic efforts to develop a corps of defenders
who become expert in the intricacies of the death penalty and who
are given the resources to assure that the procedural fairness
promised by the Constitution is realized in practice.2 14
Broadly speaking, there are three types of indigent defense
systems, one or more of which are used in all states with the death
penalty.215 Nearly sixty percent of the counties in the United
States rely primarily on assigned counsel systems, 216 through which
GRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 11-
24, 56-60 (1982) [hereinafter LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES]; NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSN, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973); Laurence A. Benner, Tokenism
and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense Services, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
667 (1975); C. Anthony Friloux, Jr., Equal Justice Under the Law: A Myth, Not a Reality,
12 AM. CRLM. L. REV. 691 (1975); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 625 (1986) [hereinafter Klein, Emperor Gideon]; Norman Lefstein, Financing
the Right to Counsel: A National Perspective, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 391 (1985) [hereinafter
Lefstein, Financing the Right to Counsel]; Joe Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the
Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 677-82 (1989); Suzanne E. Mounts &
Richard J. Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduction, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 200 (1986); see also Chester Fairlie, Gideon's Muted Trumpet,
69 A.B.A. J. 172 (1983); Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Re-
sponsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 483 [hereinafter
Mounts, Public Defender Programs]. More recently, there have been several studies regard-
ing the effect of poor compensation schemes on the representation of indigent persons
charged with capital crimes. See, e.g., COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARY-
LAND, supra note 171; SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176; SPANGENBERG, VIRGINIA
STUDY, supra note 191.
214. Initial efforts at improving the quality of capital representation have focused on
providing death row inmates with attorneys for post-conviction proceedings. In the late
1980s, capital defense resource centers were established in several states, and they have
played an important role in tracking death cases and offering assistance to attorneys repre-
senting death row inmates in habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Sean D. O'Brien, A Step
Toward Fairness in Capital Litigation: Missouri Resource Center, 16 Wm. MITCHELL L.
REV. 633 (1990); Arthur W. Ruthenbeck, Dueling With Death in Federal Courts, GRIM.
JUST., 3 (1989); Richard Lacayo, You Don't Always Get Perry Mason, TME, June 1, 1992, at
38. Unfortunately, these centers, which encounter funding problems of their own, have had
little impact on the quality of representation during the initial trial of a capital defendant,
when the greatest opportunity to have an impact on the ultimate outcome of the defend-
ant's case exists.
215. See, e.g., David Paul Cullen, Indigent Defense Comparison of Ad Hoc and Con-
tract Defense in Five Semi-Rural Jurisdictions, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 311, 320-23
(1992); Rudolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal Representation of
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 205, 209-10 (1993); Rodger
Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indi-
gent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 484 (1991).
216. A survey published in 1986 revealed that 59% of the 3082 counties in the United
States relied primarily on the assigned counsel system, but that less than 30% of the Ameri-
can population resided in those counties. See Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public
Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Coun-
1995] UNDERFUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE 379
individual private attorneys are appointed to represent indigent
defendants on a case-by-case basis.2 1 A second type of system, the
public defender system, provides defense services for the poor
through public or private non-profit organizations with full-time or
part-time salaried attorneys. 218 This system is popular in urban ar-
eas,21 9 and some sixty-five percent of the American population re-
sides in counties that use a public defender system.220 A third sys-
tem, used in relatively few jurisdictions,221 is the contract system,
where an individual attorney or law firm contracts with a county or
other government unit to provide defense services for all indigent
defendants in a particular area for a set fee.222 Regardless of the
system used, indigent defense is funded primarily by counties and
sel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 363-64 (1991) (citing TnE SPANGENBERG GROUP, NATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 11-14 (1986)). This system is particularly
popular in rural areas. Id. Since the death penalty is particularly popular in rural areas,
however, a disproportionately high number of inmates on death row in this country were
represented at trial by assigned counsel.
217. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 503, 503 (1990); Cullen, supra note
215, at 320-21; Stone, supra note 215, at 209. While some observers have been able to iden-
tify up to twelve different ways in which appointment systems have been organized, see
Cullen, supra note 215, at 321 (citing Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost
Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned
Counsel, 76 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176 (1985)), these systems tend to fall within one of
two broad categories. In some jurisdictions, a full- or part-time administrator is put in
charge of a coordinated assigned counsel system. The administrator assigns the attorney to
a case, reviews his or her payment vouchers, may set attorney qualification standards, and
may (depending on the size of the system) provide training or investigatory services. Rich-
ard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 370 (1993) [hereinafter Klein, The Elev-
enth Commandment]. In other jurisdictions, the local courts maintain a list of attorneys
who have volunteered for assignments, and assignments are made by judges or court clerks
as each case comes up. Id. Under either approach, the ultimate power to authorize payments
to the appointed attorney rests with the trial judges. Id.
218. Cullen, supra note 215, at 322-23; Klein, Emperor Gideon, supra note 213, at 656-
57; Stone, supra note 215, at 209-10. Some public defender systems operate statewide, while
others are organized at the county level. Klein, Emperor Gideon, supra note 213, at 657
n.179.
219. See Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost Comparisons of Private
Bar Indigent Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 176, 177 (1985).
220. Only 34% of the nation's counties operate public defenders' offices, but about 65%
of the nation's population reside in those counties. See Feeney & Jackson, supra note 216,
at 363-64 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 11-
14 (1986)).
221. As of 1986, the contract system was used in only about six percent of the counties
in the United States, affecting less than five percent of the American population. See id.
222. Cullen, supra note 215, at 321; Stone, supra note 215, at 209.
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states.223
Almost all indigent defense systems in the United States, re-
gardless of type, suffer ill effects resulting from resource depriva-
tion. Chronic underfunding has its most serious consequences,
however, in the area of capital defense. Because the resources re-
quired to defend capital cases are so great, the disparity between
what is needed and what is provided is, almost inevitably, far more
dramatic in death cases than in non-death cases. At the same time,
the potential harm caused by the deprivation of resources from the
defense is immeasurably greater when the defendant's very life is
at stake. The problems caused by resource deprivation, moreover,
are most prevalent in the nation's poorest states, where the death
penalty tends to be most popular.
Resource deprivation of defense services is manifested in dif-
ferent ways in different states, but regardless of the system used,
funding for the defense of capital cases is woefully insufficient in
most jurisdictions in the United States. In those jurisdictions, the
determination of whether a defendant lives or dies depends as
much on factors that play no legitimate role in the death sentenc-
ing process-the poverty of the defendant and the resources pro-
vided by the states for his defense-than any factor relevant to the
defendant's crime or culpability.
A. Maximum Hourly Rates and Fee Caps for Appointed
Counsel
Many states rely partly or wholly on appointed counsel who
labor under the constraints of statutorily-mandated maximum
hourly rates and fee caps that are shockingly low. Most of the pri-
vate practitioners assigned to death cases in these states are com-
pensated at hourly rates of $20 to $40 per hour, a rate that does
not even cover overhead costs. 224 In addition, in many of the states
223. Stone, supra note 215, at 209. Only a small percentage of indigent defense funding
comes from the federal government, city and town governments, or private foundations. Id.
Most of the state governments that provide funding make annual appropriations from the
general fund. Id. Several states, however, rely on monies raised through filing fees and other
costs imposed on litigants in civil suits. Id. Other states only fund the costs of appellate
representation and leave the costs of providing representation for the poor at the trial level
to the counties. Id.
224. See, e.g., Lefstein, Financing the Right to Counsel, supra note 213, at 396. Over-
head costs "include the cost of office, library, equipment, supplies, professional liability in-
surance, and secretarial help, all of which would be utilized in serving counsel for an indi-
gent client." State ex rel. Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 837 (Kan. 1987). Even in the
states where the cost of doing business are the lowest, these costs can range from $30 to $40
per hour of work expended by an attorney defending his or her client. See, e.g., State v.
Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 428 (La. 1993) (involving evidence that overhead costs were $30 per
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in which the death penalty is most frequently sought, the maxi-
mum amount of compensation an assigned counsel can receive in a
capital case is limited to as little as $2,000.
For example, Alabama compensates appointed counsel in capi-
tal cases at the rate of $20 per hour for out-of-court work, and $40
per hour for in-court time.225 In addition, an appointed attorney
cannot earn more than a statutory maximum of $2000 for out-of-
court work, and before March 1991, the attorney was limited to a
maximum of $1000.26 An attorney who devotes 600 hours to pre-
trial preparation in Alabama would earn $3.33 an hour under Ala-
bama's fee cap and would have earned half that much before 1991.
Until recently, two attorneys representing an indigent in a capital
case in Mississippi could earn no more than $2000 combined.22 7
The hardship created by this fee maximum has been alleviated
only somewhat by a 1989 Mississippi Supreme Court decision in-
terpreting Mississippi's compensation statute as allowing ap-
pointed attorneys to recover an additional $25 per hour to cover
some of their overhead costs.2 28 In Tennessee, appointed counsel in
hour billed); Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990) (citing 1988 survey indicat-
ing that average cost of overhead for Mississippi lawyers was $34.86 per hour); State v.
Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Okla. 1990) (noting that hourly overhead rate for Oklahoma
lawyers representing an indigent capital defendant averaged $45.80 for years 1986-88);
Loyola Death Penalty Resource Ctr., Report on the Loyola Death Penalty Resource Center
Survey on Court Appointed Counsel in Capital Murder Cases 1, 3 (1991) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting a 1991 survey of Louisiana attorneys who had defended capital cases that
showed mean overhead cost was between $34 and $50 per hour); Redick Letter, supra note
173, at 1 (relating results of survey of members of Tennessee Bar Association and Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers which indicated that average cost of overhead in
Tennessee is $47 per hour). These figures, moreover, do not adequately measure the oppor-
tunity cost of capital defense work-potential business turned away, business contacts that
are not cultivated because of the time demands of capital defense, the adverse effect of
controversial cases on a lawyer's community standing-that accompanies death penalty de-
fense work. Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 249.
225. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (Supp. 1994).
226. Id. § 15-12-21(d). In a March 21, 1991 advisory opinion provided to the State
Comptroller, Alabama's Attorney General's Office stated that "[t]he sentencing stage of a
capital case is a new case for § 15-12-21 out-of-court work maximum payment purposes,"
effectively increasing the maximum amount that defense attorneys could receive in death
cases by $1000. Indigent Defense Fund: Attorneys Fees, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-00206 (Mar.
21, 1991).
227. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1993).
228. Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1340-41 (Miss. 1989). The fee statute, in addition
to setting fee caps, also allowed appointed counsel to obtain "reimbursement of actual ex-
penses." Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1993). The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in an
effort to avoid constitutional challenges to the statute, interpreted this language to include
"reimbursement for all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door
open to handle the case, i.e., the lawyer will receive a pro rata share of actual overhead."
Wilson, 574 So. 2d at 1340. The court established a rebuttable presumption that an attor-
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capital cases are limited to $20 per hour for out-of-court time and
$30 per hour (with a daily $200 maximum) for in-court time.229
Kentucky, which typically uses private appointed attorneys to re-
present the indigent in its rural counties, has placed a statutory
limit on the compensation of defense counsel of $25 per hour for
out-of-court time and $35 per hour for in-court time,230 and attor-
neys commonly work under the constraints of a de facto fee cap of
$2500.231 As of April 20, 1994, 229 of the 2848 inmates on
America's death rows were sentenced to die in Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Tennessee, or Kentucky.23 2
Until December 1992, counsel appointed to represent indigent
capital defendants in South Carolina were paid at the nation's low-
est hourly rates: $10 per hour for trial preparation and $15 per
hour for time spent in court.2 3 While the accused was entitled to
have two appointed attorneys, those attorneys together could earn
no more than $5000 for work conducted on the defendant's be-
half.23 4 In December 1992, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
declared that these fee rates and caps were unenforceable in death
ney's overhead was equivalent to $25 for every hour the attorney billed, notwithstanding
evidence that the average overhead for attorneys in Mississippi was nearly $10 per hour
higher than that. Id. at 1340-41.
229. TENN. Sup. CT. R. 13, § 2(B)(10). Since the average overhead cost to maintain a
practice in Tennessee is $47, "[a]n attorney loses twice as much as he makes every hour that
he works on a capital case" in that state. Redick Letter, supra note 173, at 1.
230. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.170(4) (Baldwin 1993). These rates were only $5 per
hour higher than the rates paid appointed counsel in 1972, despite an inflation rate of 213%
between 1972 and 1990. Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 373-74 n.64
(citing Edward C. Monahan, Catching Up With Current Realities, THE ADVOCATE (Ky.
Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Dec. 1991, at 7, 9).
231. Before 1991, appointed counsel in capital cases were often restricted to a $1250 fee
cap. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.170(4) (Baldwin 1993). In 1991, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals determined that a capital murder case is ipso facto a special circumstance justify-
ing a exception to this statutory cap. Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217,
at 374 & n.65 (citing Lavit v. Brady, No. 89-CA-2360-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1991), reprinted in
THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Dec. 1991, at 3, discretionary review granted,
1991 WL 228037 (Ky. Dec. 9, 1992)). Nonetheless, a December 1993 task force study of
indigent defense in Kentucky reported that the de facto limit for a capital case had only
gone up to $2500. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1853 (citing The
Governor's Task Force on the Delivery and Funding of Quality Public Defender Service
Interim Recommendations, reprinted in THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advoc.), Dec.
1993, at 11).
232. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 11-12, 25-27, 36-37. Alabama has carried out 10
post-Furman executions, 4.31% of the total executions in the United States in the modern
era of capital punishment. Id. at 10.
233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (amended by 1993 S.C. Acts 164,
Part II, § 45F).
234. Id. § 16-3-26(B) (amended by 1993 S.C. Acts 164, Part II, § 45D).
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cases,2 s1 and the state legislature responded with an act that in-
creased the hourly compensation rate to $50 and $75 for out-of-
court and in-court work, respectively.23 6 The legislature, however,
also established a statutory presumption that counsel would re-
ceive no more than $25,000 for one capital case.237 If counsel in
South Carolina committed 600 hours to pre-trial preparation and
600 hours for in-court time to defend a capital defendant, the at-
torneys would receive compensation at the effective rate of $20.83
an hour, still well below the average per-hour cost of overhead.
In Arkansas, appointed counsel were limited to a maximum
fee of $1000238 until July 1991, when the Arkansas Supreme Court
declared the state's compensation statute unconstitutional as ap-
plied in capital cases.23 9 Until 1990, attorneys working in
Oklahoma counties without a public defender's office could be
drafted to represent indigents charged with capital crimes, and
they were paid a maximum of $3200 for their efforts.240 After this
compensation scheme was invalidated by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in 1990,241 the Oklahoma legislature established a maximum
statutory fee of only $20,000 for capital cases.242 Not surprisingly,
235. See Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (S.C. 1992). In Bailey, two attorneys, who
had managed to have their client's capital murder charge dismissed, brought a declaratory
judgment action seeking to have South Carolina's statutory compensation scheme declared
unconstitutional. Id. at 505. The court avoided the constitutional questions with a strained
interpretation of the language of the challenged statutes, holding that the statutory hourly
rates and fee caps were "not absolute allowances in capital cases, but merely limitations
upon the State's funds allocated for the [d]efense of [i]ndigents," and that the counties were
obligated to supplement the state expenditure in paying counsel a reasonable rate. Id. at
508.
236. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
237. Id. § 16-3-26(B). The new hourly rates and statutory cap can be exceeded in ex-
ceptional cases, but:
only if the court certifies, in a written order with specific findings of fact, the
payment in excess of the rates is necessary to provide compensation adequate to
ensure effective assistance of counsel and payment in excess of the limit is appro-
priate because the services provided were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
Id. § 16-3-26(D).
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108(b)(2) (1987) (repealed by 1993 Ark. Acts 1193, § 20).
239. Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Ark. 1991) (finding that application of
$1000 fee cap in capital case constituted unconstitutional taking of property and violated
equal protection).
240. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.14 (West 1983) (repealed by 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws
ch. 238, § 37).
241. The court held that the statutory compensation scheme as applied in death pen-
alty cases effected an unconstitutional taking of private property, violative of the due pro-
cess clause of the Oklahoma Constitution. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Okla. 1990).
242. OKLA. STAT. Am. tit. 22, § 1355.13 (West Supp. 1994). The statute provides that
the $20,000 limit can be exceeded only upon a determination that "the case was an excep-
tional one." Id. In Oklahoma, the Executive Director of the state-controlled Oklahoma Indi-
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data compiled by the United States Department of Justice shows
that South Carolina, Arkansas, and Oklahoma are among the five
states that make the lowest per capita expenditures for public de-
fense.243 As of April 20, 1994, inmates on the death rows of these
states numbered 214, 7.5% of the nation's total of condemned
prisoners.244
While Florida has a public defender system, appointed counsel
are frequently used in death penalty cases,24" 5 especially in Dade,
Palm Beach, and Broward counties.2 46 That state set a statutory
cap of $3500 for work at the trial level in death cases.247 Although
the Florida Supreme Court held in the late 1980s that those limits
should be exceeded in "cases involving extraordinary circum-
stances and unusual representation, 248 including all death penalty
cases,249 the few recent reported cases discussing attorney compen-
sation in capital cases have involved lawyers who documented less
than 300 hours and fee awards below $20,000.21" In Nevada, fees
received by appointed counsel in even the most complex death
cases do not significantly exceed a $12,000 statutory cap; before
1993, the statutory cap was $6000.251
gent Defense System determines the compensation of private attorneys appointed to re-
present indigent capital defendants, subject to the review of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense
Board. Id.
243. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATrSTIcs-1993 5 (1993) [hereinafter SOURCEBooK]. Of the 15 states that rank at
the bottom in per capita public defense expenditures, 14 have the death penalty, and those
states have accounted for 155 of the 232 executions that have been carried out in the post-
Furman era. See id.; DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 10. The 15 states, in ascending
order, are Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Oklahoma, North Dakota (a
non-death penalty state), Indiana, Georgia, Utah, Kentucky, Alabama, Nebraska, Missouri,
Texas, and Pennsylvania. SoURCEooK, supra, at 5.
244. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 13-14, 32-33, 35-36.
245. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1849 n.79.
246. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1381 (Fla. 1989) (Overton, J.,
concurring).
247. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.036(2)(d) (West 1985).
248. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987).
249. White, 537 So. 2d at 1380.
250. See Brevard County v. Wells, 571 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
fee of $9585 for 106.5 hours of work); Brevard County v. Eisenmenger, 567 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding $10,300); Leon County v. McClure, 541 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding $20,000 award for 208 hours of work); see also White, 537 So. 2d at
1377 (involving attorney awarded $6700 for 134 total hours, 63 of which were spent in
court); Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1111 (involving $9500 payment for work at trial level total-
ling 184 hours out-of-court and 64 hours in-court).
251. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7.125(2) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993). The $12,000 fee
cap currently in place applies "regardless of the number of offenses charged or ancillary
matters pursued." However, the trial court is allowed to order compensation exceeding this
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The compensation provided for appellate work in these states
is no better. Despite the importance the Supreme Court has placed
on the availability of appellate review in capital cases,25 2 the maxi-
mum fee recoverable for appellate work in Alabama is $2000.2 s An
attorney who expends 700 hours pursuing an appeal through Ala-
bama's appellate courts would be compensated at an effective rate
of $2.86 an hour. In Mississippi, the defense attorney would be
paid at half that rate, since that state's fee cap on appellate work
is $1000.2" In Florida, appointed attorneys are paid a maximum of
$2000 on appeal.255 Several states often pay nothing at all for ap-
pellate work in death cases.256
B. "Reasonable Fees" and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion
The problem of underfunding is not limited to assigned coun-
sel systems operating in states with hourly rate structures and fee
caps dictated by statute.257 Unconscionably low compensation is
common even in states in which the compensation of appointed
counsel is left entirely to the discretion of the courts. In many of
these jurisdictions, judicial perception of the reasonableness of fee
requests by defense attorneys is colored by the economic realities
of underfunded indigent defense systems. In counties accustomed
to paying modest sums for indigent defense services, judges view
requests for the type of funding necessary to properly defend a
modern death penalty case with suspicion. The "reasonableness"
of a fee or expense request often is assessed by reference to a past
history in which expenditures on indigent defense constituted a
cap in particularly complex, severe, or time-consuming cases. Id. § 7.125(4); see also Lueck
v. State, 669 P.2d 719 (Nev. 1983). While defense attorneys frequently are awarded excess
fees in capital cases, this "has not become a major issue [in Nevada] primarily because
many lawyers do not devote the amount of time necessary to litigate capital cases ade-
quately and therefore do not exceed the fee cap by huge amounts." Letter from Michael
Pescetta, Executive Director of Nevada Appellate and Postconviction Project, to Douglas
W. Vick 2 (August 26, 1994) (on file with author).
252. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
253. ALA. CODE § 15-12-22(d) (Supp. 1993). An attorney can receive up to $1000 for
work on an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and up to $1000 for work on
an appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. Id.
254. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (1994).
255. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.036(2)(e) (West 1985).
256. Ronald Smothers, A Shortage of Lawyers to Help the Condemned, N.Y. Tamss,
June 4, 1993, at A21.
257. See, e.g., Lefstein, Financing the Right to Counsel, supra note 213, at 396 ("[I]n
some areas of the country, regardless of whether the fees are adequate, the budgetary appro-
priation is not.").
19951
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
small percentage of the costs of the criminal justice system.258
In Virginia, for example, judges are authorized by statute to
award "reasonable" fees in death cases. 259 Nonetheless, a 1985
study showed that capital defense lawyers in that state were paid
an average of $687 per case.260 In 1990, defense attorneys in Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania (which includes Pittsburgh) typically
were paid $25 per hour for out-of-court work and $50 per hour for
in-court time, subject to a $4000 cap.2 1 In Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania, appointed counsel are paid an average of $6399 per capital
case.2 2 Philadelphia hands out the second-highest number of
death sentences of any American city,263 and more individuals have
been sentenced to death in Philadelphia in the post-Furman era
than in twenty-two of the thirty-seven death penalty states
combined.2 4
In Louisiana, the majority of poor persons accused of capital
crimes in judicial districts with appointed counsel systems 28 have
been represented by defense lawyers who received no compensa-
tion or reimbursement of expenses whatsoever, 8 6 despite the fact
258. For example, a study of defense services in Texas revealed a strong tendency of
judges to assess the reasonableness of requests for fees and expert funds through a lens
distorted by the experience of a long period in which draconian fee caps were in place. See
SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 14, 24.
259. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.2-163(2) (Michie 1990).
260. Tabak, Death of Fairness, supra note 4, at 801. A 1988 study showed that attor-
neys representing indigents in capital cases in Virginia earned only $13 per hour. Nancy
Gist, Assigned Counsel: Is the Representation Effective?, CraM. JusT., Summer 1989, at 18.
261. Bruce Ledewitz, Sources of Injustice in Death Penalty Practice: The Pennsylva-
nia Experience, 95 DICK. L. REV. 651, 666 (19901).
262. Frederic N. Tulsky, What Price Justice? Poor Defendants Pay the Cost as Courts
Save on Murder Trials, PHLA. INQUmER, Sept. 13, 1992, at A18 [hereinafter, Tulsky, What
Price Justice?].
263. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Circumstances in Philadelphia Consign Killers, N.Y.
TIms, June 8, 1992, at AT.
264. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1846 n.60.
265. In Louisiana, a state-controlled indigent defender board is established in each of
the state's judicial districts, and each local board has the option of providing attorneys for
poor persons through an appointed counsel system, public defender system, or contract sys-
tem. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:144-45 (West 1992) § 15:145.
266. Loyola Death Penalty Resource Ctr., supra note 224, at 2-3. A survey of attorneys
who had been appointed to represent indigent capital defendants in Louisiana yielded
highly skewed results, with respondents reporting total compensation ranging from $0 to
$20,000. Id. at 2. Only 13 of 38 respondents indicated that they had sought reimbursement
for expenses, with eight of those 13 receiving nothing, and five receiving from $25 to $2413.
Id. at 2-3. In 1990, it was reported that defense lawyers in Louisiana often forsake compen-
sation in order to persuade judges to provide some funds for experts and investigators.
Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 37. The Louisiana Supreme Court sanctioned the practice of
not compensating or reimbursing the expenses of appointed counsel in State v. Clifton, 172
So. 2d 657, 667 (La. 1965), and only recently has reconsidered the Clifton rule. State v.
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that Louisiana has not had a statutory compensation cap since
1981.267 A 1991 survey indicated that the average fee received by
appointed counsel in death cases was $1616.268 In September 1993,
the Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to ease the extreme hard-
ships caused by this situation by ruling that appointed counsel in
death penalty cases were entitled to a fee equaling their overhead
costs and to reimbursement for reasonable out-of-pocket ex-
penses.269 Nonetheless, the court was unwilling to allow defense
counsel additional compensation that could be applied toward
their own living expenses.2 70 As of April 24, 1994, Virginia, Penn-
sylvania, and Louisiana had carried out 19% of all post-Furman
executions in the United States, and 258 inmates await execution
in those states. 1
Texas has not had explicit statutory fee caps in its recent his-
tory, but its courts nonetheless have frequently refused to award
fees for work performed on behalf of indigents. 2  Before 1987,
most court-appointed attorneys received no compensation at all for
out-of-court work, 273 and compensation for an attorney's in-court
Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993).
267. Until 1981, Louisiana imposed a statutory fee cap of $1000 on appointed defense
lawyers. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:141-43 (repealed by 1981 La. Acts 873, § 4). Although
Louisiana abolished its $1000 fee cap for capital cases in 1981, in many counties that figure
served as a de facto cap for more than a decade afterward, with courts frequently expressing
the belief that their discretion to authorize fees was limited to no more than that amount.
See, e.g., State v. Wigley, 599 So. 2d 858, 863 (La. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993).
268. Loyola Death Penalty Resource Ctr., supra note 224, at 2.
269. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 427 (La. 1993). In Wigley, four attorneys-three
of whom had little criminal law experience-had been chosen from a list of "nonvolunteer
attorneys" to represent indigents in two unrelated capital cases. The trial court refused to
compensate them for their services or to reimburse them for their expenses, and the attor-
neys appealed. Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, relying on its supervisory powers, ruled
that "any assignment of counsel to defend an indigent defendant must provide reimburse-
ment to the assigned attorney of properly incurred and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
and overhead costs." Id. at 429.
270. The court stated that "[uincompensated representation of indigents, when reason-
ably imposed, is a professional obligation burdening the privilege of practicing law in this
state, and does not violate the constitutional rights of attorneys." Id. at 426. Two concurring
justices believed that uncompensated representation in capital cases is, in every case, "so
onerous that it constitutes an abusive extension of [an attorney's] professional obligations."
See id. at 430 (Hall, J., concurring); id. at 431 (Dennis, J., concurring). However, the major-
ity held that "a fee for services need not be paid, as long as the time the attorney must
devote to cases for which he does not receive a fee does not reach unreasonable levels." Id.
at 429.
271. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 10, 26, 33-35, 41.
272. See generally SPANGENBERG, TExAs STUDY, supra note 176.
273. Before 1987, the statute governing the compensation of appointed counsel did not
expressly provide for attorney compensation for anything other than court appearances, see
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appearances was typically at or near the $25 per hour minimum
rate set by statute, which as applied in many counties "became a
de facto maximum."'274 This pattern has continued, even though
the Texas legislature authorized courts to approve "reasonable" fee
and expense reimbursement requests in 1987.275 From 1987 to
1992, only slightly more than half of the judges presiding over cap-
ital trials compensated defense attorneys for out-of-court work,
and two-thirds of the judges who did provide such compensation
did so at an hourly rate of $50 or less. 278 Other judges compensated
attorneys "on a one-time flat fee basis for the trial," with the flat
fee ranging from $1500 to $25,000 per case.277 In a telephone sur-
vey, some trial-level judges reported that their counties adhered to
a maximum number of out-of-court hours for which a court-ap-
pointed attorney could be compensated, ranging from ten hours to
sixty hours s.2 7  A survey of attorneys representing indigents on di-
rect appeal revealed that the median rate at which they were paid
was less than $40 an hour279 and that several lawyers had received
no compensation whatsoever.2 0 Texas judges were asked the larg-
est total fee they had approved for an appeal, and the median of
the responses was $5000.211 As of April 20, 1994, Texas had carried
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05 (West 1989) (historical note), and in practice attor-
neys were not paid for time expended on a case outside the courtroom. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS
STUDY, supra note 176, at 13-14 (discussing former Article 26.05).
274. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 14.
275. Under the current version of TEx. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05 (West 1989),
court-appointed attorneys are to be paid "reasonable attorney's fees" and to be "reimbursed
for reasonable expenses." Id. art. 26.05(a). The statute grants county judges broad discre-
tion to establish rates of compensation within their jurisdictions. Id. art. 26.05(b) & (c).
276. SPANGENBERG, TEXAs STUDY, supra note 176, at 102-03. This is consistent with the
results obtained in a survey of attorneys who had been appointed to capital cases in that
period. Almost two-thirds of attorneys surveyed reported that they received less than $50 an
hour for the work they performed on capital cases, and the median hourly rate was $35. Id.
at 62-63. The average hourly rate for defense counsel at the trial court level ranged wildly
from $13 an hour to $150 an hour. Id. Some judges authorized compensation for in-court
time at a per diem rate ranging from $250 to $525 a day, with no money paid for time spent
outside of the courtroom. See id. at 56, 103.
277. Id. at 56. Seventy percent of the lawyers who had represented capital defendants
reported that judges imposed maximum fees at the beginning of the case that ranged from
$1500 to $25,000. Id. at 57. In some rural areas of Texas, however, it has been reported that
lawyers are paid no more than $800 per capital case. Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts
Lone Star Counsel, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 34.
278. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 24.
279. Id. at 76-77. The attorney survey indicated that the average compensation for
those who were paid on an hourly basis on appeal ranged from $11.11 to $159.06 an hour. Id.
Additionally, several attorneys reported that they were paid a flat fee for their appellate
work, with the fee ranging from $750 to $15,000. Id. at 71.
280. Id. at 77.
281. Id. at 112.
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out the most executions and maintained the largest death row in
the United States, accounting for 31.9% of America's executions
and 13.6% of the nation's death row population. 2
C. Public Defender Systems
In theory, a staff of full-time public defenders working exclu-
sively on criminal matters should be able to provide higher quality
defense services for the poor than would private, court-appointed
attorneys who do not necessarily specialize in criminal law. None-
theless, the representation provided by public defender systems to
indigents charged with capital crimes is frequently substandard, an
inevitable consequence of chronic underfunding. 288 Most public de-
fenders in this country are underpaid, some grossly so,2"4 and are
required to juggle oppressive caseloads.285 Working conditions are
such that it has been difficult for defender offices to attract and
retain good lawyers.286 Moreover, the "assembly-line justice" of
most defender offices is not conducive to the level of preparation
282. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 37-40.
283. A special committee of the ABA conducted a multi-year study of crime and crime
control in the United States and concluded that "indigent defense systems nationwide are
underfunded," AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCmTY,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 39 (1988), and that indigent defense "is too often inadequate
because of underfunded and overburdened public defender offices." Id. at 41. Accord NA-
TIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY SURvEY RESULTS FOR
PUBLIC DEFENDERS 1-4 (1990) (reporting results of survey of 375 counties nationwide).
284. For example, the starting salary for a Louisville, KY assistant district public advo-
cate was $15,000 in 1991. Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 365 n.10
(citing Edward C. Monahan, Who is Trying to Kill the Sixth Amendment?, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 1991, at 24, 27).
285. The United States Department of Justice reported that in just the four years from
1982 to 1986, the caseload for an individual attorney doing indigent criminal defense work
increased by 40%. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT. BULL. 1 (Sept. 1988). This
trend has continued. In 1990, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants noted that caseloads in most public defender offices had continued to grow "at
an alarming rate." Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 393 (citing Re-
cent Trends in Indigent Defense Services, INDIGENT DEF. INFO. (ABA Standing Comm. on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants' Bar Info. Program), Spring 1990, at 1). In a 1990 survey
of public defenders in 375 counties throughout the United States, 80% of the defenders
contacted indicated that the number of attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants
in their offices was insufficient and that the rate of growth of the defenders' caseload had
outstripped the rate at which additional defenders were being hired to handle that caseload.
NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 283, at 3. See generally Klein, Emperor Gideon,
supra note 213, at 656-81.
286. Sixty-six percent of the directors of public defender offices indicated in a nation-
wide survey that the heavy caseload of public defenders made it difficult to recruit attor-
neys, and 77% of defenders noted that heavy caseloads caused "burnout," making retention
of staff a persistent problem. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 283, at 1-4.
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contemplated by modern death penalty jurisprudence. s8
For example, in Cook County, minois, which has the largest
unified court system in the world, s" each attorney who is part of
the "murder task force" in the public defenders office handles over
twenty pending murder cases at any given time, over one-third of
which are capital cases.289 Poor persons in Louisiana who face the
death penalty in districts with public defender systems are no
more likely to be represented by a lawyer with the time and re-
sources to prepare a meaningful defense than are defendants in
districts with appointed counsel systems. Public defenders in New
Orleans might handle 70 felony cases at one time,90 the public de-
fender's office can afford to hire only three investigators for the
more than 7000 cases assigned to it, and the office is provided no
funds for expert witnesses.291 In Missouri, indigent representation
287. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 213, at 677-79; Suzanne E. Mounts, The Right to
Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 221, 244 n.13
(1986) [hereinafter Mounts, The Right to Counsel].
The problems of excessive caseloads and limited resources that characterize most public
defender systems also plague counties using the contract system. Localities that use this
system typically enter into a contract with an attorney or law firm through which the local-
ity agrees to pay a fixed fee for representation of all indigent defendants of a specified
category for a specified period of time. Stone, supra note 215, at 210. Contracts tend to be
awarded to the attorney or firm that submits the lowest bid for providing indigent defense
services. Id.; see also Mark Curriden, Begging For Justice: Indigent Defense in the South,
77 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 64, 67; Klein, Emperor Gideon, supra note 213, at 679. In one
extreme example, a county in Georgia paid a lawyer $4265 to represent all of the county's
indigent defendants, and all investigative and expert expenses were to come out of that
amount. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1850 n.84. Critics note that the
contract system creates a financial incentive to dispose of as many cases as possible with as
little work as possible in order to maximize profits. See, e.g., Klein, Emperor Gideon, supra
note 213, at 680; Meredith A. Nelson, Comment, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Con-
tracts, 76 CALiF. L. REV. 1147, 1149-55 (1988). In State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-79
(Ariz. 1984), one county's contract system was found to be so flawed that it violated both
the due process and assistance of counsel rights of indigent defendants. The Arizona Su-
preme Court established a rebuttable presumption that an indigent defendant convicted in
that county had received ineffective assistance of counsel and was entitled to a retrial. Id. at
1381.
288. Stone, supra note 215, at 214.
289. Id. at 215. Private counsel who are appointed to death penalty cases in Cook
County when the public defender is conflicted out of representation are constrained in an-
other way: such attorneys are compensated at maximum hourly rates of $30 for out-of-court
and $40 for in-court work, and he or she is subject to a fee cap of $1250 absent "extraordi-
nary circumstances." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/113-3(c) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
290. One public defender was required to represent 418 defendants in the first seven
months of 1991. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).
291. Id. at 784. The excessive workload placed on public defenders in one section of the
New Orleans judicial district was so unreasonable that the Louisiana Supreme Court per-
mitted indigent defendants from that section to raise a pre-trial challenge to the effective-
ness of the representation they were receiving and placed the burden of overcoming a rebut-
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is provided through a Public Defender Commission, which is em-
powered to hire full-time public defenders or contract with private
attorneys on a case-by-case basis. 2 Private attorneys in that state
who have handled cases in which the death penalty was ultimately
imposed were paid fees ranging from $5000 to $15,000 for their
work.2 a s
The Fulton County Public Defender program, which serves
Atlanta, Georgia, is notorious for its heavy caseloads and inade-
quate funding.29 4 Each defender must handle an average of 530 fel-
ony cases a year, in addition to other quasi-criminal matters such
as parole revocations, commitments, and extraditions.25 In 1992,
the Georgia legislature created a small statewide capital defender
program to relieve some of the pressures on county public defender
offices,29 6 but the program has been staffed with only four attor-
neys, while there are over 120 capital cases awaiting trial in Geor-
gia at any one time,297 and Georgia continues to rank near the bot-
tom in per capita expenditures on defense services in the United
States.29 " Between 1976 and April 20, 1994, thirty persons have
been executed in Georgia, Missouri, and Illinois, and 354 more
(12.4% of the condemned prisoners in the United States) await ex-
ecution in those states.2 99
D. Funding for Experts
The reluctance to spend taxpayer money on indigent defense
also manifests itself in the states' failure to provide adequate fund-
ing for defense experts and investigators. In principle, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair
table presumption that the excessive workloads of defenders rendered their representation
ineffective on the state. Id. at 783.
292. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.042 (Vernon 1994).
293. Letter from Sean D. O'Brien, Executive Director of Missouri Capital Punishment
Resource Center, to Douglas W. Vick 1 (Feb. 10, 1994) (on file with author).
294. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1850.
295. Id. The day-to-day reality of handling such caseloads can be surreal:
A public defender in Atlanta may be assigned as many as forty-five new cases at
one arraignment. At that time, upon first meeting these clients-chained to-
gether-for a nonprivate, nonconfidential "interview" in a holding area near the
courtroom, she may plead many of them guilty and have them sentenced on the
spot . . . . This system of criminal procedure is known as "slaughterhouse
justice."
Id.
296. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-91 (1992).
297. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1876 & n.230.
298. SoURcmooK, supra note 243, at 5. The only states ranking below Georgia are Lou-
isiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Indiana. Id.
299. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 10, 21-24, 27-28.
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if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without mak-
ing certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense," including the assistance of ex-
perts.300 In practice, most states have evaded this responsibility in
capital cases, refusing to earmark sufficient funds for defense
experts.30 1
No mitigation defense can be adequately prepared without the
assistance of mental health experts, among others, and it would
not be unreasonable to expect that the cost of defense experts in a
typical capital case to exceed $40,000. Yet, in many states, the re-
sources available to the defense for investigators or experts is con-
strained by statute.302 In South Carolina, for example, there is a
statutory limit of $2500 for the payment of experts and investiga-
tors in capital cases.303 In Illinois, the statutory limit is $250. 04 Ar-
kansas limited defense expenditures to $100305 until that statutory
limitation was struck down in 1991.308
In other jurisdictions, payments for defense experts are con-
strained by the penurious exercise of judicial discretion. For many
judges, acutely aware of the financial pressures on county govern-
ments, "the high cost of experts and investigators is the sub rosa
basis for denying them to the defense . . -.o. Many courts limit
expenditures by requiring a preliminary showing of need for expert
assistance which defense counsel simply cannot make without tes-
timony from the very experts whose assistance the attorney
seeks.3 08 Even if a defense motion for funds for experts is granted,
300. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (requiring state to provide defense with a
psychiatrist when defendant's sanity is at issue).
301. See Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 249 ("Payment
for expert or investigative services is ... meager beyond belief."); Gradess, supra note 209,
at 46 ("The theoretical standard under which counsel is to investigate, reflect, and prepare
faces harsh practical reality in the reimbursement allowed in death states for necessary
preparation." (citation omitted)).
302. Gradess, supra note 209, at 46.
303. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
304. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, § 5/113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
305. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108(b)(1) (Michie 1987) (repealed by 1993 Ark. Acts
1193, § 20).
306. Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Ark. 1991).
307. Gradess, supra note 209, at 46.
308. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1846. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d
702, 743 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[H]ow could [counsel]
know if he needed a microbiologist, an organic chemist, a urologist, a hematologist, or that
which the state used, a serologist? How further could he specify the type of testing he
needed without first hiring an expert to make that determination?").
Other courts have narrowly interpreted the scope of the states' obligation to provide
indigents with funds for experts. In Alabama, for example, defense attorneys are permitted
by statute to recoup "reasonably incurred" expenses provided that prior court approval of
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the amounts provided are grossly inadequate. In Philadelphia, for
example, judges will often approve only a few hundred dollars for
the hiring of defense investigators or experts in death cases, to be
paid only when the case is over. 09 A random survey of twenty cap-
ital cases in Philadelphia found that the defense was given investi-
gative support in only eight cases (an average of $605 for those
eight cases) and was provided funds to hire psychologists in only
two cases, with $400 granted in one case, and $500 granted in the
other.10 In some Georgia counties, no funds are expended at all for
investigative or expert assistance on behalf of indigent defend-
ants.3 11 In Texas, one-third of the attorneys who had represented
poor persons in death cases after 1987 stated that courts would
approve the use of state funds for defense experts only up to a
maximum of $500.312 Qualified experts are simply unwilling to con-
those expenditures is obtained. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (Supp. 1993). In the area of expert
assistance, however, Alabama courts have often limited their approval of expenditures to
cases in which the defendant's competency to stand trial or sanity at the time of the offense
are at issue. See, e.g., Smelley v. State, 564 So. 2d 74, 88 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("The only
[constitutional] requirement is that a defendant be provided competent psychiatric evalua-
tion when he claims insanity to be a 'significant factor at trial.' "); Whisenhant v. State, 482
So. 2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (concluding that once defendant is determined
to be competent to stand trial and sane at the time of offense, trial court could conclude
that there exists no reasonable basis for further psychiatric examination at state expense),
aff'd in part and remanded in part, Ex parte Whisenhant, 482 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1983);
accord Whittle v. State, 518 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (non-capital case). This
approach forecloses funding for psychiatric assistance in cases in which the defendant is not
legally insane but nonetheless suffers serious mental health problems that mitigate his cul-
pability for the crime he committed. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
In some jurisdictions, courts willing to order expert assistance for the defense have been
met with resistance from county administrators. In Kentucky, for example, county officials
embroiled in a political battle with state officials over who was responsible for paying such
expenses have frequently refused to pay defense experts, even under threat of being held in
contempt of court. Joseph Gerth, Counties Balk at Paying Experts to Testify for Indigents,
THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1A.
309. Frederic N. Tulsky, Working for Better Legal Help for Poor, THE PHMA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 27, 1992, at B1, B6 [hereinafter Tulsky, Working for Better Legal Help].
310. Tulsky, What Price Justice?, supra note 262, at A18; Tulsky, Working for Better
Legal Help, supra note 309, at B1, B6. A study conducted on behalf of the Philadelphia
County courts showed that experts were used in only two percent of capital cases tried by
court-appointed attorneys. Id. at B6.
311. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1850 n.84.
312. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 64. These attorneys reported that
while other courts allowed defense attorneys to make motions requesting additional funds
above an initial outlay of $500, such motions were denied in half of the cases in which they
were made. Id. Before 1987, Texas had a statutory cap of $500 for defense expenditures on
experts. TEx. CODE CraM. PROc. ANN. art. 26.05 (West 1989) (historical note). In a telephone
survey reported in 1993, many Texas judges referred to the $500 statutory maximum that
had been repealed in 1987, apparently believing it was still in effect. SPANGENBERG, TEXAS
STUDY, supra note 176, at 24.
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sult with defense attorneys at these rates.813
E. Summary
This pattern of grotesque resource deprivation has multiple
causes. In most death penalty states, indigent defense is funded at
the county level, 3 14 where it "compete[s] as a very low priority
among a multitude of other governmental services. '" 8 5 Many coun-
ties try to pay for indigent defense services through fines, civil
court fees, and other sources which are simply inadequate to meet
the monetary demands of indigent defense,3186 and in poorer or less
populous counties, funding is constrained by a limited tax base. 17
Yet lack of money is not the only factor explaining the crisis
in indigent defense funding for capital cases. Prosecutors are not
asked to endure the hardships that resource deprivation causes for
the defense.31 s Prosecutors receive on average more than three
times the funding that is provided to defenders in the United
States, 319 and the differential is really much greater than that fig-
313. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1847 n.66; Tulsky, What Price
Justice?, supra note 262, at Al, A18.
314. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-105 (Michie 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146
(West 1992); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d) (West 1989).
315. Gradess, supra note 209, at 4.
316. For example, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma have all tried to fund
indigent defense primarily from these sources. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, REVIEW OF THE
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM IN ALABAMA, FINAL REPORT 76 (1988) [hereinafter SPANGENBERO,
,ALABAMA STUDY]. Experts in defense systems funding have consistently concluded that these
sources will not produce sufficient revenue to assure adequate and competent representa-
tion. Id. at 76-80.
317. See, e.g., SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STUDY, supra note 176, at 7.
318. See, e.g., Vreeland, supra note 33, at 655. As Stephen Bright has explained:
Many death penalty states have two state-funded offices that specialize in
handling serious criminal cases. Both employ attorneys who generally spend
years-some even their entire careers-handling criminal cases. Both pay decent
annual salaries and provide health care and retirement benefits. Both send their
employees to conferences and continuing legal education programs each year to
keep them up to date on the latest developments in the law. Both have at their
disposal a stable of investigative agencies, a wide range of experts, and mental
health professionals anxious to help develop and interpret facts favorable to their
side. Unfortunately, however, in many states both of these offices are on the same
side: the prosecution.
One is the District Attorney's office in each judicial district, whose lawyers
devote their time exclusively to handling criminal matters in the local court
systems ...
The other office is the state Attorney General's office, which usually has a unit
made up of lawyers who specialize in handling the appeals of criminal cases and
habeas corpus matters.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1844.
319. For fiscal year 1990, the ratio between direct expenditures nationwide on prosecu-
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ure indicates. Funding for the support services essential to the
preparation of the prosecutor's case-police investigation, FBI and
local crime labs, and state and local forensic experts-does not
come out of the budget for the prosecutor's office, while analogous
expenses by the defense must be paid out of the money provided
for defense services.2 e
A more important reason that capital defense services con-
tinue to be drastically underfunded is the political popularity of
the death penalty and the lack of public sympathy for those ac-
cused of capital crimes.3 21 There is no political imperative driving
legislatures toward creating fairer compensation systems; those ac-
cused of capital murder or awaiting execution on death row are not
a part of any politician's constituency, and the fear of appearing
"soft on crime" is a powerful force thwarting change through the
322legislative process.
tion services and expenditures on public defense was 3.22:1. See SouRcEBooK, supra note
243, at 3. In some states, the ratio between prosecution and defense expenditures is more
one-sided. In Oklahoma, the ratio is 13.47:1; in Arkansas, 7.34:1; in Mississippi, 6.77:1; in
Utah, 6.7:1; in Indiana, 5.51:1; in Georgia, 5.26:1; in Kentucky, 5.21:1. Id. at 5. In Louisiana,
the ratio between prosecution and defense expenditures was a ludicrous 106.82:1. Id.
320. See Margulies, supra note 213, at 681. In fiscal year 1990, for example, prosecutors
and police in Kentucky received $156 million, while public defenders received $11.4 million,
a 14:1 ratio. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1852 n.93 (citing Edward C.
Monahan, Who Is Trying to Kill the Sixth Amendment?, CRIm. JusTiCE, Summer 1991, at
24, 27-28). According to figures compiled by the United States Justice Department, direct
governmental expenditures for the criminal justice system for the nation as a whole in fiscal
year 1990 were allocated as follows: police protection 42.8%; corrections 33.6%; judiciary
12.5%; prosecution and legal services 7.4%; public defense 2.3%; and other justice activities
1.3%. SouRcFBooK, supra note 243, at 3.
321. Several polls have shown that about 80% of the American population support the
death penalty. WHrru, NImETs, supra note 82, at 32 n.47. When Furman was decided in
'the early 1970s, only 42% of Americans favored capital punishment for murder. Id.
322. See generally Pierce & Radelet, supra note 14. See also Bright,. Counsel for the
Poor, supra note 10, at 1876 n.228 (quoting a Georgia State Senator who stated that "sup-
port for indigent defense is viewed by many in [Georgia] as being soft on crime"); Friedman
& Stevenson, supra note 111, at 41-42 (stating that "[m]any legislators seem to fear that
support for funding for defense, services in capital cases is somehow the same as support for
violent crime"). The popularity of the death penalty not only influences the legislative
branch. The National Association of District Attorneys and other groups dominated by
prosecutors have opposed even the most modest proposals for improving'indigent defense in
capital cases. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1875. In the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign, President Bush made the death penalty a central issue. Pierce & Radelet,
supra note 14, at 711. In the 1990 campaign for the democratic nomination for Governor in
Texas, all of the candidates emphasized their support for the death penalty. WroTE, NNE-
Tmis, supra note 82, at 24. The escalating fear of violent crime not only makes capital pun-
ishment a popular campaign issue, it directly affects the conduct of state executives once
they get into office. Empirical studies have shown that the rate of executive commutations
of death sentences to sentences of life imprisonment has declined from nearly one in four in
the pre-Furman era to one in forty. Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in
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Most state judges also have been reticent to use their powers
to require the expenditure of the funds necessary to assure ade-
quate representation in modern death penalty cases. In awarding
compensation to defense attorneys, state judges have usually
shown greater concern for the public fise than for the accused. This
is sometimes reflected in judicial approval of unreasonably low
hourly rates and the use of de facto compensation caps, even in
jurisdictions in which there are no statutory restrictions on the dis-
cretion of judges. Trial judges may be motivated by political or
ideological considerations of their own: many were elected to their
positions because of their pro-death penalty views, or fear electoral
backlash if their rulings are too conducive to the interests of those
accused of brutal crimes;323 others simply do not acknowledge the
relevance of the sort of mitigating evidence that the Constitution
allows defendants to present and are reluctant to require the state
to pay for the development of such evidence.
In sum, most states in which the death penalty is vigorously
pursued have decided not to pay the high costs of providing mean-
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 266 (1990-91). This trend is fueled by
"the perception that a governor who commutes a death sentence verges on committing polit-
ical suicide." Id. at 268.
323. All judges must stand for election or retention on partisan, nonpartisan, or reten-
tion ballots in 31 of the 37 death penalty states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. COUNCIL. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 210-12 (Table 4.4) (1990);
PATRICK M. McFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMI-
PAIGNS 177-88 (1990). As former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus noted,
"[t]here's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain
decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like
ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." Reidinger, supra note 14, at 58. The potential effect
of the political popularity of the death penalty on a popularly elected judiciary was realized
in California in 1986, when three Justices of the California Supreme Court were unseated in
a retention election in which the death penalty was the dominant issue. John H. Culver &
John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JUDI-
CATURE 81, 86 (1986); see also Mary Ann Galante, California Justices Face Own Executions,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 1; Reidinger, supra note 14, at 52; John T. Wold & John H.
Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Is-
sue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987). Exit polls showed that among
those who voted against retention of Chief Justice Bird in that election, 11% thought she
was unqualified, 18% thought she was too liberal, and 66% voted against her because she
opposed the death penalty. Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial Elections: The California Experi-
ence, 70 JUDICATURE 365, 367 (1987). Before the 1986 retention election, the California Su-
preme Court had affirmed only 7.8% of the death sentences it reviewed; after the retention
election, the court's affirmance rate was 71.8%. Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty
Judgments by the Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 237, 297 (1989).
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ingful assistance of counsel during the defendant's trial and direct
appeal. On occasion, private attorneys will try to subsidize the
costs of capital defense out of their own savings, but only at seri-
ous personal risk. For example, one Alabama lawyer reported that
he had spent thousands of hours defending a capital murder case
and that the cost of the case exceeded $340,000, pushing him into
bankruptcy. 2 4 The vast majority of practitioners cannot or will not
make such a sacrifice.3 2 5 The consequences are predictable.
III. THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES: THE
RESULTS OF RESOURCE DEPRIVATION
A. The Lack of Meaningful Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Litigation
The literature is replete with impressionistic, anecdotal, and
empirical evidence that indigent capital defendants are routinely
denied assistance of counsel adequate to put into practice the pro-
tections that on paper make the death penalty constitutional. This
crisis in capital representation is caused by funding systems that
discourage experienced and competent criminal attorneys from
taking appointments in death penalty cases and prevent even the
324. Curriden, supra note 287, at 67.
325. More typical is the Alabama attorney who was provided only $500 for expert and
investigative expenses to defend a death case. During a deposition taken during state post-
conviction proceedings, the attorney testified:
Without more than $500, there was only one choice, and that is to go to the bank
and to finance this litigation, myself, and I was just financially unable to do that.
It would have cost probably in excess of thirty to forty thousand dollars, and I just
could not justify taking those funds from my practice, or my family at the time.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1847 (quoting Deposition of Richard Bell at
24-25, Grayson v. State (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Ala. Oct. 10, 1991) (No. CV 86-193)).
Some attorneys may find that their motivation to prepare a good defense will flag in the
face of the tremendous expense involved. LEFSTEIN, CRiMaiAL DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note
213, at 19 ("[W]hen compensation for assignments is inadequate, private attorneys are re-
luctant to accept assignments, or unwilling to put forth all necessary efforts on behalf of
their clients."); Victoria R. Kendrick, Note, Uncompensated Appointments of Attorneys for
Indigent Criminal Defense: The Need for Supreme Court Standards, 14 Sw. U. L. REV.
389, 398-99 (1984) ("[A] lack of reasonable compensation for an appointed attorney may
reduce his motivation to prepare a good defense."). Others may maintain their spirit, but
simply lack the means to meet their obligations:
Capital trials are highly complex and require a tremendous amount of time and
resources, neither of which is available to the average practitioner representing an
indigent defendant in a capital case. The reality is that the difficulties of provid-
ing effective defense counsel for those accused of capital crimes have frequently
been insurmountable obstacles, making the chances of a fair trial for an indigent
defendant highly unlikely.
Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 69 (footnote omitted).
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most talented attorneys from preparing an adequate defense, par-
ticularly for the penalty phase.
Several observers have noted that poor compensation will not
attract the best attorneys to represent indigents in death penalty
cases.3 28 This observation is supported by empirical data. 27 For ex-
ample, as of January 1990, the Alabama attorneys who represented
defendants sentenced to death had been subject to disciplinary ac-
tion, including disbarment, at a rate twenty times that of the Ala-
bama bar as a whole. For those attorneys whose clients were exe-
cuted, the rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times
that of the bar as a whole.32 8 One-quarter of the inmates on Ken-
tucky's death row were represented at trial by attorneys who sub-
sequently were disbarred or resigned rather than face disbar-
ment.329  As of January 1990, nearly 13% of the defendants
executed in Louisiana had been represented by lawyers who had
been disciplined, while the disciplinary rate for the Louisiana bar
as a whole was 0.19%.330 In Texas, the attorneys who represented
defendants sentenced to death have been disciplined at a rate nine
times that of the Texas bar as a whole; similar disparities exist in
Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida.3 3 1
In addition to the incompetent, capital defense is often left to
the inexperienced. The typical attorney representing the poor in
death penalty cases is a non-specialist drafted into one of the most
326. See, e.g., Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 333; Uehnen, supra note 323, at 249.
327. One study, which was not limited to the defense provided in capital cases, exposed
problems typical in states that underfund defense services. The study of the Alabama de-
fense system, based on 1300 questionnaires returned by judges, prosecutors, and members of
the private bar in 1980, documented that lawyers who represented indigent criminal defend-
ants were generally younger and less experienced than the bar as a whole; many of the
judges and lawyers surveyed perceived that the quality of representation provided indigents
was inferior to that afforded defendants who could pay for their own lawyers; and that there
was a "noted reduction" in legal action taken on behalf of indigents as compared to paying
defendants. SPANGENBERG, ALABAMA STUDY, supra note 316, at 23-24 (quoting JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, ALABAMA STUDY: SURVEY OF LEGAL SERVICES PRO-
VIDED INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS (Dec. 1980)). The study concluded that
[ejach of the foregoing problems [was] related, to a greater or lesser degree, to the
lack of adequate funding for the assigned counsel system generally and for counsel
fees specifically. . . . There was virtual unanimity among all groups responding
to this survey that the lack of sufficient funds results in many repeated instances
of ineffective representation and a systemwide reduction in the quality of repre-
sentation afforded indigent persons.
Id. at 24 (quoting JOINT COMMITTEE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, ALABAMA STUDY: SUR-
VEY OF LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS (Dec. 1980)).
328. Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 44.
329. Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 74 & n.92.
330. Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 44.
331. Id.
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specialized fields of practice in American law. 2 Because of inade-
quate compensation, experienced criminal lawyers often work as-
siduously to avoid appointment to capital cases,3 3 and moit states
with serious public defense funding problems do not impose de-
manding training or qualification standards for attorneys assigned
to capital cases.3 4 As a consequence, capital defendants are often
332. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 217, at 505 ("[A]n ever-decreasing fraction of the
bar considers itself competent to undertake the types of cases for which the demand for
court-appointed counsel is greatest."); Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty
Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986)
("Death penalty litigation has become a specialized field of practice. . . . Often trial coun-
sel simply are unfamiliar with the special rules that apply in capital cases."). Resource dep-
rivation effectively prevents the development of a corps of attorneys who develop expertise
in the defense of capital punishment cases.
333. See, e.g., Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 365 n.8, 366
n.12. For example, 82% of Mississippi attorneys who represented indigent defendants in
death penalty cases in the past would either refuse to accept another appointment, or be
very reluctant to accept appointment, because of financial considerations. Friedman & Ste-
venson, supra note 111, at 31 n.148. A recent study of capital representation in Texas
showed that "more experienced private criminal attorneys are refusing to accept court ap-
pointments in capital cases because of the time involved, the substantial infringement on
their private practices, the lack of compensation for counsel fees and expert expenses and
the enormous pressure that they feel in handling these cases." SPANGENBERG, TEXAS STuDY,
supra note 176, at 152. One Alabama attorney has testified that inadequate compensation
caused him to decline capital appointments:
[The fee limitation] has stopped me from taking capital cases. . . . I would say
that it has been a severe deterrent to me and other lawyers. That the lack of
compensation, the wholly inadequate compensation [for] lawyers that do this kind
of work-that have expertise to do this kind of work-[has] a severe chilling ef-
fect. It has prohibited me from currently-I don't get calls anymore for it. I think
the courts know that I'm not going to accept them, [with] rare exceptions.
Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 30 (quoting Record at 101-02, State v. Wilson,
No. CC-86.093.2 (Talladega County Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1991) (testimony of Richard Jaffe)).
Yet, "when lawyers who have developed the expertise cannot afford to continue to represent
indigent capital clients, any movement toward the creation of a specialized bar is thwarted."
Id. at 31.
334. Several states have no training or qualification requirements whatsoever for ap-
pointing counsel to capital cases. See Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 31; Redick Letter,
supra note 173, at 2 ("There are no case load limitations and there are no training or quali-
fication requirements for appointment of capital cases in Tennessee."). Other states, such as
Alabama, require some minimal experience in handling criminal matters, but these stan-
dards are so low that a capital defendant is "generally represented by a court appointed
attorney who may have little or no experience in the intricate and unique rules that com-
prise capital litigation." Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 3-4 (footnote omitted)..
In any event, experiential standards that do not account for the defense attorney's compe-
tence to handle capital litigation can do more harm than good:
Standards for the appointment of counsel, which are defined in terms of number
of years in practice and number of trials, do very little to improve the quality of
representation since many of the worst lawyers are those who have long taken
criminal appointments and would meet the qualifications. Such standards can ac-
tually be counterproductive because they may provide a basis for denying ap-
400 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
represented by attorneys who have been out of law school for only
a few years or have little or no experience handling criminal
cases.aa5 It is not surprising that a six-month survey conducted in
1989-90 by the National Law Journal found that over one-half of
the death row inmates in six southern states had been represented
by lawyers who had never previously handled a capital case.3 36
The substantial literature addressing the problems of capital
representation recounts numerous stories of pathetic performances
by defense counsel:33 7
[A]mong the knowledgeable, horror stories abound: of defense counsel who
refer to the accused as a 'nigger' in front of the jury, who indicate that they
are representing the client with reluctance, who absent themselves from
court while a prosecution witness takes the stand, who adduce no evidence
in favor of the client at the penalty phase, or who file no brief on appeal.38s
pointment to some of the most gifted and committed lawyers who lack the num-
ber of prior trials but would do a far better job in providing representation than
the usual court-appointed hacks with years of experience providing deficient
representation.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1871 n.209. See also Redick Letter, supra
note 173, at 2 ("Many of the attorneys with the most experience doing capital work, particu-
larly from the private bar, are the least qualified; they are merely the only attorneys willing
to represent clients whose lives are at stake at the very low compensation rate."). Recently,
one scholar has advocated the creation of some mechanism to train and certify lawyers for
criminal defense work as a means of better assuring that a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are honored. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment, 78 IowA L. REV. 433 (1993).
335. See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving de-
fendant represented by attorney who had passed bar six months earlier, had no prior crimi-
nal trial experience, and had not taken law school courses in criminal law, criminal proce-
dure, or trial advocacy); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743 (11th Cir.) (involving defendant
represented by lawyer recently admitted to bar), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985); Bell v.
Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982) (involving defendant represented by recent law
school graduate).
336. Coyle et al, supra note 181, at 30.
337. See, e.g., ABA Task Force, supra note 2, at 62-71; Bright, Counsel for the Poor,
supra note 10, at 1835-43; Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 32-37; Ronald J.
Tabak, Gideon v. Wainwright in Death Penalty Cases, 10 PAcE L. REV. 407 (1990); White,
Effective Assistance, supra note 103, at 325-30.
338. Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Pro-
posals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1670 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted). Capital trials are frequently forums for surprisingly frank expressions of
ignorance and bigotry. In one case, for example, the defense lawyer did not object when the
prosecutor urged the jury to sentence the defendant to death because "[t]he defendant is
homosexual, and we all know what goes on inside of prisons, so sending him there would be
like sending him to a party." David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current
Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 23, 60 (1991) (cit-
ing Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 940 (1987)) [hereinafter Dow, Teague and Death]. Numerous African-American de-
fendants have gone to trial for their lives represented by attorneys who were openly hostile
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Some of the defendants represented by bigoted, intoxicated, or in-
ept lawyers obtain relief from their death sentences on appeal;
many others do not.
For example, John Young was put to death by the State of
Georgia on March 20, 1985, s9 after the federal courts refused on
procedural grounds to consider clear evidence of trial counsel's
woeful performance. 40 Young's attorney, who was subsequently
disbarred, was on drugs during Young's trial . 41 The attorney was
arrested on state and federal drug charges shortly after Young's
trial, and he later claimed that his attention was not focused on
the trial because he was experiencing personal and family
problems. 42 The attorney failed to discover or introduce important
mitigation evidence, including evidence that Young had witnessed
his mother's murder at the age of three and was suffering from
post-traumatic stress syndrome traceable to this childhood event
at the time he committed his crime. 43
On direct appeal, Larry Heath's appointed attorney filed a six-
page brief on one issue with the Alabama Court of Criminal and a
one-page brief citing one case with the Alabama Supreme Court;
the attorney failed to appear for oral argument.3 44 Heath died in
to them on account of their race or referred to them in open court with racist epithets. See,
e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (involving defense counsel
who referred to client as "little old nigger boy" in closing argument), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1098 (1983); Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (involving defense
attorney who testified during habeas corpus proceedings that blacks would not make good
teachers but made good basketball players; that integration had caused deteriorating neigh-
borhoods and schools; that a section of Chattanooga was a "black boy jungle"; and that
blacks had inferior morals), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993); Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (involving defense counsel who called client "wet-back" in front of all-white
jury); Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1843 n.51 (citing Record Excerpts at
102, Dungee v. Kemp, No. 85-8202 (11th Cir.) (involving defendant referred to as "nigger"
by defense counsel), decided sub nom. Issacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986)); Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 74 n.98-101 (citing Peti-
tioner's Opening Brief at 38, Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (involving attor-
ney who referred to his African-American client as "boy" six times during closing argu-
ment)). In one particularly notorious case tried in Georgia, an African-American defendant
accused of raping and murdering a white woman was represented by the former Imperial
Wizard of the local Ku Klux Klan. Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990); Paul Marcotte,
Snoozing, Unprepared Lawyer Cited, 77 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 14, 16.
339. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6.
340. Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514, 516 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissing ineffectiveness
claim since it was not substantiated until after second habeas petition was filed).
341. Tabak, Death of Fairness, supra note 4, at 841.
342. Bright, In Defense of Life, supra note 165, at 860-61 (citing Young v. Kemp, Civ.
No. 85-98-2MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985) (affidavit of Charles Marchman, Jr.)).
343. Tabak, Death of Fairness, supra note 4, at 841.
344. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1860-61 (citing Appellant's Brief
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Alabama's electric chair on March 20, 1992.34  No appellate brief
was filed on behalf of Herbert Richardson after he was sentenced
to death;se this failure meant that Richardson's post-conviction
attorneys were foreclosed from raising any issue other than ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel during federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings.3 47 Richardson was executed on August 18, 1989.348 At the
guilt phase of James Messer's trial, his defense lawyer did not give
an opening statement, did not offer any evidence on behalf of his
client, and in a closing argument emphasized "the horror of the
crime," expressed "frustration" with Messer's case, and suggested
that death was the most appropriate punishment for Messer's
crime.3 41 Messer was executed on July 28, 1988.8 0 At the penalty
phase of Jesfis Romero's trial, his attorney called no witnesses and
offered a twenty-nine word summation in defense.3 11 The State of
Texas executed Romero on May 20, 1992.352
Most examples of deficient representation, however, do not in-
volve incapable or irresponsible attorneys, but rather lawyers who
lack the time, resources, or expertise to handle death cases. Most
lawyers drafted into representing indigents facing the death pen-
alty may be willing, but simply are unable to prepare a meaningful
defense.'53 As appointed attorneys begin to realize the number of
and Argument in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, State v. Heath, 455
So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1984)). The attorney did not raise issues regarding the prosecutor's im-
proper references to Heath's failure to testify, the trial court's refusal to discharge for cause
sixty-seven venirepersons who knew that Heath had been convicted of charges in a neigh-
boring state that arose out of the same facts, and the denial of a motion for change of venue.
Id. at 1861.
345. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 9.
346. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 37 (citing Rule 20 Petition, Richardson
v. State, No. CC-77-318.62 (Houston County Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 1989)).
347. See infra part IV.A.
348. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 8.
349. See Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088, 1089-90 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
350. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7.
351. The defense attorney's opening and closing argument at the penalty phase was the
same: "Jesse, stand up. You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life in
your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I have to say." Coyle et al., supra note 181, at
34 (citing Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989)).
352. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 9.
353. Justice Marshall observed that
capital defendants frequently suffer the consequences of having trial counsel who
are ill-equipped to handle capital cases. Death penalty litigation has become a
specialized field of practice, and even the most well intentioned attorneys often
are unable to recognize, preserve and defend their client's rights .... Though
acting in good faith, they inevitably make very serious mistakes.
Marshall, supra note 332, at 1-2.
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hours capital representation can consume, and that each additional
hour spent on a death case is an hour in which they are not meet-
ing their overhead costs, they are driven by economic realities to
ration their time. This compromises their ability to adequately
prepare, which in turn affects every aspect of their clients' cases.3"
Empirical studies dramatically illustrate the consequences of these
economic forces. Although a properly defended capital case should
require a month or more to try,sa5 a study conducted in Alabama
revealed that over three-quarters of the capital trials there last less
than a week.356 The average length of a random sample of a dozen
capital trials conducted in Louisiana from 1978 to 1987 was three
days.3  A Tennessee survey showed that defense lawyers in that
state frequently invest less than 100 hours before trial preparing
for a capital case.358
Nowhere is the problem of resource deprivation of capital de-
fense felt more deeply than during the penalty phase of a capital
trial. 59 Those most familiar with the operation of the capital pun-
ishment in the United States have frequently expressed dismay at
the surprising number of cases in which little or no evidence is
presented by the defense during sentencing proceedings.36 0 A para-
354. Margulies, supra note 213, at 678-79. See ABA Task Force, supra note 2, at 78 ("A
lawyer who is paid $1,000 will not devote 1,000 hours to a case, even if the case requires
it."); Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 27 ("An attorney's rate of compensation
and the quality of his or her representation cannot be easily separated."); see also Kendrick,
supra note 325, at 398; Paduano & Smith, supra note 33, at 333-35; Tabak, Death of Fair-
ness, supra note 4, at 801-04.
355. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
356. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 37 n.185 (citing Susan J. Craighead,
Trial Representation of Capital Defendants: A Case Study in Alabama 5 (1992) (unpub-
lished manuscript)). The National Law Journal examined the records of a random sample
of twenty Alabama capital trials conducted from 1981 to 1989 and found that those trials
lasted an average of 4.2 days. Coyle et al, supra note 181, at 36.
357. Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 36.
358. Redick, supra note 18, at 23.
359. Failures of counsel that are felt in the sentencing phase of a capital defendant's
trial are usually the easiest to perceive and measure. There are, however, other types of
attorney errors, more difficult to identify, that can be just as detrimental to an indigent's
defense and which can be fairly attributed to the constraints of inadequately funded indi-
gent defense systems.
360. The experience of Clifford Sloan, a former law clerk to a United States Supreme
Court Justice, is revealing:
Again and again, in cases that I reviewed, potential mitigating evidence was read-
ily available-medical experts who could testify to mental retardation or other
evidence of diminished capacity; relatives who could help explain how and when
this individual had been brutalized; fellow veterans who could testify about the
defendant's combat valor, or about the haunting, warping effects of the battles
they experienced together. Again and again, defense counsel made little or no ef-
fort to reach such witnesses.
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digmatic case is that of Earnest Knighton, executed in Louisiana
on October 30, 1984.361 Knighton was arrested for murder in April
1981 and was sentenced to death by June of the same year.362 His
trial counsel was unaware of existing mitigating evidence because
he had been unable to conduct any mitigation investigation what-
soever.36 s At the penalty phase of Knighton's trial, which com-
menced one hour after the return of a guilty verdict, the lawyer
offered no evidence, and instead simply pleaded for his client's
life.' "
Also typical is the case of Billy Mitchell, who was electrocuted
by the State of Georgia on September 1, 1987,365 even though
Mitchell's trial attorney failed to investigate or offer mitigating ev-
idence.36 Had Mitchell's attorney interviewed his client's family
and friends and reviewed his client's school and psychological
records, he would have discovered that Mitchell had undergone
steady psychological deterioration resulting from extreme poverty,
a history of family turbulence, and a series of violent prison
rapes.36 7 A number of character witnesses who were willing to tes-
tify on Mitchell's behalf were never contacted by Mitchell's
lawyer.36 8
The attorney representing Leonard Laws offered no evidence
in mitigation during the penalty phase of his trial.368 Although
Laws was a highly-decorated Vietnam War veteran, his lawyer did
not use the available evidence concerning his military record. °
The lawyer did not pursue evidence that the defendant suffered
from post-traumatic stress syndrome related to his military service
Clifford Sloan, Death Row Clerk in the Court of Last Resort: U.S. Supreme Court and
Capital Cases, THE N.w REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 1987, at 18; see also WHITE, NINETIES, supra
note 82, at 77 ("IT]here has been a surprisingly large number of cases in which defendants
have been executed after their attorneys presented little or no mitigating evidence at their
penalty trials."); Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 71 ("Often, no investigation at all is
conducted with respect to the sentencing phase, so that exculpating or mitigating evidence
is never discovered or presented.").
361. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6.
362. Knighton v. Maggio, 468 U.S. 1229, 1230 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
363. Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 76.
364. Id.
365. DATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7.
366. Fong, supra note 103, at 461; see also Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1027-31
(1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
367. Fong, supra note 103, at 461; see also Mitchell, 483 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
368. Fong, supra note 103, at 461.
369. Laws v. Armontrout, 490 U.S. 1040, 1041 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari).
370. Id.
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in Vietnam, or evidence that Laws' personality had undergone dra-
matic changes during his service. 71 Laws was executed by the
State of Missouri on May 17, 1990.372
These cases are not simply anecdotal examples of serious mis-
carriages of justice, but rather evidence of a larger phenomenon.
Empirical studies indicate that the virtual forfeiture of a capital
defendant's essential right to introduce evidence mitigating against
a death sentence upon conviction of a capital offense is the rule,
not the isolated exception. For example, in 1989, the Tennessee
Supreme Court noted that in seventeen post-Furman capital cases
it had reviewed-representing one-quarter of the death sentences
that had been rendered at that time-the defense offered no miti-
gation evidence at all.'73 This total did not include the cases in
which some proof of mitigation was offered, no matter how "ill-
financed, ill-conceived, ill-prepared or ill-presented. 3 74 In 1990,
the National Law Journal found that in Alabama, the penalty
phase of capital trials lasted an average of only 3.6 hours.37 5 A
Harvard University study of randomly selected capital cases
showed that in more than one-half of Alabama's capital cases, the
entire proceedings of the penalty phase-opening arguments, the
presentation of evidence, and closing arguments by both
sides-were completed in less than one hour.37 6 In nearly 40% of
the cases sampled, defense counsel called two or fewer witnesses,
including the defendant, during the penalty phase, and in over
three-quarters of those cases, no evidence of the defendant's life
history was presented.317
The Louisiana Supreme Court has lamented the "recurring
problem" of lawyers who do little at the penalty phase, 78 but an
examination of available judicial opinions involving capital defend-
ants ultimately electrocuted in that state shows how reluctant the
371. Id.
372. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 8.
373. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tenn. 1989); see also Redick, supra note 18,
at 24. The Tennessee Supreme Court saw this not as evidence of a systemic problem with
Tennessee's death penalty procedures, but as justification for finding that Melson's attorney
was not incompetent for failing to present mitigating evidence. The court reasoned that in
Tennessee, defense counsel frequently "have seen fit not to offer any evidence at the sen-
tencing phase of the trial." 772 S.W.2d at 421.
374. Redick, supra note 18, at 24.
375. Coyle et al., supra note 181, at 36.
376. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 111, at 35. This data was drawn from the fif-
teen cases out of a random sample of forty-two cases in which the court reporter noted the
time elapsed during the various proceedings of the trial. Id. at 35 & n.176.
377. Id. at 35. The defense "strategy" at the penalty phase in the overwhelming major-
ity of the Alabama cases studied consisted solely of a plea for sympathy. Id.
378. State v. Williams, 480 So. 2d 721, 728 n.14 (La. 1985).
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court has been to take steps necessary to remedy that problem.
Those opinions reveal that at the trials of at least 85% of those
executed by the State of Louisiana between 1976 and April 1994,
trial counsel failed to present mitigation evidence of the sort iden-
tified by experts as being essential. 79 In eight cases, little or no
mitigation evidence was offered at the penalty phase. °80 In at least
379. Twenty-one men have been executed by the State of Louisiana between 1976,
when the Supreme Court lifted its moratorium on executions, and April 20, 1994. DEATH
Row USA, supra note 1, at 6-10. The author was unable to determine what mitigation evi-
dence, if any, was offered by or available to the attorney who represented Willie Watson,
who was executed on July 24, 1987. Based on the descriptions provided by reviewing courts
in the remaining twenty cases, it appears that substantial mitigation evidence of the sort
typically contemplated by those knowledgeable in the field was offered at the trials of
Jimmy Wingo (executed on June 16, 1987), John Brogdon (executed on July 30, 1987), and
Sterling Rault (executed on August 24, 1987). See State v. Wingo, 457 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (La.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985); State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616 (La. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985); State v. Rault, 445 So. 2d 1203, 1207, 1220 (La.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 873 (1984). An examination of the remaining seventeen cases reveal severe short-
comings in the manner in which mitigation evidence was investigated and presented to the
jury during the penalty phase.
380. Earnest Knighton's attorney, who spent all of six hours conferring with his client
before trial, expended no time at all investigating Knighton's background, and introduced
no evidence in mitigation at the sentencing phase of Knighton's trial. Knighton v. Maggio,
468 U.S. 1229, 1230 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Knighton was put to death on October
30, 1984. DATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6. The record of John Taylor's trial did "not
disclose any interruption between the verdict on the guilt phase and the argument on the
penalty phase." State ex tel. Taylor v. King, 446 So. 2d 741, 742 (La. 1984). Taylor was
executed on February 29, 1984. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6. After a trial in which
his attorney failed to introduce any mitigation evidence whatsoever, see Berry v. King, 476
U.S. 1164 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Benjamin Berry was electrocuted on June 7,
1987. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7. Alvin Moore was put to death on June 9, 1987,
after a trial in which the penalty phase lasted approximately one hour. Id.; see Moore v.
Maggio, 435 So. 2d 997, 997 (La. 1983) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting from denial of writ of habeas
corpus). A unanimous jury recommended that Jimmy Glass be sentenced to death only one
day after the completion of the guilt phase of his trial. State v. Glass, 455 So. 2d 659, 666
(La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985). Glass's trial attorney admitted during federal
habeas proceedings that he failed to call mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase be-
cause of "mental and physical fatigue" after the guilt phase. Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d
1165, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987). Glass was executed on June
12, 1987. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6. Counsel for Willie Celestine, executed on July
20, 1987, id., did not introduce any evidence at the penalty phase, failing to call a number of
available mitigation witnesses to testify. Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1022 (1985). The penalty phase of Leslie Lowenfield's trial was
completed in two hours and five minutes on the evening of the day the jury rendered its
verdict as to guilt. State v. Lowenfield, 495 So. 2d 1245, 1258 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1153 (1986). Even though Lowenfield's attorney made pre-trial motions arguing that
Lowenfield suffered from a mental condition rendering him incapable of assisting in his
defense, id. at 1250, the jury was not provided evidence of Lowenfield's mental defects dur-
ing the sentencing hearing. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987), afl'd
on other grounds, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). A psychologist's affidavit, prepared only weeks before
Lowenfield's execution, indicated that at the time of his crime Lowenfield was likely a para-
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eight additional cases, important psychiatric mitigation evidence
was either not discovered or not introduced at trial.3 81 In still an-
noid schizophrenic with persecution delusions and an impaired ability to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong, and that no effort had ever been made to investigate the origins of
Lowenfield's mental illness or whether his illness was caused by a brain lesion or other
trauma. Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014
(1988). Lowenfield was electrocuted on April 13, 1988. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7.
Wayne Felde's attorney did not offer mitigation evidence at the penalty phase, and in fact
argued in favor of a death sentence, at Felde's request. Felde, a Vietnam veteran suffering
from post-traumatic stress syndrome, later unsuccessfully challenged his sentence, claiming
he was suicidal at the time of his trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney affirmatively sought the death penalty rather than merely refusing to
offer mitigation at the sentencing hearing. See State ex rel. Felde v. Maggio, 457 So. 2d
1180, 1180 (La. 1984) (Cologero, J., dissenting from denial of habeas corpus); State v. Felde,
422 So. 2d 370, 393-95 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 918 (1983). Felde was electrocuted
on March 15, 1988. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7.
381. In the case of Elmo Sonnier, counsel failed to pursue mental health mitigation
evidence at the penalty trial, even though concern over Sonnier's mental health before his
trial was sufficient to cause the trial judge to convene a sanity commission. Sonnier v. Mag-
gio, 720 F.2d 401, 410 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). Sonnier was exe-
cuted on April 5, 1984. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6. Timothy Baldwin alleged in his
habeas petition that his attorney did not prepare for the penalty phase of Baldwin's trial
until the jury had rendered a verdict at the guilt phase. Baldwin v. Maggio, 704 F.2d 1325,
1333 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984). Baldwin argued that once he had
been determined to be sane and capable of standing trial, his attorney did not pursue psy-
chiatric mitigation evidence; the attorney also failed to make a strong evidentiary showing
regarding the effects of Baldwin's alcoholism and failed to call witnesses who could have
testified as to the positive aspects of Baldwin's character, his good work habits, the effects of
his financial problems, and his despondency. Baldwin v. Blackburn, 524 F. Supp. 332, 338
(W.D. La.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1982). Baldwin
died in Louisiana's electric chair on September 10, 1984. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at
6. While Robert Lee Willie's attorney offered penalty phase testimony from the defendant
and his aunt about the defendant's troubled childhood, counsel failed to contact numerous
friends and relatives who could have bolstered this testimony, and failed to produce evi-
dence of Willie's mental condition. See Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984). Willie was executed on December 28, 1984. DEATH Row USA,
supra note 1, at 6. Although David Martin's attorney presented evidence in mitigation, he
did not present expert evidence or testimony relating to Martin's mental state at the time of
his offense or the effect of drugs and alcohol on his mental capacity at the time of the
offense. State ex rel. Martin v. Blackburn, 392 So. 2d 648, 648 (La. 1981) (Calogero, J.,
dissenting from denial of stay of execution). Martin was put to death on January 4, 1985.
DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 6. Similarly, Edward Byrne was never evaluated by a
mental health professional before being sentenced to death. Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501,
512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1242 (1988). Byrne's death sentence was carried out on
June 14, 1988. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 7. Dalton Prejean was executed on May
18, 1990, id. at 8, despite ample evidence that the state psychologist who examined Prejean
before trial was incompetent, failing to determine Prejean's history, to conduct sufficient
tests, or to recognize and investigate signs of brain damage. Prejean v. Whitley, 560 So. 2d
447, 447 (La.) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
943 (1990). A competent independent psychologist would have discovered that Prejean had
suffered damage to the frontal and parietal lobes of his brain, rendering him unable to con-
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other case, counsel failed to present significant non-psychiatric
mitigation evidence that was available at the time of the defend-
ant's sentencing hearing.3 8 2 The National Law Journal reported
that the average length of the penalty phase of a random sample of
Louisiana capital trials was 2.9 hours.""3
Under Pennsylvania's death penalty statute, the jury must re-
turn a death sentence if it finds the existence of one of sixteen
statutory aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.38 4 Notwith-
standing the harsh consequence of failing to introduce mitigating
evidence under Pennsylvania's capital punishment scheme, no mit-
igation evidence or virtually no mitigation evidence was introduced
in seven of the thirty-one death cases affirmed by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court from 1988 through 1990.385
trol his violent impulses; suffered from paranoia and schizophrenia; had been rejected by his
mother and aunt; and had been physically abused by his aunt. Prejean v. Smith, 889 F.2d
1391, 1398 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). The attorney representing
Andrew Lee Jones also failed to procure an independent psychiatric examination of his cli-
ent before trial. Counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence of Jones' mental condi-
tion meant that the jury was never apprised of Jones' organic brain damage, history of head
injuries, migraine headaches, transient psychotic episodes, borderline retardation, anxiety
and depression, and medical history of drug and alcohol abuse. Jones v. Whitley, 938 F.2d
536, 539 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991). Jones was executed on July 22, 1991.
DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 8. Robert Wayne Sawyer's trial counsel failed to intro-
duce Sawyer's mental health records or other expert evidence at the penalty phase that
would have revealed brain damage and retarded mental development.' Sawyer v. Whitley,
112 S. Ct. 2514, 2537 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Sawyer died in the electric chair on
March 5, 1993. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 9.
382. The attorneys representing Robert Wayne Williams failed to interview numerous
readily available witnesses who could have offered mitigation evidence on his client's behalf,
instead relying solely on the testimony of the accused's mother to put this mitigation evi-
dence before the jury. See Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 391-92 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983). Williams was executed on December 14, 1983. DEATH
Row USA, supra note 1, at 6.
383. Marcia Coyle, Fatal Defense Close-Up: Louisiana, A Triple Whammy Here Foils
Justice, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 36, 36.
384. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1990). If the jury finds the existence of at
least one mitigating factor, it must then determine that the aggravating evidence outweighs
mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence. Id.
385. Ledewitz, supra note 261, at 661 n.55, 667. Those cases were Commonwealth v.
Bryant, 574 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v. Tedford, 567 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1989); Com-
monwealth v. Wallace, 561 A.2d 719 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699
(Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Blystone,
549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988), cert. granted, in part, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989), aff'd, 494 U.S. 299
(1990); and Commonwealth v. Appel, 539 A.2d 780 (Pa. 1988). See Ledewitz, supra note 261,
at 661 n.55. In several other cases, preparation for the penalty phase was clearly inadequate.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 570 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1990) (attorney argued that defend-
ant's age (18) was a mitigating factor; opinion is silent as to whether other mitigation was
introduced). In the Williams case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court showed how unde-
manding it has been in reviewing the quality of representation received by death row in-
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The chronic failure of defense attorneys to present favorable
mitigation evidence cannot be facilely attributed to the absence of
such evidence. Justice Marshall maintained that "except perhaps
in the extraordinary case, counsel's failure even to attempt to give
the jury some reason for believing a defendant is not deserving of
death denies defendant his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel," and that he had "yet to see that extraordi-
nary case."' 6 Indeed, one of the ironies of the modern death pen-
alty is that those who are capable of committing the egregious
crimes that would motivate prosecutors to seek the ultimate pun-
ishment are precisely those who are likely to have compelling miti-
gators-people With serious mental disorders, brain damage, or ex-
treme childhood deprivations.
The underlying message delivered by the studies examining
indigent defense services and the experts who have observed the
administration of the death penalty in the United States is the
same: "The quality of counsel makes a difference to the outcome of
a criminal case, and there is a relationship between the conduct of
professionals and the compensation available to reward them."8 7
The repeated failure to defend capital cases at their most vital
stage can be directly blamed on resource deprivation. Most attor-
neys asked to defend capital cases are not familiar enough with
capital litigation to appreciate the significance of the penalty
phase,88 and those who do lack the resources to undertake the ex-
mates during the penalty phases of their trials. The court noted that "trial counsel, on a
number of occasions, advised appellant that he should be prepared, in the event of his con-
viction, to supply counsel with factors about his life that could be seen as mitigating. Appel-
lant failed to provide such information." 570 A.2d at 83. The court found this level of prepa-
ration to be constitutionally sufficient. Id.
386. Berry v. King, 476 U.S. 1164, 1164 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
387. Norman Lefstein, Colloquium on Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent
Criminal Defendant: Has the Promise Been Fulfilled? (Keynote Address), 14 N.Y.U. RIv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 7 (1986). See also Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (S.C. 1992)
(recognizing that "[t]he link between compensation and the quality of representation re-
mains too clear" (quoting Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987))); White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380
(Fla. 1989) (noting that "[tlhe relationship between an attorney's compensation and the
quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored"); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536,
544 (W. Va. 1989) (stating "[ilnevitably, economic pressure must adversely affect the man-
ner in which at least some cases are conducted").
388. Many ascribe the chronic failure to present a case of mitigation at the sentencing
hearing to a failure to understand either the significance or the dynamics of the penalty
phase. Professor White notes that
many attorneys who represent capital defendants do not understand the signifi-
cance of the penalty trial. The typical defense attorney has had little or no prior
experience in dealing with capital cases .... [M]any attorneys do not even begin
to prepare for the penalty trial until after their clients have been adjudicated
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haustive investigation necessary to effectively develop mitigating
evidence.'89
In sum, every shortcoming in the quality of capital de-
fense-the disproportionate number of incompetent attorneys as-
signed to death cases, the lack of experience and expertise of de-
fense counsel, the repeated failure of defense attorneys to
investigate and present available mitigating evidence-is ulti-
mately rooted in society's unwillingness to pay for a meaningful
defense in death penalty cases. This policy decision not to fund
indigent defense has directly resulted in the execution of defend-
ants who were never provided the substantive and procedural
rights supposedly required by the Constitution.
B. Socioeconomic Status and Death Sentencing
In light of the severe underfunding of indigent defense at the
initial stages of capital litigation and the consequences of that un-
derfunding discussed above, it is hardly surprising that a high cor-
relation between the socioeconomic status of the accused and the
outcome of his trial has been found in several studies. For exam-
ple, a study by the Texas Judicial Council in the mid-1980s showed
that a defendant's chances of being convicted of a capital crime
rose by nearly thirty percent if represented by an appointed rather
than retained attorney, and the chances of receiving a death sen-
tence rose by twenty-four percent.39 0
A comprehensive empirical study of the operation of the death
penalty in Georgia after Furman showed that "[a]fter adjustment
for all other legitimate case characteristics and the defendant's
guilty of a capital crime ....
WHrT, Nn-Is, supra note 82, at 76. See also Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 73 (argu-
ing that "[s]ome of the most significant mistakes made by attorneys in capital cases are
based on misunderstandings regarding the highly complex bifurcated trial"). This is just a
symptom, however, of the resource deprivation afflicting the indigent defense system. Just
as defense counsel lack the resources to adequately investigate penalty phase evidence, they
are frequently unable, because of economic pressures, to commit the time necessary to
master the nuances of capital representation.
389. Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 70-71.
390. The study indicated that 65% of charged defendants represented by retained
counsel were convicted of capital murder while 93% of charged defendants who could not
afford their own attorney were convicted of a capital offense. Moreover, 55% of those repre-
sented by retained counsel were sentenced to death, as compared to 79% of those repre-
sented by appointed counsel. Id. at 74 (citing Factors that Lead to Death Row, DALLAS
TihEs-HERALD, Nov. 17, 1985, at 18, col. 3). Data gathered by David R. Dow indicates that
this study understated the problem. Dow, Teague and Death, supra note 338, at 26-27, 61-
72 (reporting data showing that capital defendants represented by court-appointed attor-
neys are far more likely to be sentenced to death than are those defended by a public de-
fender system).
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race, defendants with court-appointed attorneys faced odds of re-
ceiving a death sentence that were 2.6 times higher than defend-
ants with retained counsel."""1 Data gathered in that study indi-
cate that the differential treatment of defendants based on their
poverty has been exacerbated by the growing complexity of mod-
ern capital punishment jurisprudence.392
A similarly exhaustive study of the operation of the death
penalty in Florida from 1973 through 1977 was designed to identify
the factors that explained different outcomes in murder cases in
which the prosecutor sought or could have sought the death pen-
alty.39s The study is one of several that demonstrated that racial
biases-and particularly considerations of the race of the vic-
tim-have continued to influence capital sentencing decisions in
the post-Furman era. 4 But the study also revealed another influ-
ence on death-sentencing decisions: the poverty of the defendant.
In Florida, representation by a court-appointed lawyer or public
defender was a stronger predictor of a death sentence than the fact
that the defendant killed a white person rather than a black per-
son. 95 Moreover, the fact that the defendant was represented by a
court-appointed attorney was as strong a predictor of a death sen-
tence as the existence of any legitimate aggravating circumstance
and a stronger predictor than most legally relevant
considerations.9 6
391. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 158.
392. The authors found "no compelling evidence" that Georgia's pre-Furman death
sentencing system was affected by the socioeconomic status of the defendant. Id. at 400.
The authors warned that "there [was] little variation in the socioeconomic status" of the
defendants charged with capital crimes in the pre-Furman era, and that the study's "mea-
sures of ... economic status are far from perfect." Id.
393. BowERs, supra note 23.
394. See supra notes 24 and 64.
395. BowEms, supra note 23, at 355-56. Among other things, the study used regression
coefficients, which measure the strength of the relationship between one variable (for exam-
ple, the fact that the victim was a police officer) and an outcome variable (for example,
whether the defendant is sentenced to death) after controlling for all other variables. The
regression coefficients can be compared to determine which variables are the strongest
predictors of the outcome. Using black defendants who kill black victims as the reference
category, the Florida study found that the regression coefficient measuring the relationship
between a white victim and a death sentence was 0.13 (regardless of whether the defendant
was white or black), and the regression coefficient for white defendants who kill black vic-
tims was -0.17 (indicating that that class was much less likely to receive a death sentence).
Id. at 354 (Table 10-4). In comparison, using defendants represented by privately retained
counsel as the reference category, the study found that the regression coefficient measuring
the relationship between representation by a court-appointed attorney and a death sentence
was 0.22, and the relationship between representation by a public defender and a death
sentence was 0.16. Id.
396. Id. at 355-56. Controlling for all other factors, and using defendants represented
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These studies, while yielding disturbing results, probably tend
to understate the effect of resource deprivation on the quality of
representation provided to the poor. They are based on compari-
sons between appointed and retained attorneys, and even most re-
tained counsel in capital cases are subject to serious economic con-
straints. Few defendants or their families can afford to pay in
excess of $200,000 to defend a capital case through the direct ap-
peal stage, and, as a consequence, even retained counsel will usu-
ally lack the resources to do all that is necessary to assure that the
defendant is provided the full measure of procedural and substan-
tive protections guaranteed by the Constitution.3 9 7
In sum, resource deprivation of defense services for the poor is
among the most significant factors influencing the outcome of
death penalty cases. As the Executive Director of the Capital Rep-
resentation Resource Center of Tennessee observed, "[t]he inmates
on death row are . ..characterized more by their economic and
political powerlessness than by their culpability."3 8 Yet, the socio-
economic status of a particular defendant is an extralegal factor
that has no legitimate role in determining which offenders should
be put to death for their crimes. The influence of this extralegal
factor is so pronounced that it calls into question the constitution-
ality of all death sentences in states with underfunded indigent de-
fense systems.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE STATUS QUO
In a shockingly high percentage of cases, the constitutional
guarantees identified in the Supreme Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence have been nothing more than an elaborate set of
empty promises. Despite the considerable evidence that primary
responsibility for this lies with the failure to adequately fund indi-
gent defense, there have been only sporadic and largely inadequate
by privately retained counsel as the reference category, the study found that being repre-
sented by a court-appointed attorney was a significant predictor of being indicted for a
capital, as opposed to non-capital, crime (with a regression coefficient of 0.17) and among
the strongest predictors of a death sentence (with a regression coefficient of 0.22). Id. at 343
(Table 10-1), 348, 354 (Table 10-4), 356. In comparison, the only legally relevant factors that
were comparably strong predictors of a death sentence-committing the murder in the
course of committing another felony, and killing a child who was age 16 or younger-had
regression coefficients of 0.23 and 0.20, respectively. Id. at 354 (Table 10-4).
397. See Redick, supra note 18, at 23 (stating "[r]etained representation, when it does
occur, is usually financed by family, not the defendant; and retained counsel is almost al-
ways underfinanced, either because counsel does not charge enough or the defendant/family
can not pay enough").
398. Id.
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efforts to remedy the injustices of resource deprivation.399 Indeed,
there has been substantial resistance to any changes that will fur-
ther burden financially strapped state and local governments in or-
der to improve defense services for those charged with capital
crimes. 400
Two chief arguments have been advanced to justify non-ac-
tion. The first focuses on the availability of collateral post-convic-
tion remedies as a safety valve that identifies unjust death
sentences before they are carried out. Since America's criminal jus-
tice system gives death row inmates several opportunities to show
they are undeserving of the death sentences they have received,
the argument goes, at the end of this process only the "truly de-
serving" will be executed. The second argument focuses on the eth-
ical obligation of practicing attorneys to provide legal representa-
tion to the poor without pay. This line of reasoning maintains that
providing free indigent defense services in death penalty cases is
part of the pro bono obligation of the bar and that the poor quality
of representation received by indigent capital defendants ulti-
mately is the fault of the bar, not the states. Upon close examina-
tion, neither of these arguments can excuse the failure of the
courts to remedy the injustices occasioned by the gross underfund-
ing of defense services in capital cases.
A. The Illusory "Safety Valve" of Post-Conviction Collateral
Proceedings
Death row inmates typically have two levels of collateral post-
conviction review available to them after they have exhausted their
direct appeals. In most states, an inmate may file a petition in the
state court in which he was convicted and sentenced, seeking
whatever relief might be available under the state's post-conviction
laws.40 1 If relief is denied, the inmate can appeal to the state's ap-
399. See infra part V.A.
400. See, e.g., Gary Taylor, Texas Death-Penalty Study Hit, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1993,
at 3, 50 (discussing prosecutor's attack on study calling for increased funding of capital
defense in Texas as "a plan to load the system up with so many costs that the death penalty
would become unworkable").
401. The Supreme Court has held that the states have no constitutional obligation to
provide post-conviction procedures for attacking a verdict and sentence that has been af-
firmed on direct appeal. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Typically, the grounds for relief in state post-
conviction are very limited. Except for clims of ineffective assistance of counsel, only the
rarest of claims can survive the doctrines of waiver, forfeiture, and issue preclusion that bar
substantive review in state post-conviction proceedings. Amsterdam, supra note 99, at 17;
see, e.g., Ex parte Singleton, 548 So. 2d 167 (Ala. 1989) (discussing Alabama's post-convic-
tion rules); Whitmore v. State, 771 S.W.2d 266 (Ark. 1989) (severely limiting availability of
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pellate courts. 402 Upon exhaustion of available state post-convic-
tion proceedings, an unsuccessful inmate can file a petition with a
federal district court seeking habeas corpus relief from his convic-
tion and sentence. 03 Substantively, federal habeas relief is availa-
ble to an inmate who can show that his conviction or sentence was
obtained in violation of the United States Constitution or federal
law.404
It is widely believed that these avenues provide ample oppor-
tunity for the criminal justice system to remedy any wrongful con-
victions or death sentences it has produced.40 5 This contention is
not entirely without historical support. While state post-conviction
proceedings have rarely played any role in curing injustices that
occurred during an indigent's trial or direct appeal,40 8 about sev-
post-conviction remedies in Arkansas); Clark v. State, 533 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1988) (discuss-
ing Florida's strict rules barring claims raised for the first time in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings); Valenzuela v. Newsome, 325 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 1985) (discussing Georgia's strict
default rule barring most claims in post-conviction); Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 524
(Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (noting that Mississippi's procedural default rules
are so strict that "[a]ll constitutional claims are . . .precluded from post-conviction re-
view"). Moreover, even when state courts do reach the merits of a post-conviction claim,
relief is rarely granted. Professor Anthony Amsterdam has observed that some state judges
"are so intractably hostile to federal constitutional rights and locally unpopular criminal
defendants that a condemned inmate's pursuit of the theoretically available state post-con-
viction remedies is a foregone fool's errand." Amsterdam, supra note 99, at 17. The numbers
support this observation: from 1984 through 1990, post-conviction relief for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel was granted at the state court level only nine times in Florida, twice in
Mississippi, once each in Alabama, Louisiana, and Georgia, and not at all in Texas. Mari-
anne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just A Nominal Right?, NAT'L L.J.,
June 11, 1990, at 42, 42.
402. Amsterdam, supra note 99, at 16.
403. Id.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988); see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). There is one conspicuous exception to the substantive reach of
federal habeas corpus relief: the Supreme Court has removed Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule claims from habeas review altogether. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976).
405. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 831 (Kan. 1987) ("Simply
because the system could result in the appointment of ineffective counsel is not sufficient
reason to declare the system unconstitutional; those rare cases where counsel has been inef-
fective may be handled and determined individually by the appellate courts." (emphasis
added)); see also Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990).
406. Seemingly, the most significant role played by state post-conviction proceedings in
the administration of the death penalty is the additional opportunities they provide for
forfeiting substantive constitutional claims. Failure to raise claims in state post-conviction
proceedings can preclude federal courts from considering them during habeas proceedings.
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Frequently, these defaults occur when a
death row inmate proceeds (or fails to proceed) without the aid of an attorney during collat-
eral proceedings in state court. An inmate has no constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel during such proceedings, Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion), and "there is no guarantee that counsel will be appointed to assist a condemned person
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enty percent of the federal habeas corpus petitions in death cases
decided between 1976 and 1983 resulted in the reversal of the in-
mate's conviction, sentence, or both.4 07 Since 1984, however, the
percentage of death row inmates who have obtained habeas corpus
relief has dropped precipitously. In the period from 1984 to 1990,
in bringing a collateral review petition." Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103, at
356. In recent years, the pool of attorneys willing and able to represent death row inmates
during post-conviction proceedings has declined at a time when the number of inmates
needing representation has increased dramatically. See generally ABA Task Force, supra
note 2; Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death
Row, 37 AM. U. L. Rv. 513 (1988); McGill, supra note 176. See also Smothers, supra note
256, at A21.
In addition, while state post-conviction proceedings have provided inmates little oppor-
tunity for relief from their sentences, they have given the states the opportunity to insulate
their death sentences from federal review. For example, for several years the State Attorney
General's office in Alabama has followed a practice of submitting lengthy drafts of full opin-
ions (often running 50 pages or more) to trial judges in post-conviction proceedings, which
the judges sign with little or no modification. See, e.g., Holladay v. State, 629 So. 2d 673,
687 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994); Bell v. State, 593 So. 2d
123, 126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2981 (1992); Hubbard v. State, 584
So. 2d 895, 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1041 (1992); Weeks v. State,
568 So. 2d 864, 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990). Those opin-
ions invariably contain language designed to procedurally foreclose federal review of the
defendant's conviction and sentence. The Mississippi Attorney General has frequently urged
the Mississippi Supreme Court to invoke procedural bars, so as to prevent subsequent fed-
eral review of the merits of the defendant's claims. See, e.g., Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d
621, 626 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987); Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d
520, 531 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984); see also
Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1873-74.
407. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet even'in
this period of close federal supervision of the administration of capital punishment, several
death row inmates slipped through the system and were executed despite serious errors of
commission and omission by their attorneys during their trials. A few examples of substan-
dard representation received by men who have since been executed were recited above. See
supra notes 338-52, 361-72 and accompanying text. Other observers have recounted exam-
ples that are similar or worse. See sources cited supra note 337. Even those who ultimately
obtained relief in federal court from often abominably unfair trials suffered years of uncer-
tainty and the psychological torment attendant with long confinement on America's death
rows before their convictions were overturned.
The most troubling implication of the success death row inmates had in federal habeas
proceedings before 1984 is that "[i]n every one of the[] cases [in which habeas corpus relief
was granted by a federal court], the inmate's claims had been rejected by a state trial court
and by the state's highest court, at least once and often a second time in state post-convic-
tion proceedings." Amsterdam, supra note 99, at 51; see also WHr, Nmumrs, supra note
82, at 22 (arguing that the "astonishingly high" success rate of death row inmates in habeas
proceedings before 1987 "indicates that state courts often failed to apply federal law cor-
rectly in death penalty cases and, therefore, suggests that the state courts cannot be relied
on to protect capital defendants' constitutional protections"). If, as suggested, many state
courts have abdicated their role in assuring that the death penalty is administered in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Constitution, the Supreme Court's recent retrenchment
in the habeas area is particularly disturbing. See infra part IV.A.1.
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federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel-the pri-
mary legal theory available to capital defendants under current
habeas corpus law-was granted once and denied thirty-one times
by the Fifth Circuit, granted once and denied nine times by the
Fourth Circuit, and granted fourteen times and denied forty-one
times by the Eleventh Circuit.40 8
Several developments in the past decade have dramatically re-
duced the utility of post-conviction proceedings as a safety valve
for the criminal defense system. With the ascent to the federal
bench of conservatives sympathetic to public impatience with de-
lays in carrying out death sentences, 40 9 the federal courts have
been increasingly unreceptive to habeas claims, and the scope of
federal review has been severely contracted through the erection of
imposing procedural barriers to habeas relief. Under these proce-
dural rules, unprepared attorneys who fail to make and preserve
objections or neglect to discover or present evidence can forfeit
their clients' most compelling defenses and waive their clients'
strongest claims. In such cases, often the only recourse for the con-
demned is a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, which has been a difficult claim to sustain since the Su-
preme Court decided Strickland v. Washington410 in 1984.
1. Restrictions on the Availability of Habeas Relief. In re-
cent years, the Supreme Court has retreated steadily from active
federal habeas review of state court convictions.41' Primarily, this
408. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 401, at 42. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
were successful eight times and unsuccessful sixteen times in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits. Id.
409. See Wrra, NINETms, supra note 82, at 23-24. Currently, support for the death
penalty is considered the "touchstone" for Senate Republican support for federal judicial
appointees of President Clinton. Henry J. Reske, Liberal Detectors: Judicial Nominees
Sized Up Based on Death-Penalty Stance, 80 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 14.
410. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
411. This trend, which has accelerated dramatically since the late 1980s, has been the
subject of several excellent law review articles. See, e.g., John Blume & William Pratt, Un-
derstanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1991); Markus Dirk
Dubber, Prudence and Substance: How the Supreme Court's New Habeas Retroactivity
Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 Ahl. CRIi. L. REv. 1
(1992); Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas
Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193 (1989); Garvey, supra note 71;
Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal
Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1991); Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty
Cases: Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence, 24 CraM. L. BULL. 379
(1988); Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L.
REv. 423 (1994); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303
(1993); Dow, Teague and Death, supra note 338; Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial
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retreat has been accomplished through formidable procedural bar-
riers that prevent federal courts from considering the merits of
claims raised in habeas petitions.412 As a general rule, federal
courts cannot address claims that were not raised in state court in
accordance with state procedural rules ("procedural default");41
claims that are substantially identical to claims raised and decided
in a previous federal habeas corpus petition (the rule against "suc-
cessive" petitions);414 or claims that could have been raised but
were not in a previous habeas petition (the rule against "abusive"
petitions).415
Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Re-
cent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1991); Ann Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1993); see also ABA Task Force, supra note 2, at
93-134; Tabak & Lane, supra note 18, at 85-89. As this Article has gone to press, Congress is
considering further restrictions on habeas relief.
412. In addition to the barriers discussed in the text, the Court has recently held that
even if a habeas petitioner is not otherwise procedurally barred from obtaining relief and
can show that his substantive constitutional rights were violated, the state can avoid a new
trial by satisfying a "harmless error" standard that is less demanding in habeas proceedings
than on direct appeal. When an error of constitutional magnitude is made, the state is ordi-
narily required to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
avoid reversal. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). For habeas cases, however, the
Court has opted for a "less onerous standard" for determining whether a constitutional er-
ror was harmless, Brecht v. Abraharnson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993), looking to whether
the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's ver-
dict." Id. at 1718 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Under this
test, a petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief for most types of constitutional error unless he
"can establish that 'actual prejudice' resulted." Id. at 1712 (citing United States v. Lane,
474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). Justice O'Connor has noted that in adopting a less demanding
harmless error standard for habeas proceedings, the Court "tolerat[es] a greater probability
that an error with the potential to undermine verdict accuracy was harmful ... [and] in-
creases the likelihood that a conviction will be preserved despite an error that actually af-
fected the reliability of the trial." Id. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Contra John H.
Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 35 Wm. & MARY L. RIv. 163, 164 (1993) (concluding that the Brecht rule and
the Chapman rule, "though doubtlessly different, turn out not to be that different").
413. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728-29, 742 (1991) (holding that
claims procedurally barred because petitioner's attorney failed to file an appeal in state col-
lateral proceeding); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (barring claims not raised in
petitioner's direct appeal because of attorney error); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule forecloses
federal habeas review).
414. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 444-51 (1986) (plurality opinion).
415. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488-93 (1991). These procedural bars
pose a unique problem for attorneys representing death row inmates who at some point
express a desire to abandon their appeals and have their sentences carried out. There is a
fairly predictable pattern of vacillation "between vigorously pursuing their appeals and re-
sisting all efforts to prevent their executions" exhibited by many defendants who have been
sentenced to die, who after all tend to be mentally disturbed in the first place and are
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A petitioner can overcome these procedural barriers and ob-
tain review of his claims of constitutional error by showing "cause"
for the failure to raise the claims on an earlier occasion and
"prejudice" so serious that there is a "substantial likelihood" that
the constitutional error led to a different outcome.418 However, in
recent years the "cause and prejudice" standard has been inter-
preted so restrictively that it has become "virtually insurmounta-
ble. ' 417 "Cause" cannot be established merely by showing that the
petitioner's claims were not raised or were forfeited because of the
mistakes of the petitioner's attorney,418 despite the fact that attor-
ney error is the primary reason claims are not properly raised in a
timely manner; "prejudice" cannot be established by anything
short of a "showing that the prisoner was denied 'fundamental
fairness' at trial. '419
Until recently, one of the ways that "cause and prejudice"
could be established in capital cases was to show that "the factual
or legal basis for [the] claim was not reasonably available to coun-
sel" at the time of the procedural default.420 Since the law gov-
erning capital punishment has been in a state of flux in the last
two decades, with new rulings frequently providing grounds for re-
lief from convictions or sentences obtained in violation of the Con-
subjected to great psychological pressures while confined on death row. WHrr, NINETIES,
supra note 82, at 165. An attorney who acquiesces to his or her client's expressed wish not
to proceed with appeals, even if that wish is transient, will forfeit the client's ability to have
his substantive claims heard in federal habeas proceedings. See id. at 164-65. For a discus-
sion of the dilemmas created for defense attorneys by this common pattern of behavior, see
id. at 165-81.
416. "Cause and prejudice" was established as the primary test for determining
whether procedural errors should be excused in Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 72, but the Su-
preme Court did not precisely define the terms "cause" and "prejudice" in that case. In
Murray, 477 U.S. at 478, the Supreme Court stated that "cause" exists only if there is
"some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts to comply
with the State's procedural rule." Id. at 488. For example, "cause" might exist if the factual
or legal basis for claim was unavailable at the time of trial, id., although other procedural
rules may effectively block claims that were "unavailable" when petitioner's case was pend-
ing before the state courts. "Prejudice" requires a showing of "substantial likelihood" that
the constitutional error led to a different outcome. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 174 (1982). Petitioner "must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the
errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions."
Id. at 170.
417. Denno, supra note 49, at 464 (quoting Mark Hansen, Final Justice: Limiting
Death Row Appeals, 78 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 67).
418. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
419. Id. at 494.
420. Id. at 488 (citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)); see also McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991).
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stitution, this was an important exception to the Supreme Court's
harsh default rules. In Teague v. Lane,42 1 however, the Court
sharply curtailed the availability of this exception by largely pre-
cluding retroactive application of "new" rules of constitutional
law.422 Under this "nonretroactivity principle," a federal court is in
most cases prevented "from granting habeas corpus relief to a state
prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sen-
tence became final. '423 A "new rule" is defined broadly as one that
"was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant's conviction became final. '424 This standard invites federal
courts to find that virtually any holding in a case decided after a
petitioner has exhausted his direct appeals is a "new rule" that
cannot be applied retroactively. 425
If the habeas petitioner fails to establish cause and prejudice,
a federal court can reach the merits of a constitutional claim other-
wise procedurally barred only if failure to do so would result in a
"miscarriage of justice. '426 But this standard is also nearly impossi-
ble to meet. Recent decisions have limited this exception to cases
in which the petitioner can establish by probative evidence that
421. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
422. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).
423. Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994).
424. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion). In order to divine whether a particular
rule is a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague, the federal court presented with the
habeas claim must first determine the date on which the defendant's conviction and sen-
tence "became final for Teague purposes." Caspari, 114 S. Ct. at 953. The court must then
"'[s]urve[y] the legal landscape"' as it existed as of that date, and "'determine whether a
state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would
have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required
by the Constitution."' Id. (citations omitted).
425. There are only two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity principle of Teague.
First, cases that announce a "new rule" prohibiting states from punishing certain conduct
under any circumstances can be applied retroactively. This exception is for rulings that
place "'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the crimi-
nal law-making authority to proscribe."' Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). This is a very limited; if Teague had been the law
in the 1960s, this exception might have applied if the state tried to criminalize one's invol-
untary status as a drug addict, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), or the distri-
bution of contraceptives, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The second ex-
ception is for cases that announce "'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
426. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2515 (1992). In Wainwright v. Sykes, the
Court expressly noted that the "cause and prejudice" standard did not "prevent a federal
habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a de-
fendant who in the absence of such an adjudication [would] be the victim of a miscarriage of
justice." 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
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"he has a colorable claim of factual innocence.' 427 Further, the
Court has drastically restricted a petitioner's opportunity to pre-
sent evidence supporting a claim of factual innocence in federal
court4 28 and has foreclosed altogether the use of the "miscarriage
of justice" exception in cases in which death row inmates wish to
challenge errors that occurred during the penalty phases of their
trials. 429
For indigents sentenced to death after a trial in which they
were denied a meaningful defense because of resource deprivation,
these developments in habeas corpus law have serious practical
consequences. Under the Court's current habeas jurisprudence, de-
fense attorneys are expected to adhere to labyrinthine procedural
rules, identify and present all claims of error early and often, and
anticipate "new rules" in a highly volatile area of the law. There
are innumerable occasions for unprepared or unseasoned defense
attorneys to forfeit even vital rights guaranteed their clients, par-
ticularly during the penalty phase, and experience teaches that
such forfeitures regularly occur. The sorts of attorney errors most
frequently associated with the underfunding of defense ser-
vices-those caused by a lack of familiarity with the procedural
and substantive rules applicable in capital cases or those associ-
ated with the failure to properly prepare for the penalty
phase-will not excuse the procedural forfeiture of claims. The
only recourse for the condemned in such cases is a claim that the
attorney was ineffective within the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
427. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) ("miscarriage of justice" standard
as applied to successive claims); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ("mis-
carriage of justice" standard as applied to procedurally defaulted claims).
428. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (indicating that in order to
claim right to opportunity to present new evidence supporting a constitutional claim in fed-
eral court, petitioner must show "cause and prejudice" to excuse failure to present eviden-
tiary basis for claim in state-court proceedings). The Court has held petitioners presenting
new evidence of actual innocence to an "extraordinarily high" burden of proof. Herrera v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993) (stating that if the claim is one of actual innocence, and
the evidence supporting that claim has not been presented before, the evidence of innocence
must be "truly persuasive," and the burden placed on the petitioner to show that the newly-
discovered evidence establishes the petitioner's innocence is "extraordinarily high"). Al-
though the Court did not ultimately resolve the question, there is substantial language in
Herrera suggesting that a claim that newly-discovered evidence of the petitioner's innocence
cannot be raised in federal habeas proceedings at all. See id. at 859-69.
429. For those sentenced to death, "to show 'actual innocence' one must show by clear
and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law." Keeney,
112 S. Ct. at 2517. Courts can only look to the petitioner's eligibility for the death penalty;
federal courts cannot consider "additional mitigating evidence which was prevented from
being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error." Id. at 2523; see also id. at
2531-33.
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ment. As is explained in the next section, even in cases of the most
egregious errors of counsel, ineffective assistance claims promise
little hope for those facing execution.
2. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard and the
Shift in the Burden of Proof. Stephen B. Bright, the director of
the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee, has observed that
"[e]veryone always thinks errors are going to be reversed for inef-
fective assistance of counsel. What people don't realize is that the
standard has come down, down, down .... .130 This trend acceler-
ated after 1984, when the Supreme Court articulated its test for
determining whether a criminal defendant has received effective
assistance of counsel, as required by the Sixth Amendment.3 1 In
Strickland v. Washington,3 2 the Court held that errors of a de-
fendant's attorney rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation
only if the defendant establishes that (1) the attorney's perform-
ance was constitutionally "deficient," and (2) this deficient per-
formance resulted in "prejudice. '43 3 Even serious errors will not
render a lawyer's performance constitutionally deficient unless
they undermine the reliability of the outcome of the trial.4  More-
over, the courts apply a strong presumption of competency, 4 5 with
430. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 401, at 42.
431. The Court has long recognized that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel subsumes within it a right to "effective assistance" of counsel at all critical stages
of a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
The Court has reasoned that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is "to protect the funda-
mental right to a fair trial," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984), and that
this purpose is served if the prosecution's case has been tested by a truly adversarial trial.
Id. at 684-87; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (explaining that
"[t]he essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so
upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered
unfair and the verdict rendered suspect"); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-57
(1984) (stating that the test for determining whether defendant has received constitutionally
acceptable legal representation is designed to assure that defendant's trial retains "its char-
acter as a confrontation between adversaries"). For a summary of the evolution of the Su-
preme Court's right to counsel jurisprudence, see Kendrick, supra note 325, at 390-93 and
Mounts, Public Defender Programs, supra note 213, at 476-81.
432. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
433. Id. at 687; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842 (1993).
434. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 (holding that the Sixth Amendment is not violated if
"a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted," even if defense attorney makes "de-
monstrable errors").
435. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Under this prong of the Strickland test, a defense
lawyer's errors will not rise to the level of a violation of the right to counsel unless the
lawyer's performance as a whole falls outside the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Id. at 689. Strickland requires courts to "judge ... counsel's challenged con-
duct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at
690.
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an attorney's "strategic decisions" entitled to substantial defer-
ence.438 If the petitioner can overcome this presumption, he must
establish that he was prejudiced; that is, "that there is a reasona-
ble probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different, '437 and that this
fact rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.45 5
In practice, this has been a difficult test to satisfy,4 9 as is sug-
gested by an examination of the cases of inmates who have been
executed despite absurd errors by their attorneys at trial or the
complete failure of their attorneys to investigate wide categories of
mitigating evidence.440 Data show a substantial drop in findings of
ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases over the past dec-
ade.441 Lower courts have applied the Strickland standard much
more restrictively than the language of the case necessarily re-
quires, attributing critical errors to counsel's trial "strategy" and
finding "strategic decisions" to be virtually unassailable. 442 The ex-
436. Id. at 689.
437. Id. at 694. Strickland indicates that counsel's errors must undermine confidence in
the outcome of the trial. Id. Language in a recent Supreme Court decision has suggested
that a court's prejudice inquiry should go beyond Strickland's focus on outcome determina-
tion, seemingly requiring the defendant to "point to some additional indicia" that the result
of the defendant's trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 848
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In Lockhart, the Supreme Court refused to set aside a conviction
and sentence of death under the Sixth Amendment notwithstanding the state's concession
that defense counsel's performance was deficient, and the defendant's demonstration that if
not for counsel's deficient performance, "the outcome would have been different." Id. at 842
& n.1. In that case, the defense attorney had failed to raise a challenge to the applicability
of a statutory aggravating circumstance that would have been successful under the control-
ling authority of the Eighth Circuit at the time of the defendant's trial. The reasoning un-
derying these Eighth Circuit cases was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court, see
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), after the defendant's trial but before the defend-
ant raised an ineffectiveness claim during habeas. The Court held that in determining
whether the defendant was "prejudiced" within the meaning of Strickland, the reviewing
court "may not consider the effect of an objection it knows to be wholly meritless under
current governing law, even if the objection might have been considered meritorious at the
time of its omission." Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
438. Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 841.
439. See, e.g., Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 78 (arguing that in
order to obtain relief from a death sentence, defendant must prove that but for failure to
present mitigation in the first place, he would not have been sentenced to death, a "burden
[that] can be insurmountable, even in the most meritorious of cases," in light of "the strong
presumptions in favor of attorney competence and the reliability of trial results"); Stone,
supra note 215, at 208-09 (stating that the Strickland standard "has proved to be extremely
difficult to meet, particularly for indigent defendants").
440. See supra notes 338-52, 361-72 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text.
442. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1858; Fong, supra note 103, at
475-80. An all-too-typical example of this approach is Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (6th
Cir. 1989), where the defense attorney failed to introduce any mitigating evidence at the
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treme deference afforded the decisions of defense counsel is cap-
tured in an oft-quoted remark of the vice-president of the Georgia
Trial Lawyers Association, who described the standard for compe-
tence in Georgia as the "mirror test": "You put a mirror under the
court-appointed attorney's nose, and if the mirror clouds up, that's
adequate counsel. '4 43 Courts have been loathe to find even the
most appalling attorney errors to be the basis for a new trial for
several reasons: concern that a finding of ineffectiveness would re-
sult in a disciplinary action against the defense attorney, even
though the attorney's errors are often the result of the unreasona-
ble burdens placed upon him or her by the justice system;4 44 fear
that members of the bar would refuse appointments if their repre-
sentation were subject to close scrutiny;445 and concern for the fi-
nality of criminal judgments.446
For indigent defendants charged with capital crimes, the
Strickland decision has been particularly disastrous. Language in
the Strickland opinion suggests that the deprivation of resources
necessary to prepare a meaningful defense is a factor mitigating
against a finding that the defendant was afforded ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. In judging the performance of defense attorneys,
courts are instructed to take into account "[l]imitations of time
and money . . . [which] may force early strategic choices, often
based solely on conversations with the defendant and a review of
the prosecutor's evidence. ' 447 Strickland seems to take the "cir-
cumstantial constraints of time, money, and clients' initial stories
as givens which the defense attorney has neither the responsibility
nor the capacity to change. '448 Moreover, in applying the Strick-
land test, lower courts have tended to focus their attention on er-
penalty phase of his client's trial and offered a 29-word closing argument. Id. at 875. The
Fifth Circuit characterized the attorney's approach as a "dramatic ploy," and found that the
attorney's performance was not constitutionally deficient. Id. at 877; Klein, Emperor
Gideon, supra note 213, at 634.
443. Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon From Being Blown Away: Prospective
Challenges to Inadequate Representation May Be Our Best Hope, 4 CRM. JusT., Winter
1990, at 10, 11.
444. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representa-
tion of the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. Rav. 1171, 1174-90 (1988) [hereinafter Klein,
Legal Malpractice].
445. See Stone, supra note 215, at 209.
446. See id.
447. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681 (1984); see also Rogers v. Zant, 13
F.3d 384, 386-88 (11th Cir.) (maintaining that "'strategy' can include a decision not to in-
vestigate," and "[o]nce we conclude that declining to investigate further was a reasonable
act, we do not look to see what a further investigation would have produced"), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 255 (1994).
448. Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 77-78.
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rors of commission rather than errors of omission,449 largely be-
cause it is difficult for reviewing courts to discern the prejudicial
effects of errors of omission."0 When defense attorneys are not
provided sufficient resources or sufficient time to properly prepare
for a capital case, however, "the defects in representation are more
likely to be in what is not done rather than what is done.""1
The nature of the sentencing decision in a capital case is not
easily susceptible to after-the-fact prejudice analysis. The most
common deficiency of defense attorneys in death cases is the fail-
ure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence and
rebut aggravating evidence. During post-conviction proceedings,
courts are often presented with substantial evidence that could
have been offered at trial and asked to determine whether the
proffered evidence would have changed a jury's "reasoned moral
response" to the defendant and the circumstances surrounding his
crime." 2 Yet such a question is not susceptible to resolution by
some divine formula. There is no way to know what weight the
jury accorded the evidence of aggravation and mitigation it heard
at trial, much less to know how that calculus might have been af-
fected if the balance of evidence presented during the penalty
phase had been different.453 Determining whether the jury might
have found additional evidence sufficient to shift the balance away
449. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 215, at 487 (stating that "[b]y requiring the defendant
to demonstrate that the ineffectiveness of counsel was prejudicial, the Strickland criteria
tend to focus on errors of commission"); Stone, supra note 215, at 208-09 (stating that "the
failure of defense counsel to conduct an investigation into plausible lines of defense may not
be reflected as prejudice").
450. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (referring to difficulty of prov-
ing prejudice when "the evil. . .is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing"); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that "[t]he insidious-
ness of overburdening defense counsel is that it can result in concealing from the courts, and
particularly the appellate courts, the nature and extent of damage that is done to defend-
ants by their attorneys' excessive caseloads"); Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note
287, at 234 (pointing out that "[w]hen errors are of omission rather than commission, it is
often difficult for courts to see the effect").
451. Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note 287, at 222; see also Citron, supra note
215, at 487 (stating that "especially with overworked defense attorneys, ineffective assis-
tance more often results from an attorney's errors of omission").
452. Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 83-84. To establish prejudice
during the penalty phase of a capital trial, the petitioner must show "a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . .would have concluded that the bal-
ance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
453. See Gredd, supra note 88, at 1567; Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 401, at 42 (stating
that "it is difficult to distinguish whether a jury reached a verdict because of its reaction to
the heinous circumstances of a capital murder or because defense counsel failed to do his or
her job").
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from death and toward a life sentence is a highly speculative
enterprise.
Moreover, a jury's "reasoned moral response" to evidence is
not strictly logical: "The decision may turn as much, or more, on
the emotional, moral, or sympathetic content of evidence and argu-
ment" than on the factual content of the information provided to
the jury.455 Strickland's prejudice test undervalues such intangible
considerations, 456 however, and habeas courts must ponder the ef-
fect that a change in the balance of mitigating and aggravating evi-
dence might have had on the jury's life and death decision in the
context of a legal proceeding that is "disengaged from the living
context of the capital trial. 45 7 The Supreme Court itself has ac-
knowledged as much:
Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination,
few can be gleaned from an appellate record. This inability to confront and
examine the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastat-
ing to any argument for consideration of what this Court has termed
"[those] compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind." When we held that a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to the consideration of such factors, we clearly envisioned that
that consideration would occur among sentencers who were present to hear
the evidence and arguments and see the witnesses.4 58
This vision has been lost in a system that withholds the resources
necessary to develop and present relevant mitigating evidence at
trial, and devalues the importance of such evidence under an inef-
454. See Fong, supra note 103, at 487 (stating that "[a]s the Strickland progeny
demonstrate, . . . the prejudice standard requires a reviewing court to speculate as to
whether the sentencer might have found the available evidence sufficient to mitigate a sen-
tence of death"); Gredd, supra note 88, at 1567-68 ("The result of the balancing is known to
the reviewing court but not the particular means by which that result was achieved. Conse-
quently, any attempt to determine the likelihood that additional elements would have al-
tered that balance necessarily is speculative." (footnote omitted)).
455. Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 84.
456. Id. (arguing that "[tihe prejudice test undervalues these intangible but important
factors in capital sentencing and thereby misses the significance of certain possible attorney
derelictions in capital cases").
457. Id.; see also Gredd, supra note 88, at 1568:
The task [faced by a habeas court] is made all the more speculative by the nature
of the evidence to be evaluated. The determination of the weight to be given to
character, background, emotional state, or "expressions of sincerity" involve sub-
tle assessments of credibility that are likely to hinge on the particular amount and
mix of evidence presented. Identifying the effect that a change in the mix would
have had cannot be easy. The risk of error is great.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
458. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
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fective assistance of counsel test that "focus[es] on the intellectual
content of the mitigating evidence and not the emotional and psy-
chological responses stimulated by live witnesses, which incline a
sentencer's decision one way or another. '459
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the combination of
resource deprivation at trial and Strickland's prejudice require-
ment in post-conviction proceedings has had the effect of shifting
the burden of proof on the most important issues of the trial from
the state to the defendant. For example, all capital punishment
schemes place upon the prosecution the evidentiary burden of
showing that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors jus-
tifies imposition of the death penalty. Because of resource depriva-
tion, however, the defense attorney virtually disappears during the
penalty phase, immeasurably lightening the state's burden of es-
tablishing the propriety of a death sentence.4 0 For countless de-
fendants, the first time significant mitigating evidence is presented
is during habeas proceedings, in the context of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim. At this stage, the onus is on the defendant
to show that this evidence would have caused the jury to "con-
clude[] that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances did not warrant death. '461 Effectively, the burden of proof
regarding the appropriate sentence shifts from the state to the de-
fendant, with the presumption favoring a life sentence becoming a
presumption of death.462
In sum, several legal developments of the past decade have
largely removed the federal courts from active supervision of the
operation of the death penalty in the United States. 463 Case by
459. Goodpaster, Adversary System, supra note 103, at 84.
460. The state's burden is most substantially eased by the failure of the defense attor-
ney to provide the jury with significant mitigating evidence to weigh against the evidence of
aggravation offered by the state. Less obviously, resource limitations can affect the ability of
the defense to challenge the state's evidence of aggravation. Moreover, the greater the de-
gree to which a defense attorney is unfamiliar with the substantive and procedural rules
governing penalty trials (also a consequence of resource deprivation), the greater the
chances that the state will benefit from a legal ruling or the wording of a jury instruction
that it would not have won if a fully prepared attorney was representing the defendant.
461. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
462. See Tabak, Death of Fairness, supra note 4, at 842 (stating that the Strickland
prejudice test "places on the defendant, rather than the State, the burden of proving the
effect of the unconstitutionality"); see also Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra note 103,
at 346 (requiring an ineffective assistance claimant to show that a constitutional error was
harmful shifts a burden ordinarily placed on the government to the claimant).
463. This retreat from active federal overview of capital punishment appears to have
been an important factor in Justice Blackmun's ultimate conclusion that the death penalty
could not be administered fairly and reliably. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Two terms before his dissent in Callins, Justice Black-
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case habeas review cannot be counted on as a safety valve for the
injustices that result from inadequately funded capital defense
systems.
B. Pro Bono Obligations and Ethical Dilemmas
Until recently, most legal challenges to inadequately funded
indigent defense systems were rejected on the theory that defend-
ing the poor for little or no pay was a professional obligation of the
bar. As "officers of the court," the argument goes, attorneys have
an obligation to render service to the poor when called upon to do
so by the courts. 464 Moreover, attorneys accept their licenses to
mun observed that "[my ability ... to enforce, notwithstanding my own deep moral reser-
vations, a legislature's considered judgment that capital punishment is an appropriate sanc-
tion, has always rested on an understanding that certain procedural safeguards ... would
ensure that death sentences are fairly imposed." Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
As I review the state of this Court's capital jurisprudence, I thus am left to
wonder how the ever-shrinking authority of the federal courts to reach and redress
constitutional errors affects the legitimacy of the death penalty itself. Since Gregg
v. Georgia, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty where
sufficient procedural safeguards exist to ensure that the State's administration of
the penalty is neither arbitrary nor capricious. At the time those decisions issued,
federal courts possessed much broader authority than they do today to address
claims of constitutional error on habeas review and, therefore, to examine the ade-
quacy of a State's capital scheme and the fairness and reliability of its decision to
impose the death penalty in a particular case. The more the Court constrains the
federal courts' power to reach the constitutional claims of those sentenced to
death, the more the Court undermines the very legitimacy of capital punishment
itself.
Id. at 2529-30 (citations omitted).
464. See, e.g., Makemson v. Martin County, 479 U.S. 1043, 1045 (1987) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) ("I discern nothing in the Sixth Amendment that would
prohibit a State from requiring its lawyers to represent indigent criminal defendants with-
out any compensation for their services at all."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932)
("Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such
appointment." (dictum)); People ex rel. Karlin v. Cuklin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.) ("'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions' ....
[The attorney] became an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or -
agency to advance the ends of justice." (citation omitted)); THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATIsE
ON THE CONsTrrUIioNAL LIuTATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AimmcAN UNION 334 (2d ed. 1871) (stating that the "humanity of the law"
has provided for the public appointment of counsel for indigent defendants and "it is a duty
which counsel so designated owes to his profession,. . . and to the cause of humanity and
justice, not to withhold nor spare his best exertions"); see also Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d
488 (Alaska 1966), overruled in part by De Lisio v. Alaska Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 437 (1987);
Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966);
Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211 (N.J. 1992);-State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J.
1966), superceded by statute; State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1173-74 (Okla. 1990) (Simms
J., dissenting); Kendrick, supra note 325, at 395. In the past, courts have found support for
428 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
practice law with the knowledge that they may be asked to re-
present the indigent without pay, and impliedly consent to do so if
asked.46 5 Under this view, states may permissibly ask the legal pro-
fession to effectively fund most of the cost of indigent representa-
tion in criminal cases by requiring individual attorneys to render
services at artificially low levels of compensation. 468 Any shortcom-
ings in the quality of indigent defense are attributed not to the
actions of the states in failing to adequately fund defense services
but rather to the failure of attorneys to meet their ethical responsi-
bilities. Courts were unwilling to acknowledge that the resources
available to a defense lawyer could affect the quality of representa-
tion rendered, regarding any such suggestion as "offensive to pro-
fessional ideals. '4 7
imposing this obligation on the bar from the traditions of the English barristry. See, e.g.,
Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979). The
historical basis for imposing this obligation has been effectively debunked. See generally
Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Ark. 1991), appeal after remand, State v. Indepen-
dence County, 850 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1993); David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's
Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735 (1980). Nonetheless, while one can question the his-
torical pedigree of this tradition, the image of the unpaid lawyer defending the poor has
become an integral part of the folklore of the American legal profession, taking on a life
independent of any imagined historical antecedent.
465. Kendrick, supra note 325, at 395-96; see also Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671
(5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1966); In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D.
Ala. 1979), vacated, 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981); Warner v. State, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211
(Ky.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966); State v. Clifton, 172 So. 2d 657, 667 (La. 1965);
Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 451 P.2d 708, 709 (Nev. 1969); Scott v. State, 392
S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 1965).
466. See generally Anderson, supra note 217 (rejecting constitutional challenges to un-
derfunded indigent defense systems and arguing that legal profession should address prob-
lem of indigent representation by increasing its pro bono commitment).
467. Richard J. Wilson, Litigative Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective As-
sistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 206 (1986);
see also Sparks, 368 o. 2d at 530 (an attorney's "sense of duty and... pride" will assure
that defendant will receive adequate representation); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 444-45
(N.J. 1966) (same).
The government has not been so quick to downplay the "commercial" character of an
attorney's work and stress the "service" attributes of the legal profession when it has not
suited its purposes. A prime example is the government's response to the efforts of the
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) of Washington. D.C. to improve the
system of compensation for indigent defense work in the District of Columbia. In 1983, the
attorneys most frequently appointed to do indigent criminal defense work in Washington,
D.C. (most of whom were members of SCTLA) "went on strike," refusing to accept new
appointments in protest of statutory hourly rates of $30 per hour for in-court time and $20
per hour for out-of-court work and fee caps that only went as high as $1000 for felony cases.
See Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 375-89. The strike resulted in
the authorization of higher fees by the District of Columbia City Council, but also attracted
the attention of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which filed an antitrust lawsuit
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The first thing one notices about this argument is that it is
most frequently made by judges and law professors who have
steady jobs and comfortable salaries, and who are unlikely to be
called upon to defend capital cases. No doubt, the legal profession
should encourage its members to provide indigents with free repre-
sentation.4 s  But requiring an attorney to work hundreds or
thousands of hours without pay and to subsidize the cost of expert
assistance "is beyond the wildest dreams of even the most impas-
sioned advocates of pro bono service."'4 9 It is unrealistic to expect
individual practitioners to expend the resources necessary to prop-
erly defend a death penalty case, and it should be no surprise to
find that they rarely commit the time and resources necessary to
assure that their clients' rights are respected.7 0
against SCTLA, charging illegal price fixing. Id. at 379-89. The FTC claimed that the attor-
neys were sellers of a product (their representation of indigent defendants) who acted to
coerce the buyer (the government of the District of Columbia) to pay higher prices for their
services. Id. at 380-81. In justifying its action, the Commissioners emphasized the commer-
cial (as opposed to "professional") aspect of the attorneys' work: "A lawyer who provides
legal representation for an indigent defendant also provides a service, and the exchange of
this service for money is also commerce." In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107
F.T.C. 510, 574 (1986); see Klein, The Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 382.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court validated the FTC's position, finding that SCTLA's "strike"
was an economic boycott that violated the antitrust laws. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426, 436 (1990). Thus, when it served the government's interest-in
this case, limiting the amount paid for indigent defense services-the "professional" attrib-
utes of the legal profession were deemphasized and the "commercial" character of the work
of attorneys became paramount. When necessary to justify efforts to shift the financial bur-
den of indigent defense to individual members of the bar, however, the "professional" obli-
gations of the bar are invoked. Klein, Eleventh Commandment, supra note 217, at 386-89.
468. Both the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Code of Professional Responsibility indicate that attorneys have a professional obligation to
accept court appointments to represent the poor. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 6.2 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY EC 2-29 (1980).
469. Vreeland, supra note 33, at 653.
470. In recent years, courts have been more willing to acknowledge this. See, e.g., White
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989) (stating that "[t]he relation-
ship between an attorney's compensation and the quality of representation can not be ig-
nored"); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 544 (W. Va. 1989) (recognizing that "[i]t is
unrealistic to expect all appointed counsel with office bills to pay and families to support to
remain insulated from the economic reality of losing money each hour they work"); see also
Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The state paid defense
counsel $11.84 per hour. Unfortunately, the justice system got only what it paid for."); cf.
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199 (1979) (noting that federal government provided com-
pensation for appointed counsel through Criminal Justice Act of 1964 "[i]n response to evi-
dence that unpaid appointed counsel were sometimes less diligent or less thorough than
retained counsel"). Reliance on romantic notions of volunteerism is particularly absurd
given that the burden of capital representation falls on a relatively small percentage of the
bar. The workload typically falls on a small class of criminal defense lawyers from sole prac-
tices or from small law firms with limited economic resources. See, e.g., Anderson, supra
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Further, the invocation of the bar's pro bono obligation as ajustification for inadequate funding for defense services confuses
the rights of defendants with the ethical obligations of attorneys, 7 1
and it tends to obscure the fact that providing adequate defense
services is ultimately the obligation of the states, not the bar.472
Adequately funded indigent defense is part of the price of a just
and efficient criminal justice system, "a cost properly borne by the
society that created it and benefits from it.' 4 7 Often, rhetorical
reliance on the pro bono traditions of the legal profession is little
more than a disguised effort to shift primary responsibility for in-
digent defense away from state and local governments to a small
segment of the criminal defense bar.
One of the ironies of this reliance on the ethical obligations of
the bar is that forcing a defense lawyer to work without adequate
resources in developing a meaningful defense in a capital case ac-
tually forces that lawyer to violate other ethical tenets governing
the legal profession. 475 As compelling as an attorney's pro bono ob-
ligation is the duty to refuse to represent a client in a matter un-
less the attorney possesses the "knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation necessary for the representation. '47 6 Moreover, an at-
note 217, at 505; LEFSTEmN, CRmI mAL DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 213, at 18; see also
Vreeland, supra note 33, at 653 (stating that "[c]ompelled criminal pro bono service would
either conscript unqualified counsel or impose an overwhelming burden on a small segment
of the bar").
471. Wilson, supra note 467, at 206.
472. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 835-37, 841-42 (Kan. 1987)
(noting that, notwithstanding attorneys' ethical obligations, the legal obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel rests with the state); Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1342
(Miss. 1990) (Robertson, J., concurring) (same); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217
(N.H. 1983) (noting that the public has responsibility to pay for administration of criminal
justice, and that responsibility cannot be shifted to the bar); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d
536, 544 (W. Va. 1989) (same); see also Vreeland, supra note 33, at 653 (asserting that
"[tihe state, not the bar, ultimately owes the criminally accused meaningful assistance of
counsel").
473. Vreeland, supra note 33, at 651.
474. One could argue that while it is unfair to burden a small segment of the legal
profession with the cost of indigent defense in capital cases, if that cost were borne equally
by the entire profession, the states' practice of passing the cost of indigent defense onto the
bar would be more defensible. Cf. Klein, Emperor Gideon, supra note 213, at 681-89 (sug-
gesting that the legal profession raise money, through lawyer registration fees or other
means, to fund improvements in indigent defense system). Accepting the premise (which
would be disputed by many) that it is reasonable to impose the cost of a service that bene-
fits society as a whole on a discrete segment of that society (the legal profession), it bears
noting that if the bar did assume responsibility for funding indigent defense, it would re-
quire a revenue-raising effort by bar organizations unprecedented in this country.
475. For a discussion of the ethical dilemmas frequently faced by attorneys assigned to
represent the poor, see generally Klein, Legal Malpractice, supra note 444.
476. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.1 (1983).
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torney is ethically obliged to provide his or her client with diligent
representation,4 7 a duty impossible to discharge unless the attor-
ney is able to prepare adequately. An attorney is not to accept a
case if an unreasonable financial burden will likely result,478 and is
not to take on a caseload so excessive that the attorney's capacity
to give the client effective representation is compromised. 79 These
ethical duties are breached in the vast majority of death penalty
cases tried in this country, and the fault lies not with the lawyers
asked to perform impossible tasks, but with indigent defense sys-
tems that are financed in a way that prevents defense attorneys
from fulfilling their obligations. 80
In short, underfunded indigent defense systems create seem-
ingly unresolvable ethical dilemmas for attorneys called upon to
defend capital cases. They effectively preclude defense attorneys
from providing the type of defense contemplated by the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the tension be-
tween the attorney's financial interests and the cost requirements
of capital defense creates nothing less than a conflict of interest
between the attorney and his or her client.481 Yet if an attorney
were to admit that resource deprivation affected the quality of his
or her work, that admission could result in disciplinary sanctions
for the attorney.482
477. Id. Rule 1.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1980).
478. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 6.2(b) (1983).
479. AmmcAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.2(d) (2d ed.
1980) ("A lawyer should not accept more employment than the lawyer can discharge within
the spirit of the constitutional mandate for speedy trial and the limits of the lawyer's capac-
ity to give each client effective representation."); id. Standard 5-4.3 (stating that an attor-
ney should not accept caseload so excessive that it "will lead to the furnishing of representa-
tion lacking in quality or to the breach of professional obligations").
480. In most jurisdictions using public defenders, the head of the defender office is a
political appointee who may fear reprisal if he or she made vigorous efforts to improve the
caseloads for the attorneys he or she supervises, and thus few concerted legal challenges to
excessive caseloads have been made by public defenders. See Klein, The Eleventh Com-
mandment, supra note 217, at 419-22.
481. The economic disincentives for the lawyer to invest the time and resources neces-
sary to develop the client's case are overwhelming. For example, in jurisdictions that have
fee caps (whether set by statute or by judges exercising their discretion), "[o]nce counsel has
spent the number of hours on a case that warrants the maximum compensation, it will be to
the attorney's financial detriment to continue to vigorously represent the client's best inter-
est." Id. at 374. The same conflict arises for lawyers working in grossly underfunded public
defender offices. Professor Mounts has argued that a showing that resource deprivation re-
sults in excessive caseloads for attorneys, requiring them to pursue the interests of one cli-
ent at the expense of another, "actually constitutes a showing of conflict of interest."
Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note 287, at 234.
482. Klein, Legal Malpractice, supra note 444, at 1174-90. An admission of ineffective-
ness might also be used against the attorney in a subsequent malpractice suit. See id. at
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While the pro bono justification for resource deprivation con-
tinues to have resonance with some courts, others have begun to
acknowledge its shortcomings.8 3 Courts have been more willing in
recent years to entertain legal challenges to underfunded indigent
defense systems. Unfortunately, even these courts have been un-
willing to go very far in using judicial power to solve the problems
caused by resource deprivation.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS Quo
A. Judicial Responses to Resource Deprivation
Until the late 1980s, American courts were almost universally
unreceptive to arguments that underfunded indigent defense ser-
vices and the conscription of uncompensated or under-compen-
sated defense attorneys implicated constitutional concerns. 484 In
1205-06. It is not surprising that defense attorneys have been unwilling to admit that they
did not provide effective assistance to a death-sentenced inmate, even when inadequate
compensation schemes prevented them from doing so. When the constitutional adequacy of
an attorney's representation is challenged in post-conviction proceedings, the experience of
Vivian Berger, who has represented many death row inmates in habeas proceedings, is
typical.
[The habeas petitioner's trial attorney] protected himself by simply answering
"yes" to the state attorney's suggestions, on a very friendly cross-examination,
that he had had excellent strategic reasons for failing to investigate or adduce
mitigating facts, such as the mental retardation of our client. This scenario is very
common, although there are occasional exceptions: Ben Atkins was finally dis-
barred on account of his honest admission of fault in Jack House's habeas
proceeding.
Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 251 (citations omitted).
483. Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (S.C. 1992) ("[I]t would be foolish to ignore
the very real possibility that a lawyer may not be capable of properly balancing the obliga-
tion to expend the proper amount of time in an appointed criminal matter where the fees
involved are nominal, with his personal concerns to earn a decent living by devoting his time
to matters wherein he will be reasonably compensated. The indigent client, of course, will
be the one to suffer the consequences if the balancing job is not tilted in his favor." (cita-
tion omitted)); See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 441 (Alaska 1987) (rec-
ognizing that an "officer of court" in England has no historical counterpart in United
States); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Ark. 1991) (noting that the State, not the
individual attorney, is ultimately responsible for assuring defendants receive effective assis-
tance of counsel); Cunningham v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45-50 (Ct. App. 1986)
(rejecting traditional view); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 829 (Kan. 1987)
(same); State ex. rel Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 765-66 (Mo. 1985) (noting that the
United States departed from the English model for legal profession, and that there was no
counterpart to English "attorney" in United States); cf. Mallard v. District Court, 490 U.S.
296, 304 (1989) ("To justify coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm
tradition in England and the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not
there.").
484. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1982); Dolan v.
1995] UNDERFUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE 433
the two decades following Gideon v. Wainwright, courts have re-
jected challenges to inadequately funded indigent defense systems
based on the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary
servitude,4 s5 the equal protection clause,486 the constitutional pro-
hibition against the uncompensated taking of property,8 7 and the
United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th
Cir. 1965); see also Anderson, supra note 217, at 509-10; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Va-
lidity and Construction of State Statute or Court Rule Fixing Maximum Fees for Attorney
Appointed to Represent Indigent, 3 A.L.R.4TH 576 (1981); B. Finberg, Annotation, Con-
struction of State Statutes Providing for Compensation of Attorney for Services Under
Appointment by Court in Defending Indigent Accused, 18 A.L.R.3D 1074 (1968).
485. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XHI, § 1. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Thirteenth Amendment,
standing alone, forbids deprivations of liberty "akin to African slavery," Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328, 332 (1916), and empowers Congress to enact whatever legislation is necessary to
"abolish[] all badges and incidents of slavery in the United State[s]." The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). No courts have found compelled public service violative of an
attorney's rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Williamson, 674 F.2d at 1214
("The thirteenth amendment has never been applied to forbid compulsion of traditional
modes of public service even when only a limited segment of population is so compelled.");
In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979),
vacated, 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981); Lindh v. O'Hara, 325 A.2d 84, 94 (Del. 1974); Ste-
phan, 747 P.2d at 846-47.
486. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The challenges to attorney compensation systems under the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution and under counterpart provisions of state constitutions have focused on
the rights of appointed attorneys, not the rights of the accused. Typically, the argument is
that a small segment of the citizenry-those who practice law, or those who practice crimi-
nal law-are singled out to bear the full burden of indigent defense. Until recent years, this
argument was consistently rejected under the highly deferential rational basis test generally
applied to economic regulations. See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala.), dismissed,
444 U.S. 803 (1979); Lindh, 325 A.2d at 94; Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490, 493 (Nev.
1976); Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 215 (N.J. 1992); State v. Rush, 217
A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966); State v. Davis, 153 S.E.2d 749, 757 (N.C.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828
(1967).
487. The takings clause of the federal constitution provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
principle is echoed in state constitutions, either in a parallel takings clause or as an aspect
of due process. The challenge to indigent defense systems under the takings clause focuses
on the rights of the attorney, not the client, and is predicated on the contention that an
attorney's time, advice, counsel, and labor are property that cannot be appropriated by the
state without adequate compensation. This argument was consistently rejected until very
recently, usually on the theory that uncompensated service on behalf of the indigent is an
implied condition of an attorney's license to practice law, and that a taking does not take
place when the state merely requires the attorney to fulfill an implied commitment he or she
has already made. See, e.g., Williamson, 674 F.2d at 1215; Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077,
1078-79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635; Jackson v.
State, 413 P.2d 488, 489 (Alaska 1966), overruled in part by, DeLisio v. Alaska Superior
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel.488
More recently, however, challenges to attorney compensation
schemes have achieved some measure of success in several jurisdic-
tions, particularly in the context of capital representation. 489 With
varying degrees of enthusiasm, some courts have begun to address
the injustices caused when the state compensates defense lawyers
at nominal rates. 9 ° Unfortunately, the judicial response to the
problems caused by resource deprivation has been sporadic, and
those cases in which some relief has been granted have not gone
far enough to rectify the injustices traceable to underfunded capi-
tal defense services.
Most successful challenges to the inadequate funding of de-
fense services have focused primarily on the rights of appointed
attorneys rather than the rights of their clients. State courts in
Oklahoma4 91 and Arkansas, 492 reasoning that a lawyer's time, ad-
Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); Pickens v. State, 783 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Ark.), cert. de-
nied, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990); State v. Ruiz, 602 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Ark. 1980); Lindh, 325 A.2d
at 94; Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858
(1966); State v. Clifton, 172 So. 2d 657, 667 (La. 1965), overruled in part, State v. Wigley,
624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993); Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990); Madden, 601
A.2d at 215; Rush, 217 A.2d at 441; Keene v. Jackson County, 474 P.2d 777, 778 (Ore. 1970);
Scott v. State, 392 S.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Tenn. 1965); Sparks, 368 So. 2d at 532. But see
Williamson, 674 F.2d at 1215-16 (indicating that requiring attorney to pay expenses in-
volved in defense would constitute an unconstitutional taking); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487
S.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that requirement that attorneys represent
indigent defendants without any compensation whatsoever violated state and federal consti-
tutions); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Okla. 1977) (requiring lawyer to pay out of
pocket expenses or to perform extraordinary professional services constitutes a taking of
property without just compensation).
488. The argument is that an indigent defendant's right to counsel is compromised
when the attorney assigned to his case does not receive adequate compensation. The courts
that have rejected this argument have reasoned that the Sixth Amendment does not guaran-
tee a defendant the best possible lawyer, the outcome of few cases depend on the skill of the
advocate, underpaid attorneys can provide the quality of performance guaranteed by the
Constitution, the attorney's sense of duty and pride are sufficient motivation for the attor-
ney to perform adequately, and it is not necessary that the attorney be experienced for the
defendant to receive the quality of representation owed him. See, e.g., Sparks, 368 So. 2d at
531-32; Pickens, 783 S.W.2d at 348; Young v. State, 255 So. 2d 318, 320-22 (Miss. 1971);
Madden, 601 A.2d at 211; Rush, 217 A.2d at 444-45.
489. For a discussion of these cases, see Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at
1866-70; Edward C. Monahan, Attorneys Must Be Paid Fairly, 5 CRIM. JUST. 16 (1990).
490. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d
770 (Ark. 1991); Cunningham v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1986); White v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); Makemson v. Martin County, 491
So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); State ex rel Stephan v. Smith,
747 P.2d 816, 831 (Kan. 1987); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); Wilson, 574 So. 2d
at 1341; State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C.
1992); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
491. In Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1150, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that a statutory
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vice, counsel, and labor are "property" that cannot be appropri-
ated by the state without adequate compensation,493 found that
draconian caps on fees and expenses in capital cases violated state
constitutional provisions prohibiting the uncompensated taking of
property.49 4 Other courts have sought to avoid finding attorney
compensation schemes unconstitutional by engaging in liberal stat-
utory construction. The Mississippi Supreme Court avoided a tak-
ings clause claim in this way;495 the Florida Supreme Court has
interpreted Florida's fee caps as "directory, not mandatory" in
death cases;4 6 and the Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated
fee cap of $3200 in death cases "provide[d] an arbitrary and unreasonable rate of compensa-
tion for lawyers which may result in an unconstitutional taking of private property depend-
ing on the facts of each case," and thus violated the due process clause bf the Oklahoma
Constitution. Id. at 1153 (citing OKLA. CONST. art. H, § 7). Without rejeciing the idea that
"an Oklahoma lawyer has a duty to the oath of office, to the Courts, to his/her clients, and
to the public at large to be more than a tradesperson," the court recognized that "[a] law-
yer's skills and services are his/her only means of livelihood" and struck down the cap. Id. at
1156-57.
492. In Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 770, the Arkansas Supreme Court relied on the "takings"
component of the due process clause of the Arkansas Constitution in finding that the $1000
fee cap, as applied in a capital case, was "constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at 775.
493. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 774; see also Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1156-57. The courts not
only found that appointed attorneys were asked to donate their advice and counsel without
just compensation, but also were "required to donate funds out-of-pocket to subsidize a
defense," a separate taking of property without compensation. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 773.
494. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at.775. The Supreme Court of Kansas, which was a non-capi-
tal punishment state at the time, relied on the same theory in striking down compensation
limits set by State Board of Indigents' Defense Services. Stephan, 747 P.2d at 842; see also
Jewell, 383 S.E.2d at 544. The Arkansas court also found that singling out a relatively small
group of attorneys to shoulder most of the burden of indigent defense violated those attor-
neys' right to equal protection of the laws. Arnold, 813 S.W.2d at 775; see also Jewell, 383
S.E.2d at 547 (concluding that equal protection and due process principles place "upward
limit" on attorney's obligation to accept appointments to represent indigent defendants).
495. Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990). The court interpreted a provision of
the Mississippi statute allowing appointed attorneys "reimbursement for actual expenses"
as authorizing the courts to award "reimbursement for all actual costs to the lawyer for the
purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle the case, i.e., the lawyer will receive a pro
rata share of actual overhead." Id. at 1340. The court established a rebuttable presumption
that an appointed attorney's overhead costs amount to $25 per hour and held that attorneys
were entitled to compensation at that hourly rate in addition to the $2000 maximum fee (for
two attorneys) provided by statute. Id. at 1340-41. After interpreting the compensation stat-
ute in this way, the court rejected the takings clause challenge to the statute, reasoning that
since the lawyer would not lose money under its statutory interpretation, there is no uncon-
stitutional taking of property, and rejected the equal protection challenge by holding that as
officers of court, lawyers can be singled out and asked to contribute their time and resources
to indigent defense without violating their. constitutional rights. Id. at 1341.
496. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989). The court stated
that Florida's statutory compensation cap in certain cases encroached upon a sensitive area
of judicial concern. Id. at 1379 (citing FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 1; id. art. H, § 3). Furthermore,
the statute was unconstitutional "when applied in such a manner as to curtail the court's
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that in some situations courts might rely on its power to regulate
the profession in finding that uncompensated representation can
be "so onerous that it constitutes an abusive extension of [the ap-
pointed attorney's] professional obligations. '4 7
Legal attacks on indigent defense funding predicated on the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel have been less suc-
cessful. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently established a
rebuttable presumption that defendants represented by a public
defender office serving part of New Orleans have received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel49 s (although the court validated that
state's grossly deficient indigent defense system as it operated in
the rest of the state);49 the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a sim-
ilar presumption in connection with the contract system used in
that state in the mid-1980s;500 and right to counsel concerns in-
formed the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of that
state's compensation statute.50 1 For the most part, however, state
inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused." Id. at 1378
(citing Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987)). To avoid invalidating the statute, the court exercised its inherent power
"to interpret the statute as directory, not mandatory," and indicated that fees in excess of
$3500 cap could be awarded in "'cases involving extraordinary circumstances and unusual
representation,'" and that all capital cases fall within this category. Id. at 1380 (quoting
Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1110).
497. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 428 (La. 1993) (quoting State v. Clifton, 172 So.
2d 657, 668 (La. 1965)). The court also indicated that compelled uncompensated representa-
tion of indigent defendants did not implicate any state or federal constitutional rights en-
joyed by the attorney or the defendant. Id. at 427 n.1, 428.
498. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). The court found that "the services being
provided to indigent defendants in Section E of Orleans Criminal District Court do not in
all cases meet constitutionally mandated standards for effective assistance of counsel." Id.
at 783. The court stated that trial judges in that district could make fact-specific inquiries
into the constitutional adequacy of representation before trial. See id. at 787-88. In doing
so, trial judges were to employ "a rebuttable presumption" that indigent defendants tried in
Section E "are receiving assistance of counsel not sufficiently effective to meet constitution-
ally required standards." Id. at 791.
499. In Peart, the court noted that Louisiana's system of funding "indigent defense
through criminal violation assessments, mostly traffic tickets, '[was] an unstable and unpre-
dictable approach,"' resulting in "wide variations in levels of funding, both between differ-
ent [districts] and within the same [district] over time," and a "general pattern ...of
chronic underfunding of indigent defense programs in most areas of the state." 621 So. 2d
at 789 (quoting SPANGENBERG GROUP, STUDY OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDER SYsTEM IN LouIls-
ANA 50 (March 1992)). Nonetheless, the court was unwilling to find that the statutory provi-
sions governing indigent defense in Louisiana were unconstitutional or to remedy the effects
of chronic underfunding in most areas of the state. Id. at 785-89.
500. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-84 (Ariz. 1984). For a discussion of this case,
see supra note 287.
501. Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992). In Bailey, attorneys who had success-
fully represented a defendant charged with capital murder commenced a declaratory judg-
ment action claiming that South Carolina's compensation scheme violated their client's
1995] UNDERFUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE
courts have continued to reject facial challenges to indigent de-
fense compensation statutes, preferring to dispose of Sixth Amend-
ment claims under the case-by-case approach of the Strickland
test.5
0 2
These sporadic efforts to alleviate the effects of resource dep-
rivation will have only minimal impact on the quality of indigent
representation in death cases. The judicial remedy provided by the
Mississippi Supreme Court allows appointed attorneys to recover
only $25 per hour plus an "honorarium" of $1,000 per attorney, an
amount that at best might cover overhead costs, but provides no
income that can be used to meet the day-to-day needs of the attor-
ney or the attorney's family.5 0 3 Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme
Court now allows counsel appointed to defend a death penalty case
to recover a fee equaling overhead costs, but the court has been
unwilling to allow additional compensation that could cover the at-
right to effective assistance of counsel and the takings clauses of the United States and
South Carolina Constitutions. Id. at 505. The court reviewed the peculiar burdens of repre-
sentation in capital case, see id. at 506-08, and acknowledged that grossly inadequate com-
pensation for lawyers assigned to represent the poor implicated Sixth Amendment concerns:
"Given the extraordinary time, effort, and commitment required of defense counsel in capi-
tal cases, it is unrealistic to expect that token compensation will suffice in the future to
provide an indigent defendant with the quality of legal representation mandated by the
United States Supreme Court." Id. at 508. The court refrained from striking down South
Carolina's compensation scheme under the Sixth Amendment, however, by liberally inter-
preting its terms. The court held that "the hourly rates and cap provided... are not abso-
lute allowances in capital cases, but merely limitations upon the State's funds allocated for
the Defense of Indigents," and that in certain cases county governments could be required
to supplement the funds provided by the state. Id.
In West Virginia (a non-death penalty state), the state supreme court relied on the
Sixth Amendment as the primary justification for striking down statutory fee restrictions.
Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 541-44 (W. Va. 1989). In a case decided before Kansas
reinstituted the death penalty, the Kansas Supreme Court seemed to rely in part on Sixth
Amendment concerns in finding an inadequate compensatioh scheme unconstitutional.
State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 836 (Kan. 1987).
502. See Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990) ('The argument concern-
ing the ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter that is better decided on a case by case
basis .... [J]ust because the [compensation] limitation could have such a result is no rea-
son to declare it unconstitutional."); see also Coulter v. State, 804 S.W.2d 348 (Ark.), (re-
jecting challenge to compensation system by defendant, because defendant could not show
prejudice), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991); Stephan, 747 P.2d at 831 ("[T]hose rare cases
where counsel has been ineffective may be handled and determined individually by the ap-
pellate courts."); State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 427 n.1 (La. 1993) (stating that attorney
compensation does not implicate rights of criminal defendant); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d
1150, 1156 (Okla. 1990) (specifically stating that decision invalidating compensation scheme
not based on constitutional rights of defendant). But see Cunningham v. Superior Court,
222 Cal. Rptr. 44, 52-54 (Ct. App. 1986) (indicating through dicta that uncompensated rep-
resentation adversely affects the indigent's right to effective assistance of counsel).
503. See Wilson, 574 So. 2d at 1341.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
torney's living expenses, 504 and it has been reluctant to compel
changes in the funding of public defender offices in most of the
state.50 5 In response to the criticisms of indigent capital defense by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, that state's legislature capped
the total compensation for two attorneys appointed to represent a
capital defendant at $25,000,508 while the Oklahoma legislature es-
tablished a presumptive maximum fee of only $20,000 for capital
cases.50 7 While both figures represent marked improvements over
the $5,000508 and $2,500509 fee caps that had previously existed in
those states, they are far below what is necessary to assure that an
indigent defendant is receiving a meaningful defense.5 10
Moreover, these cases have, for the most part, marginalized
the rights of the defendants-the persons whose very lives are at
stake-as a concern secondary to the rights of the attorneys who
represent them. Courts have been reluctant to recognize that re-
source deprivation directly impacts the constitutional rights of
those accused of capital crimes. Rather, they have preferred to rely
on a case-by-case application of the Strickland test as the exclu-
sive means of remedying the effects of inadequate legal representa-
tion caused by the gross underfunding of defense services. This ap-
proach frequently fails to detect or remedy even the most
egregious mistakes and omissions committed by overburdened de-
fense attorneys and effectively shifts the burden of proof in death
penalty cases from the government to the accused.5 1
504. Wigley, 624 So. 2d at 429.
505. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 785-89 (La. 1993).
506. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
507. OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 22, § 1355.13 (West Supp. 1994).
508. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (subsequently amended by 1993
S.C. Acts No. 164, Part H, § 45D).
509. OKLA. STAT. AmN. tit. 21, § 701.14 (West 1983) (repealed 1991).
510. See supra part I.C.
511. See supra notes 460-62 and accompanying text. Professor White has argued that if
state and federal courts enforced the right to effective assistance of counsel more rigorously
in capital cases-with more convictions and sentences being overturned on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds-the systemic effects of underfunding death penalty defense would ultimately
be eliminated. White, Effective Assistance, supra note 103, at 332. Once the states learn
that substandard representation in capital cases will likely lead to reversals and costly retri-
als, they would have the economic incentive to upgrade the quality of capital representation
at the early stages. Id. Professor White argues that the Strickland standard as applied in
death penalty cases is evolving, and that "under current standards, the failure of a capital
defense attorney to take specific actions-in particular, failure to seek and introduce certain
types of mitigating evidence, to seek a favorable plea bargain that will avoid the death sen-
tence, and to try to establish a relationship of trust with the defendant-usually should be
viewed as deficient representation." Id. at 336. Unfortunately, while such deficiencies should
result in findings of ineffectiveness, the fact is that with rare exceptions, they do not. Far
from holding defense attorneys to higher standards in death cases, the prevailing judicial
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the courts have not
concerned themselves at all with the consequences of past resource
deprivation. At best, the cases discussed above might have some
small impact on the quality of capital defense provided after those
cases were decided.512 However, hundreds of death row inmates,
who never received the procedural and substantive protections
contemplated by the Constitution because of the lack of resources
attitude is that the quality of representation provided by the "lowest common denominator"
is the watermark for judging ineffective assistance claims. See, e.g., Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d
384, 386 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 255 (1994) (stating that "[e]ven if many reason-
able lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can be granted on
ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances,
would have done so").
512. Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings of prospective solutions, some observ-
ers have suggested that in light of the current political climate favoring capital punishment,
prospective challenges to indigent defense systems might be "the best hope of implementing
the constitutional rights to counsel" promised by Gideon v. Wainwright. Bright et al., supra
note 443, at 12; see also Citron, supra note 215, at 482, 497-503 (advocating a litigation
approach seeking structural reform through declaratory judgment and/or injunction con-
taining reform guidelines, and, if necessary, a remedial order requiring legislature to appro-
priate sufficient funds for indigent defense); Wilson, supra note 467, at 215-17 (advocating
litigation strategy directed at obtaining declaratory relief and broad injunctive relief, as well
as damages and punitive damages, as means to obtain systemic reform, and preferring theo-
ries based on takings and equal protection clauses).
Few systemic challenges to indigent defense systems have been attempted, and those
few attempts have yielded only limited results. See generally Klein, The Eleventh Com-
mandment, supra note 217, at 410-13, 417-18. Perhaps the best known of these efforts is the
federal class action commenced in Georgia on behalf of indigent persons seeking prospective
relief from "systemic delays in the appointment of counsel" that infringed upon their right
to counsel at critical stages of criminal proceedings and their Eighth Amendment right to
bail. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957
(1990). The plaintiff class also raised right to counsel and equal protection claims arising out
of the state's failure to provide resources necessary to prepare an effective defense. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit held that substantively, the plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Id. Subsequently, however, the case was dismissed on abstention
grounds. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
district court's determination that absent extraordinary circumstances, the federal courts
should not interfere with state criminal proceedings, id. at 676 (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971)), particularly when declaratory or injunctive relief is sought that
would require federal judicial oversight of the operation of a state's criminal justice system.
Id. (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974)). The Sixth Circuit also relied on the
abstention doctrine in refusing to interfere with Kentucky's compensation system for attor-
neys assigned to death cases. Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (6th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to entertain civil rights action brought by indigent defendant challenging limit on
her attorney's compensation under due process and equal protection clauses of Fourteenth
Amendment and right to counsel provision of Sixth Amendment). While these federal court
decisions do not foreclose a systemic attack on indigent defense in a state court action, the
success of such an action would be doubtful, since relief would be sought from the state
judges who themselves often force attorneys to work with resources insufficient to properly
defend a capital case.
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dedicated to their defense at trial and on appeal, remain unaf-
fected by such prospective relief and continue along a path that
will end in the execution chamber. 13
B. The Sixth Amendment Argument
Courts have not embraced the most compelling challenge to
the legitimacy of convictions and death sentences obtained in a
system in which the defense is denied adequate resources. This ar-
gument, most effectively articulated by attorney Joe Margulies, 14
centers on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. At its core is the
contention that the two-prong test outlined in Strickland v. Wash-
ington is inapplicable when a right to counsel claim is based not on
the conduct of an individual defense attorney, but rather on the
systemic effects of deficiencies in the way in which the state man-
ages its obligation to provide counsel to the poor. In such cases, the
defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment may be violated
even if the defendant cannot establish the "ineffective perform-
ance" and "prejudice" prongs of the Strickland test. 5
Margulies observes that an individual's right to counsel com-
prises a number of distinct protections, 16 including the right to
representation at all "critical stages" of the prosecution,1  the
right to freedom from governmental interference in the attorney-
client relationship,1 8 the right to representation by an attorney
513. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1882 ("The death penalty will
continue to be imposed and new capital statutes enacted with the continuing promise that
efforts will be made to improve the quality of counsel in the future. But this is surely back.
wards. A very high quality of counsel-instead of minimal representation-should not only
be the goal, but the reality before a jurisdiction is authorized to take life.").
514. Margulies, supra note 213, at 682; see also Citron, supra note 215, at 486-89;
Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note 287, at 221-22, 224, 230-41 (arguing that in cases
in which defendant establishes systemic resource deprivation, the burden should shift to the
State to establish that this systemic defect did not affect the outcome of the case); Wilson,
supra note 467, at 216.
515. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957
(1990).
516. Margulies, supra note 213, at 682.
517. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (right to assistance of counsel
before pretrial interview by state psychiatrist); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)
(right to counsel at preliminary hearing in non-capital case); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (right to counsel at post-indictment pre-trial lineup); White v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing in a capital case); Ham-
ilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (counsel cannot be denied at arraignment in a
capital case).
518. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that automatic
reversal is warranted when attorney-client consultation prevented during overnight recess);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975) (invalidating statute which gave trial judge
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who is not hampered by an actual conflict of interest,519 and the
right to effective assistance of counsel. 52 0 At the heart of all right
to counsel cases is whether the defendant received a "fair trial,
521
but the assessment of fairness depends on the nature of the Sixth
Amendment deprivation alleged. In one category are cases that are
concerned with the integrity of the adversarial process itself, rather
than a particular outcome produced by the process. 522  In those
cases, involving what Margulies calls "system error," "fairness is
perceived as a product of procedural rigor. ' 523 In a second category
are cases which assume the fairness of the state-created procedures
used in obtaining an outcome in a particular case and are con-
cerned instead with whether the outcome was fair and just.5 24 Un-
fair outcomes that are solely the fault of the individual shortcom-
ings of defense attorneys-the concern of the Strickland line of
cases-fall within this second category.5 25
discretion to refuse to hear closing arguments on ground that right to counsel bars restric-
tions upon defense counsel which are not "in accord with the traditions of the adversary
factfinding process").
519. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) ("The mere physical presence
of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflict-
ing obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.... [I]n a case of joint
representation of conflicting interests the evil. . . is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negoti-
ations and in the sentencing process.").
520. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
521. Margulies, supra note 213, at 682.
522. Margulies places within this category cases concerned with the denial of counsel
altogether during the trial or during a critical stage of the prosecution, governmental inter-
ference in the attorney-client relationship "that impedes the ability of defense counsel to
subject the state's case to adversarial testing," and representation by an attorney laboring
under an actual conflict of interest. Id. at 698. In these cases, the Court was concerned with
systemic defects which "threatened to undermine the adequacy of the fact-finding process"
and the "integrity of the adversarial process," and which "operated entirely apart from the
performance of individual counsel." Id.
523. Id. at 688.
524. Id.
525. Margulies observed that "[e]very right to counsel decision before Strickland
presented an example of system error." Id. at 697. Strickland was the first right to counsel
case considered by the Supreme Court that focused on the effect of attorney error on the
reliability of the outcome rather than systemic barriers to the full benefit of the right to
counsel. Id.; see also id. at 694-700 (discussing differences between Strickland and prior
right to counsel cases decided by Supreme Court). Margulies noted that the "unarticulated
concern" of the Strickland Court was that defense counsel would "sandbag" the prosecution
and the courts:
The fear is that defense counsel, if faced with the virtual certainty that his or her
client would be convicted, would inject ineffective assistance into the case as a way
to protect the client on appeal .... The hope is that for any number of reasons,
the next trial, if one occurs, will be more hospitable.
Id. at 697. This concern helps explain why the Court adopted such a highly deferential
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Margulies maintains that attorney failures attributable to the
insufficient resources provided for indigent defense fall within the
first category, not the second. Such failures ultimately are rooted
not in the lack of diligence or competence of the individual attor-
ney but in "systemic conditions that pervade and undermine the
trial process. 5 26 Significantly, this characterization of the nature
of the Sixth Amendment violation affects the determination of
what relief is appropriate. In cases in which the violation is
deemed to be the result of a systemic defect, relief is "prophylactic
in the form of a per se rule mandating the removal of the 'taint,' or
the condition threatening to undermine the adequacy of the adver-
sarial process. 5 27 The fact-specific showing of prejudice to the out-
come of an individual case mandated by Strickland is not required
when the constitutional defect is systemic, because the prejudice
resulting from a defect that pervades the entire process is not
readily identifiable.5 28 Therefore, defendants convicted and sen-
tenced in a system in which public defense is chronically un-
derfunded are entitled to automatic reversal, regardless of whether
they can demonstrate prejudice.
This argument is not foreclosed by existing Supreme Court
precedent. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether severe
standard of judging attorney performance in Strickland, particularly when "strategic" deci-
sions were at issue, and why lower courts have interpreted the prejudice standard so strin-
gently. See supra part IV.A.2. Margulies contends that in cases in which inadequate repre-
sentation is primarily the fault of the state rather than the individual defense lawyer, this
concern is not present; "the rationale driving the result in Strickland has no place in cases
involving system error." Margulies, supra note 213, at 697.
526. Margulies, supra note 213, at 724-25.
527. Id. at 691 (footnote omitted).
528. See id. at 688-89, 707 ("Because the system producing the conviction has broken
down, there can be no presumption of legitimacy in the outcome. There can be, therefore,
no requirement that a defendant demonstrate prejudice in the result."); Citron, supra note
215, at 488 (stating that resource deprivation prevents counsel from doing things that need
to be done, and "'[i ]t is impossible to reconstruct, much less to evaluate, what these things
were'" (quoting Brief for Respondent )); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 847
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is enough that the adversarial testing envisioned by the
Sixth Amendment has been thwarted; the result is constitutionally unacceptable, and rever-
sal is automatic."); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989) (recognizing that cases in which
government is accused of interfering with right to counsel are not "subject to the kind of
prejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's per-
formance itself has been constitutionally ineffective"); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,
257 (1988) (noting that automatic reversal is appropriate remedy when "the deprivation of
the right to counsel affected-and contaminated-the entire criminal proceeding"); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (stating that in conflict of interest cases, "[io
determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained. . . is at once difficult and unnecessary.
The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts
to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial").
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resource deprivation constitutes a systemic Sixth Amendment vio-
lation that so permeates criminal proceedings that relief can be ob-
tained without a showing of prejudice.5 29 In cases that concern the
quality of representation provided to a criminal defendant, the
Court has not looked beyond the conduct of the attorney to the
quality of the system that supplied that attorney.530 There is lan-
guage in Supreme Court opinions indicating that pervasive govern-
mental interference with the right to counsel would require rever-
sal without any showing of prejudice, 5 1 since under such
circumstances the adversarial process has been so compromised
that it is "unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assis-
tance," and thus a presumption that the conviction was unreliable
is warranted.3 2
While the logic of this argument is persuasive, it faces certain
practical roadblocks. The facts underlying the Sixth Amendment
cases of the past decade suggest that courts have a high tolerance
for artificial constraints placed on appointed defense attorneys by
the state. For example, in United States v. Cronic,53 3 a case de-
cided the same day as Strickland, the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment claim was rejected even though his lawyer had no previous
criminal law experience, was given only twenty-five days to prepare
for a sophisticated fraud case that government attorneys had been
working on for four and one-half years, and was unable to inter-
view several key witnesses who resided out of state.3 4 Despite
529. See Margulies, supra note 213, at 709.
530. Wilson, supra note 467, at 204.
531. The Court has said that "various kinds of state interference with counsel's assis-
tance" can result in a "constructive" denial of the right to counsel requiring automatic re-
versal, notwithstanding the defendant's inability to show prejudice, or the state's ability to
show that the error was harmless. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984);
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1984).
532. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661; see also id. at 657-62; Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 851 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that counsel's performance constituted an abject failure to
address the most important legal question at issue in his client's death penalty hearing gives
rise, without more, to a powerful presumption of breakdown in the entire adversarial sys-
tem[,] . . . generating a presumption of prejudice and automatic reversal."); Citron, supra
note 215, at 486; Margulies, supra note 213, at 699 (arguing that Cronic "stands for the
proposition that some attorney errors are so extraordinarily egregious that no inquiry into
prejudice is required"); Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note 287, at 228-30.
533. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
534. United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 648
(1984). One commentator noted that "[b]y any objective yardstick, this system of assign-
ment resulted in the constructive denial of counsel." Chester L. Mirsky, Systemic Reform:
Some Thoughts on Taking the Horse Before the Cart, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
243, 247 (1986). Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found a Sixth Amendment violation, not-
withstanding the defendant's failure to show prejudice resulting from specifically identified
attorney errors. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1128. The Cronic case is discussed in detail in Mirsky,
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state-imposed external constraints on the attorney's ability to ade-
quately prepare for trial, the Supreme Court was unwilling to re-
verse the defendant's conviction absent the identification of spe-
cific errors of counse 535 and some resultant prejudice.5 86
More fundamentally, courts will be reticent about embarking
on a course that could undermine the legitimacy of the entire crim-
inal justice system. The arguments that have been made about the
constitutional inadequacies of indigent defense in capital cases can
also be raised about the funding of indigent defense in general. In-
deed, Margulies himself does not distinguish between capital and
non-capital cases in his analysis. While the demands of capital rep-
resentation are far greater than the demands of representing a de-
fendant charged with non-capital felonies, at some point the cumu-
lative burden of defending countless "garden variety" criminal
cases will approach the burden of defending a capital case. The
Supreme Court has not drawn clear distinctions between capital
and non-capital cases in its Sixth Amendment cases, and courts
may well fear that addressing the inequities of capital defense
under a Sixth Amendment theory could open the floodgates to le-
gal challenges potentially affecting most criminal convictions ob-
tained in the United States. In this way, Margulies' argument is
too persuasive; it challenges the legitimacy of every conviction ob-
tained against indigents in jurisdictions with underfunded defense
systems.5 37
Thus, while the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to
counsel might be the most natural place to look when seeking a
constitutional footing for a legal assault on the underfunding of
public defense services, both existing precedent and practical con-
siderations present serious impediments. A legal strategy that
would affect only the administration of capital punishment, -how-
ever, might succeed where a Sixth Amendment challenge might
fail. Courts may be more likely to redress the injustices in death
cases resulting from resource deprivation if doing so does not call
into question the legitimacy of the entire system of indigent de-
fense in the United States. After all, even a complete moratorium
on executions (either on the national level or in individual states)
supra, at 246-47.
535. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666.
536. Id. at 662 n.31 (stating, in dictum, that "[tihe fact that the accused can attribute a
deficiency in his representation to a source external to trial counsel does not make it any
more or less likely that he received the type of counsel envisioned by the Sixth Amendment,
nor does it justify reversal of his conviction absent an actual effect on the trial process or
the likelihood of such an effect").
537. See generally Mirsky, supra note 534.
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would not significantly impact the day-to-day operation of the
criminal justice system.5 8s The most promising doctrinal source for
a remedy that could be confined to capital cases is the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.
VI. RESOURCE DEPRIVATION AND THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
A. The Eighth Amendment is the Appropriate Vehicle for
Challenging the State's Failure to Adequately Fund Capital
Defense Services for the Poor
While the Eighth Amendment "is not limited in application to
capital punishment," 5 9 the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is informed by the "qualitative difference between
death and any other permissible form of punishment. ' 540 This dif-
ference underlies "'a corresponding difference in the need for reli-
ability in the determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment in a specific case,' "541 and it justifies the greater scrutiny
given capital cases to ensure that the death penalty is not adminis-
tered arbitrarily.5'2 Thus, the Court has frequently used the Eighth
Amendment to require procedures and rules in capital cases that
are unknown in other criminal proceedings.43 Accordingly, a con-
stitutional attack on the injustices caused by resource deprivation
that is founded on the Eighth Amendment could be framed in such
538. Although approximately 23,000 homicides are committed annually in the United
States, see Daniel S. Greenberg, Research on Violence: Washington Perspective, THE LAN-
cEr, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1339, fewer than 250 persons have been executed since 1976, and
fewer than 3000 persons sentenced to death in the twenty years following the Furman deci-
sion currently await execution. DEATH Row USA, supra note 1, at 1. Both before and after
Furman, only a small fraction of convicted murderers have been sentenced to death, sug-
gesting that despite its political importance, the death penalty does not play a central role
in the day-to-day administration of justice in the United States.
539. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314 (1987).
540. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1982); see also supra notes 48-52 and accom-
panying text.
541. Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)).
542. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (recognizing that "the quali-
tative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting that this difference "calls for a greater degree of relia-
bility when the death sentence is imposed"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (recognizing that "the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long ... [and thus] there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appro-
priate punishment in a specific case").
543. See supra part IA.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a way that the reach of a judicial remedy could be confined to capi-
tal cases.
The fact that the consequences of resource deprivation impli-
cate values associated with the constitutional rights to counsel and
to a fair trial does not foreclose a legal strategy based on the prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishments. The Court's modern in-
terpretation of the Eighth Amendment's limitations on capital
punishment has frequently borrowed values associated with other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The mere fact that a death sen-
tencing system that violates Eighth Amendment principles of fair-
ness and reliability also violates other provisions of the Constitu-
tion does not mean that the Eighth Amendment inquiry is
supplanted.5 " Indeed, the basic standards of rationality, fairness,
and consistency against which the Court judges capital punishment
schemes under the Eighth Amendment are rooted in values associ-
ated with the constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial,
among others. The difference is that when the death penalty is in-
volved, these constitutional values are more rigorously observed,
primarily through the Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.
Furman itself is the preeminent example of how the Eighth
Amendment magnifies core constitutional values in the death pen-
alty context. A year before Furman was decided, the unguided dis-
cretion given juries to impose death sentences was challenged in a
case raising arguments that closely resembled those made in
Furman, except that it was based on the due process clause.5W The
Supreme Court rejected this challenge. 46 In Furman, however, the
544. Justice Brennan made this observation in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987), in which Georgia's capital punishment scheme was attacked as both racially
discriminatory and arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 291-92, 299. The majority rejected equal
protection and Eighth Amendment claims, in part because the petitioner had failed to prove
to the Court's satisfaction that the discriminatory effects demonstrated by extensive empiri-
cal data was the result of a purposeful policy of the state. Id. at 292-99, 306. In disposing of
the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court "decline[d] to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious." Id. at 313. Justice Brennan noted that
[w]hile the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination, and intent may
be critical in a successful claim under that provision, the Eighth Amendment has
its own distinct focus: whether punishment comports with social standards of ra-
tionality and decency. It may be, as in this case, that on occasion an influence that
makes punishment arbitrary is also proscribed under another constitutional provi-
sion. That does not mean, however, that the standard for determining an Eighth
Amendment violation is superseded by the standard for determining a violation
under [another constitutional] provision.
Id. at 323 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
545. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
546. The Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to capital punishment sys-
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same argument tied to an Eighth Amendment theory was success-
ful."7 Effectively, the Court used the Eighth Amendment to am-
plify the due process-like concerns raised by unguided sentencing
and reached a result opposite to that reached the year before." 8
Since Furman and Gregg, the Court has adopted constitutional
rules through the Eighth Amendment-the requirement of individ-
ualized sentencing being a prominent one-that are confined to
death penalty cases. 4 e
Thus, even if the case-by-case approach of Strickland v.
Washington is appropriate in determining whether resource depri-
vation has compromised an indigent defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights, this does not mean that the Strickland test is ade-
quate to safeguard the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights.5 In
fact, Strickland's preoccupation with identifying prejudice in spe-
cific cases runs counter to the emphasis placed on systemic con-
cerns in the Supreme Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The Eighth Amendment demands, above all else,
procedural fairness 51 in distinguishing "the few cases in which
tems that gave jurors unfettered and unguided discretion in deciding whether to sentence a
defendant to death, see id. at 197-208, and a due process challenge to the use of a unitary
trial procedure that forced capital defendants to choose between a waiver of their privilege
against self-incrimination before a determination of guilt and the forfeiture of their oppor-
tunity to testify as to mitigating circumstances. Id. at 213-17. In Furman, "[b]asically, the
argument was that death sentences that juries imposed in only a small minority of all death-
eligible cases without any guidelines or standards constituted 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment," an argument that "closely resem-
bled the procedural due process objections to standardless jury sentencing that the Court
had rejected in McGautha v. California." BALDUS FT AL., supra note 10, at 11 (footnote
omitted).
547. 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972).
548. The outcome in Furman was also influenced by values borrowed from the equal
protection clause. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It would seem to be
incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discrimi-
nates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.").
549. See supra part LA.
550. See Dow, Teague and Death, supra note 338, at 29 (stating that "whatever the
merits of the Strickland test for safeguarding the Sixth Amendment right to effective coun-
sel, the Eighth Amendment value is entirely distinct"); see also Berger, The Chiropractor as
Brain Surgeon, supra note 18, at 245 (stating that "whatever may be true in ordinary cases,
in the capital setting defense counsel too often deliver-and courts at all levels too often
tolerate, when indeed they do not encourage-performance so shoddy as to render the law
in its application a mockery of the sixth and eighth amendments").
551. See supra part I.A; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189-207 (1975) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.); Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704
(1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "we have con-
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[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not." ' 2 Beginning with Furman and Gregg, the Supreme Court
has followed a process-oriented approach to its Eighth Amendment
scrutiny of the administration of the death penalty"' s which fo-
cuses on whether the capital punishment system adopted by a
state is likely to produce outcomes in particular cases that are ra-
tional, fair and consistent. 5" In general, the Court has not been
concerned with the actual operation of those procedures and rules
in particular cases; the Supreme Court's decisions have assumed
that fair outcomes will result if the procedures are fair."5 On the
other hand, the Court will find an Eighth Amendment violation if
state procedures "create a substantial risk that the [death penalty]
will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."5
The "super due process" promised by the Court's capital pun-
ishment cases since Furman is anchored in the Eighth Amend-
ment, not in the due process clause. 55 7 In assessing the constitu-
sistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding").
552. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
553. See Hubbard, supra note 71, at 1114-15; Steiker, supra note 75, at 1159.
554. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95,
197-98, 206-07 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 220-24 (White,
J., concurring); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-77 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-60 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
555. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 (recognizing that despite substantive imper-
fections within the criminal justice system, procedural safeguards in the determination of
guilt or punishment satisfy constitutional fairness requirements); Ramos, 463 U.S. at 999
(explaining that "[iln ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capri-
ciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State
imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury
as a basis for imposing death").
556. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 343
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (noting that the death sentence may not be im-
posed under circumstances that "creat[e] an unacceptable risk that 'the death penalty [may
have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously' or through 'whim or mistake"' (citations
omitted)); Ramos, 463 U.S. at 999; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 203 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (arguing that the inquiry
is whether defendants "were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial
risk of arbitrariness or caprice"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating
that "[ilt would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant
is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social posi-
tion, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices").
557. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 71, at 1114-15 (explaining that the Court's "process
model" for ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily is founded in Eighth
Amendment, not equal protection or due process clauses of Fourteenth Amendment).
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tional implications of deleterious effects as pervasive as those
caused by resource deprivation, it is appropriate to look to the
Eighth Amendment principles that lay at the core of the modern
death penalty.
B. Resource Deprivation Defeats the Objectives of the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Court has located certain central principles in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments that
are at the foundation of its death penalty jurisprudence. A state's
capital punishment procedures must not operate arbitrarily or ca-
priciously. 58 They must serve a legitimate penological objective,
and the primary justification that has emerged for the death pen-
alty is retribution. 59 They must reliably and fairly identify those
offenders who most deserve having their lives extinguished.5 60
Given the emphasis that retributivist theory places on the moral:
choices of the offender, a reliable and fair sentencing decision must
be based on a full consideration of the "character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense." 561
In order to achieve these goals, extensive procedural and sub-
stantive rules peculiar to the death penalty have evolved. Yet, pro-
cedural structures, no matter how well designed to assure fairness,
will yield fair outcomes only if the procedures are actually carried
out.5 62 Primary responsibility for assuring that capital defendants
enjoy the protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment rests
with the attorneys assigned to represent them.563 Any state-created
impediment to the discharge of that responsibility undermines the
integrity of the entire capital punishment system. The level of re-
source deprivation described in this Article is such a state-created
obstacle to fairness in the death sentencing process, creating great
variation in the quality of representation provided different capital
558. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
559. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (stating that procedures must "minimize the risk that the penalty
will be imposed in error"); Zant, 462 U.S. at 884-85 (stressing "need for reliability" in deter-
mining "the appropriate punishment"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (same).
561. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
562. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 71, at 1117 (discussing that the Court's process-
oriented approach to capital punishment can "legitimize[] the conclusion that there is a
meaningful basis to execute" in individual cases only if "the process 'works'--that is, it
effectively curbs both intentional and unintentional arbitrariness").
563. See supra part I.B.
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defendants and creating a "substantial risk" that life and death
decisions are made arbitrarily in most of the nation's death penalty
states. Achievement of each of the objectives of the Supreme
Court's modern capital punishment jurisprudence is frustrated by
resource deprivation. Most fundamentally, the failure of the states
to adequately fund indigent defense has perpetuated the arbitrari-
ness in death-sentencing that was condemned in Furman. A sys-
tem for selecting which defendants will die for their crimes can be
arbitrary in two ways. First, the death-sentencing system can yield
death sentences that are either "the product of legally irrelevant or
impermissible factors" or ones that are influenced by such fac-
tors.5 " Second, the death-sentencing system can operate in a way
that admits a substantial risk that individual sentences are the
product of whim or caprice. 5 5 Resource deprivation injects an un-
acceptable level of arbitrariness into the death-sentencing process
in both ways.
Resource deprivation is a primary source of arbitrariness in
the first sense because it makes the socio-economic status of the
defendant and the identity of his attorney among the strongest
factors influencing the determination of whether a defendant is
sentenced to death.5 6 6 Under the retribution model for capital pun-
ishment that has emerged from the Supreme Court's post-Furman
cases,5 67 the decision to sentence a capital defendant to death
"must be strictly a function of legally relevant characteristics of
564. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 (asserting that it is impermissible to label as "aggravating"
factors that are "totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as. . . the race, religion,
or political affiliation of the defendant"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51, 267
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that discriminatory patterns in death-sentencing is
evidence of arbitrariness); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same); BALDUS ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 15; see also GROSS & MAURO, supra note 24, at 8 (explaining that the
system operates arbitrarily if it permits "imposition of the death penalty based on the pres-
ence or absence of a legally irrelevant factor, such as race"). If the legally irrelevant factors
differ from case to case, occurring randomly, the arbitrariness is unsystematic, or "capri-
cious;" if an extralegal factor influences death-sentencing systematically, "they may be le-
gally irrelevant characteristics of the defendant or of the crime," such as the defendant's
race or the victim's race. BowERs, supra note 23, at 203.
565. See BALDus T AL., supra note 10, at 14-15; GROSS & MAURO, supra note 24, at 8;
see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1975) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.); id. at 220-21 (White, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). "When the Supreme Court invalidates a death sentence on this ground, it is
most often on the basis of the Court's intuitive determination that certain procedures ap-
plied in the case fail to minimize the risk that the death sentence may have been the prod-
uct of whim or caprice." BALDus ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
566. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 323 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a death-sentencing system "that features a significant probability that sentencing deci-
sions are influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as rational").
567. See supra notes 74-78, 85-87 and accompanying text.
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the crime and of the defendant." 568 The determination of which
characteristics are legally relevant is made by reference to statu-
tory guidelines regarding the defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty and the legitimate aggravating and mitigating factors that
have been identified by legislatures and courts. 6 Clearly, the de-
fendant's poverty is not a legally relevant characteristic of the de-
fendant that should play any role in the determination of whether
the defendant should die for his crime. Arbitrariness has been de-
fined as "any departure" from a model that requires "death as
punishment to be strictly a function of statutory guidelines and
evolving standards of practice; 5 °70 under this definition, resource
deprivation renders death-sentencing in most states arbitrary.
Systems in those states are arbitrary in the second sense as
well. A death-sentencing scheme must allow the jury to make an
informed "reasoned moral response" to the defendant and the
crime.5 7 1 The accuracy of this determination is affected by "the
identity of the sentencer, the reliability of the information the sen-
tencer receives, and the kind and quantity of that information.
57 2
Each of these factors can be influenced by the underfunding of in-
digent defense. If an indigent's attorney lacks either the experi-
ence, expertise, or necessary expert assistance to identify jurors
who are likely to give full consideration of a sentence other than
death if the indigent is convicted of capital murder, the accuracy
of the sentencing process will be affected to the detriment of the
indigent. More importantly, if a lack of resources effectively pre-
vents the attorney from discovering and presenting evidence rele-
vant to a jury's sentencing decision, the chances that the jury's
sentencing decision is based on complete and reliable information
diminish considerably, creating a substantial risk that individual
sentences are the product of whim or caprice.
573
Moreover, resource deprivation undermines confidence in the
568. BowERS, supra note 23, at 203.
569. Id. (stating that through consideration of the evidence supporting and negating
the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury determines "the retributive ap-
propriateness of death as punishment under the law").
570. Id.
571. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326-28
(1989).
572. Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection
Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1037, 1043 (1985).
573. If a statute that prevents a jury from giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence
violates the Eighth Amendment, see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text, it is difficult
to see how an opposite conclusion could be reached when the state action that prevents the
jury from hearing the relevant evidence is the underfunding of indigent defense services
rather than a statutory directive.
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utility of a state's death penalty system to meaningfully serve le-
gitimate penological objectives. Because of the underfunding of de-
fense services, defendants are frequently sentenced to death after
their attorneys failed to develop and present evidence at the pen-
alty phase of their trials. In such a case, a jury cannot make an
intelligent assessment of whether the death penalty is an appropri-
ate retributive judgment. In addition, resource deprivation in-
troduces factors into the death-sentencing equation-the socio-ec-
onomic status of a defendant and the resources available to the
attorney who represents him-that have no relevance to the peno-
logical objectives of deterrence or retribution.
Resource deprivation is the root cause of one of the "tragic
ironies ' 57 4 of the modern death penalty: while the additional pro-
cedures, special rules, and separate penalty phase available in capi-
tal cases are intended to foster greater reliability in sentencing, the
complexity of death penalty litigation and the wide disparity in the
quality of capital representation caused by resource deprivation
have combined to exacerbate arbitrariness in the death-sentencing
process.575 Yet the substantive and procedural rules governing the
application of the death penalty were created out of constitutional
necessity. Historical experience leaves little doubt that without
these rules, there is no way to be certain that the ultimate penalty
will be meted out in a rational, consistent, and fair manner. 7 6
These rules are not self-executing, however, and the defense attor-
ney bears the primary responsibility for assuring that the promise
of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments
is realized in individual cases. When a state denies counsel the
means of carrying out this responsibility, it does so at the cost of
the constitutional legitimacy of its entire death penalty system, no
matter how fair that system may seem on paper. In the vast major-
ity of death penalty jurisdictions, the level of funding of defense
services is so low that the integrity of the process has been irre-
deemably compromised. 7
574. Berger, Born-Again Death, supra note 49, at 1309.
575. Id.; see also Denno, supra note 49, at 454 (stating that "one more paradox of the
capital sentencing process ... [is that] the defendant relies even more on an attorney's
representation that may often be totally inadequate for the legal complexities of such
litigation").
576. See supra notes 23-24.
577. See Margulies, supra note 213, at 724-25 ("The attorney's appointment is reduced
to a mere sham, destroying the integrity of the process.").
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C. Distinguishing McCleskey v. Kemp: Resource Deprivation is
a Systemic Defect Created by State Policy
The constitutional violation described here is systemic, in that
"it operates without regard either to particular cases or to the con-
duct of individual defense counsel. '57 8 No matter how skilled or
dedicated a defense attorney may be, he or she must work under
conditions that do not allow the development of a meaningful de-
fense .579 Resource deprivation distorts the entire adversarial pro-
cess by preventing the defense attorney "from subjecting the
state's case to the crucible of adversarial testing.
'58 0
Responsibility for this systemic defect rests squarely with the
state, which creates and funds indigent defense systems. An indi-
gent person does not have the luxury of choosing his own attorney.
The poor person has an attorney assigned to him by the state, and
the state ultimately determines whether it will demand that the
assigned attorney possesses the experience and skills commensu-
rate with the demands of capital representation; whether it will
burden the defense attorney with a caseload so excessive that it is
impossible to discharge the responsibilities associated with capital
defense; and whether it will provide the money necessary to assure
that the defense attorney can properly defend the case.581 By fail-
ing to adequately fund its indigent defense system, the state cre-
ates the conditions that foreclose the development of a meaningful
defense. 2  In doing so, the state interferes with defense counsel's
ability to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing, easing the government's burden of proving guilt and the
propriety of the death penalty.
It is easier to comprehend the significance of the state's direct
role in creating this systemic defect-and the arbitrariness in
death sentencing that results from it-by examining a case where
such a direct role was arguably absent. The last major systemic
challenge to the death penalty passed upon by the Supreme Court
578. Id. at 691; see also id. at 706, 724-25.
579. See Mounts, The Right to Counsel, supra note 287, at 221.
580. Margulies, supra note 213, at 724-25; see also id. at 706-07.
581. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1863; cf. Polk County v. Dod-
son, 454 U.S. 312, 332 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The county's control over the size
of and funding for the public defender's office, as well as over the number of potential cli-
ents, effectively dictates the size of an individual attorney's caseload and influences substan-
tially the amount of time the attorney is able to devote to each case.").
582. See Citron, supra note 215, at 488 (explaining that "the damage caused by inade-
quate funding results from state action at an earlier stage in the process-the legislature's
failure to allocate sufficient funding for the indigent defense system").
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was raised in McCleskey v. Kemp.58 3 In that case, challenges to the
operation of capital punishment in Georgia under the equal protec-
tion clause and the Eighth Amendment were based on an elaborate
statistical study showing that the death penalty was imposed more
frequently on black defendants and defendants who killed white
victims than on white defendants and defendants killing black vic-
tims. 5 4 These claims were rejected because the petitioner could
not establish that the discriminatory patterns revealed by the sta-
tistical study were intended by the state. 85 The Court was disin-
clined to interfere with the jury's discretion to refrain from sen-
tencing a death-eligible defendant to death, even if the exercise of
mercy might have been influenced by considerations of race,5 88 and
the Court was reluctant to hold the state answerable for the "un-
known and perhaps unknowable" range of "qualities of human na-
ture and varieties of human experience" that influence the deci-
sions of jurors587 when the state itself does not directly inject
improper considerations into the proceedings.8
In a legal challenge to the arbitrariness traceable to resource
deprivation, each of the points supporting the result in McCleskey
can be distinguished. There is no question that the inadequate re-
sources provided by the states for indigent capital defense result
directly from policy decisions made by the states. Remedying the
effects of resource deprivation would not interfere in any way with
the discretion traditionally left with the jury to act mercifully and
refrain from sentencing to death one who may "objectively" de-
serve it. Most importantly, resource deprivation and its effects on
death sentencing remain within the control of the states. In Mc-
Cleskey, the arbitrariness identified by the statistical study was
caused by an extralegal factor-societal racism-that, in the
Court's view, was largely beyond the control of the state. The
Court refused to hold the state responsible for the influence of ra-
cism on sentencing decisions if the state's legal structures are con-
583. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
584. Id. at 286-87. See supra note 395.
585. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-99, 313.
586. Id. at 303-13; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (concluding that isolated instances where juries show mercy in refraining
from rendering death sentences do not render the death sentences of other defendants un-
constitutional if defendants "were sentenced under a system that does not create a substan-
tial risk of arbitrariness or caprice").
587. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).
588. Id. at 313 (stating that despite imperfections in the administration of the death
penalty, "our consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees are met when 'the
mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to
make it as fair as possible'" (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
454 [Vol. 43
UNDERFUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE
structed to minimize the influence of extralegal factors. In con-
trast, the state is directly responsible for-and able to
prevent-the arbitrariness caused by resource deprivation. More-
over, resource deprivation is a defect that the state can cure; the
influences of societal racial attitudes may not be.
In sum, the arbitrariness in death sentencing resulting from
resource deprivation is on different constitutional footing than the
arbitrariness at issue in McCleskey. By refusing to provide ade-
quate resources to indigent defense services, the states are directly
responsible for injecting an illegitimate extralegal factor into the
death-sentencing process. In order to eliminate this improper influ-
ence from the capital punishment system, the courts must act af-
firmatively to remedy the effects of resource deprivation.
D. The Remedy
In most capital punishment states, every poor person who has
been sentenced to death or who awaits trial for a crime punishable
by death has suffered or will suffer a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights because of inadequately funded indigent de-
fense systems. For those who have yet to be tried, it is theoretically
possible that legislatures could act to prevent this violation, but
the political and economic forces that created the indigent defense
crisis in the first place make legislative action unlikely.589 It is
probable that the only way that legislatures will remedy this crisis
is if they are spurred to action by the judiciary.59 0 Moreover, judi-
cial action to prevent future constitutional violations will not be
enough. There are hundreds of inmates on the nation's death rows
who have been denied the protections promised by the Eighth
Amendment. The state should not be authorized to take the life of
someone who has not received a trial in which the risk of the arbi-
trary and capricious imposition of the death penalty has been
minimized.
Ultimately, courts will need to decide at what point the fund-
ing of indigent defense becomes so deficient that the constitutional
rights of indigents have been violated. Currently, this is not a close
question. The funding provided in the jurisdictions discussed in
this Article is so inadequate that there can be no serious doubt
that the constitutional rights of every indigent facing the death
penalty in those jurisdictions have been violated. If legislatures re-
589. See supra part H.E.
590. Most likely, judicial intervention must come from the federal bench. Popularly
elected state judges face the same political and economic forces that discourage legislatures
from acting on behalf of those charged with capital murder. See supra part H.E.
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spond to judicial pressure, however, the question may become
more difficult. This Article has offered a conservative estimate of
what should be spent on capital defense, 591 and that estimate may
serve as a guide in judging the adequacy of defense funding in in-
dividual cases. Nonetheless, the constitutional inquiry is whether
the funding was adequate to assure that the defendant received
the protections contemplated by the Supreme Court's capital pun-
ishment jurisprudence. Given the intense demands of capital de-
fense, it is likely that this constitutional minimum can be achieved
only by funding indigent defense under a formula similar to that
used for calculating the attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs in
civil rights cases. 592 Under that approach, the states would be re-
quired to pay for attorneys, paralegals, and investigators at the
hourly rates typically charged paying clients within the community
in which the defendant is tried.59 3 Compensation cannot be limited
by artificial fee caps or the unreasonable exercise of discretion by
local judges. In addition, the states must be required to pay for the
experts needed to properly prepare a defense in a capital case.
The remedy for defendants who have been denied an ade-
quately funded defense is straightforward. The courts must pre-
vent the execution of any poor person sentenced to death under a
system likely to produce arbitrary results.59 4 The constitutional vi-
olation described in this Article can be remedied only by a per se
591. See supra part LC.
592. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1983 provides that the prevailing party in a civil
rights action may recover a reasonable attorney's fee, expenses, and, in certain actions, ex-
pert fees. Id. § 1988(b) & (c).
593. The Supreme Court has stated that a "reasonable fee" under section 1983 is usu-
ally one that is "in line with prevailing market rates." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
n.11 (1984). There is a strong presumption that the "lodestar"--the product derived by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a case by an hourly rate typically
charged by attorneys of like skill and experience in the community-is the appropriate fee.
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Paralegal time may be recovered if it is
the common practice in the community to bill for such time. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.
274, 288 (1989). Out-of-pocket expenses, including investigative fees, are also recoverable.
Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (4th Cir. 1986); Bradley v. School Dist. of the City of
Richmond, 53 F.R.D. 28, 44 (E.D. Va. 1971). This formula is certainly relevant in determin-
ing the compensation that should be provided to appointed attorneys in capital cases. More-
over, it should provide a benchmark for determining an adequate level of funding for public
defender offices. In this regard, it is significant to note that a nonprofit legal services organi-
zation is entitled to recover fees in civil rights cases calculated at the same market rates
available to private attorneys, and the same rule should apply in determining the level of
funding that should be provided nonprofit defender offices. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 886.
594. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1883 (arguing that "[s]o long
as juries and judges are deprived of critical information and the Bill of Rights is ignored in
the most emotionally and politically charged cases due to deficient legal representation, the
courts should not be authorized to impose the extreme and irrevocable penalty of death").
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rule requiring vacation of all death sentences imposed on indigent
defendants in jurisdictions that failed to provide reasonable com-
pensation and investigative and expert support to the attorney
representing that indigent at trial or on appeal.
This remedy is not compelled because everyone on death row
would have avoided their fate had they been provided the sort of
defense contemplated by the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.595 Rather, it is compelled because it is impossible to
identify with any reliability which outcomes were and are affected
by resource deprivation. The level of resource deprivation dis-
cussed here has destroyed the adversarial character of the trials in
which these death sentences were obtained. "When a criminal pro-
ceeding 'loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries,'
the harm done a defendant is as certain as it is difficult to de-
fine." 5 8 The prejudice that results from resource deprivation per-
meates the entire death sentencing process. Its reach cannot be
readily ascertained, and its effect cannot be isolated9 7 : "The insid-
iousness of overburdening defense counsel is that it can result in
concealing from the courts, and particularly from the appellate
courts, the nature and extent of damage that is done to
defendants."5 "9
Under such circumstances, it is inappropriate to "allow courts
to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." 59 9 If procedural protections break down, proof
that impermissible influences actually affected the sentence in the
individual case in which the challenge is raised is not required.600
The nature of the death-sentencing process does not lend itself to
after-the-fact reassessment by appellate courts. Rather, the de-
fendant is entitled to a full trial in which the state is put to the
evidentiary rigors of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant committed a capital crime, and of convincing the sen-
tencer that death is the appropriate "rational, moral response" to
595. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 3 (asserting that "the system has improved since
Furman and it is clear that even though many of the death sentences imposed since 1973
are arbitrary or racially discriminatory, all the death sentences imposed since then cannot
be so characterized").
596. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 848 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984)).
597. See Margulies, supra note 213, at 674 n.2. See also Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S.
249 (1988); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978).
598. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984).
599. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that per se rule of rever-
sal appropriate when Sixth Amendment violation affects entire representation of criminal
defendant).
600. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 323-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the legally relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Inmates on death row who have never received the quality of
defense contemplated by the Eighth Amendment should not be de-
nied relief from that constitutional violation because of the proce-
dural status of their cases. For example, the mere fact that habeas
petitioners have failed to challenge the constitutionality of re-
source deprivation in earlier proceedings should not preclude re-
lief. The Supreme Court has recognized that "cause" for a proce-
dural defaults exists if "some objective factor external to the
defense impeded" compliance with procedural rules.601 This factor
is present when "the factual or legal basis for [the] claim was not
reasonably available to counsel" at the time of the default. 02 Since
the courts have not previously ruled on an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the effects of resource deprivation, the novel "legal
basis" for the claim should be sufficient to establish "cause" for
procedural defaults. Moreover, the Eighth Amendment violation
described here is so integral to the integrity of the death-sentenc-
ing process that defendants who receive death sentences through
that process have been denied "fundamental fairness" and were
thus prejudiced by the Eighth Amendment violation.603 While the
Court has imposed significant hurdles to habeas relief when it an-
nounces "new rules" not in effect before a petitioner's direct ap-
peal was exhausted, 04 one of the exceptions to the Court's non-
retroactivity rule would be applicable. That exception applies to
"'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the funda-
mental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."60 5 Again,
the magnitude of the constitutional violation attributable to re-
source deprivation justifies the application of this exception.
601. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
602. Id. at 488 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). See also McCleskey, 499
U.S. at 493.
603. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 494. For essentially the same reason, a conviction and
death sentence obtained in a system in which adequate resources are denied defense counsel
should not be subject to harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court's harmless error cases
distinguish between "trial" errors and "structural" errors. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 290-91 (1991). The latter, which comprise "structural defect[s] affect[ing] the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
itself," cannot be deemed harmless under any circumstances, because the integrity of the
entire trial process is called into question. Id. at 291. In other words, the trial has failed to
"reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no crim-
inal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
604. See supra notes 421-25 and accompanying text.
605. Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (citing Teague v' Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311,
reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989)). The Court has identified Gideon v. Wainwright as an
example of such a landmark decision. Id.
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CONCLUSION
There have been several efforts to compare the cost of enforc-
ing the death penalty with the cost of imprisoning a murderer for
the rest of his life. These studies have consistently concluded that
"a criminal justice system with the death penalty is inordinately
more expensive than a criminal justice system without the death
penalty."' 06 These studies have assumed, however, that the states
would bear the cost of a defense that conforms with modern con-
stitutional requirements. Yet nearly all of the states that vigor-
ously enforce the death penalty have found a foolproof method of
controlling the cost of capital punishment: they have refused to
pay for a meaningful defense. This allows state governments to re-
tain the death penalty while avoiding the political repercussions
that would be associated with imposing higher taxes or sacrificing
other public services in order to pay for it.
But this strategy has not been without a price. The deplorable
underfunding of capital defense services that has been documented
in this Article undermines the very legitimacy of the death penalty
itself as it has been administered in most jurisdictions in the
United States. The effects of resource deprivation pervade the en-
tire process of determining who shall be chosen to die for their
crimes, manifesting itself most dramatically in the pretrial investi-
gation and legal research that goes undone, and in the expert assis-
tance that is never provided. It can be said with confidence that
most indigent defendants who have been sentenced to death re-
ceived severely substandard representation, and that this pattern
will continue unless the courts intercede.
The reluctance of courts to confront directly the injustices
caused by the underfunding of the defense in capital punishment
cases stems in large part from the enormity of the capital defense
crisis. Tackling it would be a daunting and largely thankless task.
The individuals adversely affected by this crisis-those accused of
aggravated murder-are the most hated and least politically pow-
erful in the country, and political actors, including judges, are not
highly motivated to make unpopular decisions that would benefit
them. Moreover, many judges no doubt fear that any substantial
intervention on their part to address this crisis could threaten the
entire criminal justice system in America. After all, studies docu-
menting the effects of underfunded defense services on the quality
606. CAIrrAL LossEs, supra note 111, at 12. See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 111;
Garey, supra note 53, at 1270; Barry Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRm L.
BuLL. 69 (1978); Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 171; see also COmsmrrrE TO STnDY THE
DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND, supra note 171, at 5.
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of indigent representation date virtually from the Supreme Court's
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.
In the end, none of this justifies acquiescence to the status
quo. The enormity of an injustice simply cannot relieve us of our
obligation to redress it. The political unpopularity of the victims of
the injustice does not relieve us of our moral responsibility for it.
And, as has been demonstrated here, avenues exist for constructing
a remedy that is limited to capital cases and which would not im-
pact the operation of the criminal justice system in non-capital
cases. If we are going to have the death penalty, the states should
be required to commit enough resources to the system to assure
that arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty is mini-
mized. Until that commitment is made, the words of Justice Bren-
nan should continue to torment the national conscience: "[T]he
way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of
moral commitment among the living. '607
607. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43
